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north_malaysian
06-18-2009, 01:55 AM
Leader of Sunni minority in Majlis expresses concern about Ahmadinejad’s Reelection

Saturday 6 June 2009

Saman Rasoulpour

Rooz spoke with the leader of the Sunni minority faction in Iran’s national assembly, the Majlis, Jalal Mahmoudzadeh, the representative from Mahabad. He declared that “Kurdish and Sunni representatives in the Majlis will be voting for reformist candidates,” adding that “concerns over incumbent president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s reelection cannot be hidden.”

Rooz : Mr. Mahmoudzadeh, what is the official position of the Kurdish and Sunni representatives in the Majlis on the upcoming presidential elections?

Jalal Mahmoudzadeh: As a faction representing the Sunnis in the Majlis, we have very specific expectations from the new president. These can be categorized into four groups: Economic, political, cultural and social. We have announced that any candidate who supports our rights and demands, and who pays attention to our needs the most , while at the same time who puts the un-implemented articles of the constitution relating to the rights of minorities will certainly receive our votes in the upcoming election. We shall support the candidate who does not ignore the Sunni citizens of this country and who promises to use Sunnis in the senior, intermediate and mid level management. We will support any one who promises to diminish the national and religious bias against us. For example, there are over a million and half Sunni residents in the capital of Iran, the greater Tehran, who do not have even one mosque of their own.

Rooz: Have any of the candidates specifically supported your calls?

Mahmoudzadeh: We have met with both Mr. Karroubi and Mr. Mousavi. They are closest to our demands. Mr. Karroubi is closer to the demands of the Kurds and Mousavi follows suit. It of course appears that Mr. Mousavi has a better chance to win the race and the Sunni minority group in the Majlis is leaning towards supporting him.

Rooz: Even some of the Kurdish opposition political groups who has boycotted earlier elections are now calling for people to participate this time, and have implicitly supported Mr. Karroubi’s programs. Why?

Mahmoudzadeh: This is an important issue and it shows that Mr. Karroubi’s statements and programs are closer to the interests of the minorities. I think boycotting the elections does not solve our problems and is in fact against our interests. Even if we gain the minimum through participation, it is better than getting nothing. We are not saying the current candidates are extremely good. You too know that as Kurds and Sunnis, we only have the right to vote, not be candidates, and this I believe is unjust and un-democratic. But even under the circumstances, we can be content with accomplishing even the minimum, and therefore we must participate in the election and vote for any of the candidates whose views and programs are closest to our demands.

Rooz: At the same time, what is your view and those of other Kurdish representatives in the Majlis on the performance of the ninth (current) administration and the possibility of Mr. Ahmadinejad being re-elected? Some Kurdish civil and political activists have expressed their concern about the re-election of Mr. Ahmadinejad.

Mahmoudzadeh: Concern about his re-election is real and cannot be denied or hidden. The reality is that social, political and cultural activists have suffered pressure in respect to civil, political, and press freedoms exerted by the ninth administration and we have witnessed the closure of publications, journals and news outlets for writers and thinkers in place thus limiting such forums and completing closing some. On the other hand, during Mr. Ahmadinejad’s presidency we also saw his administration’s efforts to take control of Sunni religious schools. This issue has pained Sunni citizens to the heart and we as Sunni minority representatives have stood against laws on this from the very first day till today and fortunately this has not been implemented in any town as yet and we will not allow it to be implemented in the future. This and other pressures on the Sunnis have given rise to concerns among this minority. The concerns regarding Mr. Ahmadinejad’s re-election are over these issues. Which is also why Kurdish citizens have shown the green light to reformist candidates.

Rooz

http://www.metransparent.com/spip.ph...e=7036&lang=en
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north_malaysian
06-19-2009, 03:15 AM
bump
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roohani.doctor
06-19-2009, 03:32 AM
Reading the above post,it seems as if some Sunni's aren't too happy?

Question - Are Muslims generally happy that Ahmadinejad got re-elected? Or is it a sunni/shia thing where one is happy and the other isn't? I am speaking in general.

One of my Iranian Muslim friend is ANNOYED that he won. I know next to nothing about this sort of thing and am trying to learn more now so can someone please let me know the basic idea of why he is good for the Islamic population or why he is not?
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north_malaysian
06-19-2009, 07:10 AM
I am a Mousavi supporter..... he prayed in a Sunni mosque led by a Sunni Imam... he promised to build the first Sunni mosque in Tehran as now our 1,000,000 Sunni brethren could only perform Friday prayers in embassies...
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north_malaysian
06-19-2009, 07:20 AM
ETHNIC POLITICS AND THE TENTH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

By Kaveh-Cyrus SanandajiMiddle East Center, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford

As the Iranian presidential election rapidly approaches, the frontrunners – incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mohsen Rezai, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi – are tirelessly campaigning across the country. Reformists Mousavi and Karroubi, in particular, are competing intensely for support among Iran’s large, but often neglected, ethnic and religious minority voting blocs. Although Karroubi initially received the endorsement of several minority groups, the tide has turned in favor of Mousavi in recent weeks as his extensive campaigning appears to have demonstrated a sincere empathy for the welfare of these groups.

Iran is an ethnically and religiously diverse country, but its diversity has been subverted repeatedly by the state as a means both to present and preserve national unity. Iran’s leaders, both during the Pahlavi dynasty and later following the Islamic revolution, have long feared that minorities, predominantly located in the peripheral provinces, pose a threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Past attempts to reassert ethno-linguistic identity through local dress or language have been opposed as explicit efforts to undermine the state. Although these groups—including, among others, Arabs, Kurds, Baluchis, Turkmen, Azeris and Lurs—comprise roughly half of Iran’s population, their local needs have been overlooked by successive governments, entrenching political, socio-cultural and economic grievances.

Mohammad Khatami’s landslide presidential victory in 1997 and the corresponding rise of the reform movement offered peripheral ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious minorities the promise of greater regional autonomy and more equitable rights, such as the freedoms of expression and association. Though the establishment of local councils was included in Article 7 of the 1989 constitution, it was only during Khatami’s presidency that this measure was enforced. In 1999, newly-formed elected provincial, city, district and village councils were charged with addressing the day-to-day welfare needs of their respective constituencies, effectively affording peripheral minorities more control over their local and regional affairs.

Not until the 2005 presidential election, however, did candidates begin to address openly the needs of ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious minorities in national arenas. In particular, Mostafa Moin and Karroubi repeatedly made statements promising to respect equal rights, incorporate more ethnic minorities in government positions and increase the quality of non-Persian television and radio broadcasts. Although reformists Moin, Mohsen Mehralizadeh and Karroubi received a combined majority of votes in Western and Eastern Azerbaijan, Golestan, Hormozgan, Ilam, Kermanshah, Kurdestan, Lurestan and Sistan/Baluchestan, none was able individually to secure enough votes to proceed to the second round of elections, which Ahmadinejad ultimately won.

Since becoming president in 2005, Ahmadinejad’s emphasis on renewing early revolutionary ideology has led to the subversion of regional identities in favor of a unified revolutionary, Islamic identity. Tehran’s reluctance to continue granting regional autonomy, while attributable to several factors, is most likely a result of the state’s framing of the minority question in security terms. Despite Ahmadinejad’s much publicized provincial tours, he has prioritized efforts to repress “domestic terrorists” over addressing regional needs. Heightened Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) activity in the peripheral areas, particularly in the South-Eastern region dominated by Baluchis, has dove-tailed with the abrogation of local council authorities, provoking a backlash against the state – including a rising number of mass protests and violent attacks against IRGC installations and oil pipelines – which threatens regime stability.

The resurgence in minority grievances has recently brought ethnic politics to the fore with an unprecedented sense of urgency, and the regime has taken steps to assuage perceptions of disenfranchisement or repression shared by ethnic minorities. For example, in a recent trip to Sanandaj, the capital of Kurdistan province, Mehr News published photos of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei inspecting troops at an IRGC base – striking only because several units donned traditional Kurdish garb. During this same trip, Khamenei met with local leaders to hear their grievances and called for renewed investments to develop Kurdistan’s limited infrastructure. Though anecdotal, these actions indicate a shift in the regime’s approach toward ethnic minority rights and the improvement of their conditions.

The discourse on ethnic politics has also drastically expanded during the 2009 presidential campaigns. Mousavi in particular has been campaigning in the minority-dominated provinces of Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, Kermanshah, Mazandaran and Golestan, among others. Beyond the standard assurances of greater minority incorporation in government and promises to respect minority rights, which are echoed by Karroubi and Rezai, Mousavi has proposed unprecedented, detailed policies to address minority grievances.

At numerous campaign rallies and in discussions with ethnic and religious minority leaders, Mousavi has criticized Ahmadinejad’s administration. Stating that Iran’s diversity should be embraced, Mousavi declared that, “throughout history, Iran’s minorities have lived in peaceful coexistence, so we should not deal with them as a security problem.” Moreover, citing Article 19 of the constitution – which emphasizes the equal value of human beings regardless of religion or ethnicity – Mousavi has stated he does not believe there should be any special limitations on minorities in the Islamic Republic.

In addition to campaign rhetoric, public demonstrations of respect for and dedication to minority groups have distinguished Mousavi from his rivals. Aftab News reported that during a trip to Kermanshah, Mousavi, who is a devout Shi’a, not only prayed in a Sunni mosque but also followed a Sunni Imam to demonstrate his respect for Sunnis. In a conversation with Molavi Abdol-Hamid – one of the spiritual leaders of the Sunni community in Iran – Mousavi also promised to prepare a national plan to address and resolve the Sunni community’s numerous grievances, including constructing the first Sunni mosque in Tehran.

Mousavi has also reached out to ethno-linguistic minorities. At a recent rally in Azerbaijan, he stated that in return for committing to the revolution many years ago, the government must show more sensitivity to the local needs of ethnic Azeris. Moreover, Mousavi, who is an ethnic Azeri himself, declared “I am the son of Azerbaijan” to cheering crowds at a campaign rally in which he reportedly delivered his entire speech in Azeri Turkish. In a state whose official language is Persian, it is almost unheard of for a national politician to speak in another language in a public forum.

Past studies of voting behavior in Iran suggest the peripheral minorities are most likely to vote for one of the reformist candidates – Karroubi or Mousavi. These voters respond not only to ethnic ties, but also to active campaigning. So although Karroubi, an ethnic Lur, will likely carry Lorestan and Mousavi, an ethnic Azeri, will likely carry East and West Azerbaijan, the remaining 13 minority-dominated provinces are up for grabs. Karroubi won many of these provinces in the 2005 election, but Mousavi’s extensive campaigning seems to be successfully drawing the endorsements of notable minority groups. Mousavi has received significant help from former president Khatami, who is actively campaigning on his behalf in the provinces, effectively enabling Mousavi to cover twice as much ground as Karroubi.

To remain competitive in the provinces, Karroubi must intensify his campaign efforts and focus on specific policies to address their regional needs. But even if he increases his visits and develops clear proposals, Karroubi still must overcome perceptions that he may be a political opportunist and that his promises are just designed to capture the prevailing wind.

Minorities do not expect that either reformist will have the political capital to implement the full range of their promises. However, based upon the experience of the last four years, they do believe their overall condition is likely to be far better under a reformist president than not. As realist voters, minority groups are therefore more likely to support the reformist candidate they believe has the best chance of winning. With Mousavi increasingly being touted as the frontrunner, Karroubi’s chance of retaining minority support is steadily decreasing.

Published on May 21, 2009

http://www.ndi.org/node/15471
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north_malaysian
06-19-2009, 07:31 AM
The Sunni Vote in Iran's Election Who Would Iranian Sunnis Vote for?


By Fathi al-Maraghy Expert - Iranian Politics

The four presidential candidates – Mehdi Karroubi, Mirhossein Mousavi, Mohsen Rezaei, and Ahmadinejad – have been competing for the Sunni vote in the election set for next Friday in an unprecedented way. Each candidate has made a big number of promises to Iran’s Sunni minority; however, the candidate who has been most active in this regard is Mehdi Karroubi.

Karroubi has come to be known as the protector of Sunnis after the big number of visits he made to governorates that have a majority of Sunni residents, such as Sistan, Kurdistan, and Kermanshah. Also, he has made a special statement about the rights of ethnic and religious minorities.

Although the Iranian society is a demographic mosaic that consists of religious minorities, such as Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Baha’is, sectarian minorities, such as Sunnis, Isma’ili Shiites, Zaidi Shiites, and ethnic minorities, such as Azeris, Baluchis, Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmens. And there are also the Persian ethnic majority and the Twelver Shiite religious majority.

However, Sunnis in Iran can be considered an oppressed minority.

The Persecution of Sunnis

There are various types of persecution practiced against Sunnis, the most continuous and severe of which is the one arising from the theory upon which the Iranian political system is based. Those who do not believe in the Guardianship of the Jurist theory are not allowed to assume any political or governmental position or to be part of the intellectual elite in Iran.

And since the Guardianship of the Jurist theory is a product Shiite thought, it is unlikely that any Sunni embraces it. As a result, since the Islamic Revolution, there has been an obstacle in the way of the integration of the Sunni minority in the Iranian society.

Iran’s Sunnis benefitted from the relatively liberal political environment under Khatami.

The four presidential candidates – Mehdi Karroubi, Mirhossein Mousavi, Mohsen Rezaei, and Ahmadinejad – have been competing for the Sunni vote in the election set for next Friday in an unprecedented way. Each candidate has made a big number of promises to Iran’s Sunni minority; however, the candidate who has been most active in this regard is Mehdi Karroubi.

Karroubi has come to be known as the protector of Sunnis after the big number of visits he made to governorates that have a majority of Sunni residents, such as Sistan, Kurdistan, and Kermanshah. Also, he has made a special statement about the rights of ethnic and religious minorities.

Although the Iranian society is a demographic mosaic that consists of religious minorities, such as Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Baha’is, sectarian minorities, such as Sunnis, Isma’ili Shiites, Zaidi Shiites, and ethnic minorities, such as Azeris, Baluchis, Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmens. And there are also the Persian ethnic majority and the Twelver Shiite religious majority.

However, Sunnis in Iran can be considered an oppressed minority.

The Persecution of Sunnis


There are various types of persecution practiced against Sunnis, the most continuous and severe of which is the one arising from the theory upon which the Iranian political system is based. Those who do not believe in the Guardianship of the Jurist theory are not allowed to assume any political or governmental position or to be part of the intellectual elite in Iran.

And since the Guardianship of the Jurist theory is a product Shiite thought, it is unlikely that any Sunni embraces it. As a result, since the Islamic Revolution, there has been an obstacle in the way of the integration of the Sunni minority in the Iranian society.

Such political persecution is stated explicitly in the constitution of the Islamic Republic, which states that the president must be a Shiite Iranian who believes in the Guardianship of the Jurist theory. Consequently, throughout the past 30 years, Iran has witnessed neither a Sunni candidate running for president, nor a single Sunni minister. Moreover, no Sunni has been appointed as a governor of any of the governorates with Sunni majorities.

Thus, the persecution of Sunnis in Iran has been associated with the articles of the constitution.

The persecution of the Sunni minority in Iran can be found at the heart of Shiite rituals; Sunnis are weekly humiliated during what is known as Shiite prayers that are recited in collective rituals. These prayers contain curses of both contemporary and ancient Sunnis. Such explicit expression of hatred has put the Sunni minority in Iran in an inferior status.

Sunnis constitute around 20 percent of Iran’s 70 million residents, and they belong to different ethnic groups, such as Kurds, Balushis, Turkemans, Arabs, and Talishis.

Iran’s Sunni minority has faced systematic oppression; its leaders, such Ahmed Mufti Zadeh and Sheikh Ali Dahwary, were jailed and assassinated. Also, the authorities have demolished a number of Sunni mosques as a form of collective punishment.

Sunni religious schools do not receive an official recognition, local TV stations in governorates with Sunni majorities are forced to air Shiite missionary programs, and Sunni azan (call for prayer) is not allowed to be made.

The abovementioned facts about the persecution of the Sunni minority in Iran is a systematic process that has been going on since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, but still it can be understood in the Middle Eastern context, in which most majorities oppress minorities.

However, the question that poses itself now is about the increasing importance of the Sunni vote in Iran.

Sunnis’ Electoral Weight

The increasing importance of the Sunni vote can be attributed to two factors: 1) the unity of Sunni voters under the leadership of religious scholars and Sunni MPs; and 2) the increasing regional and international pressure on the Iran, and the system’s need to quell the anger of the residents of border areas, the majority of which are Sunnis.

It has been widely known that Sunnis abstain from participating in elections because of their disbelief in the possibility of obtaining their rights through the elected political bodies. Nevertheless, such an attitude started to change with the ascendance of the Reformists to power. In 1997, Sunnis voted for Khatami in huge numbers, which resulted in a phenomenal turnout in the presidential election.

Also, the seventh and eighth parliamentary elections witnessed the highest turnouts in the history of the Islamic Republic.

Iran’s Sunnis benefitted from the relatively liberal political environment under Khatami; they revived the role of the Union of Iranian Sunni Scholars, they strengthened the ties between the various Sunni groups in the border areas, they established radio stations and newspapers, and they revived the role of student unions and women’s organizations.

Thus, the presidential hopefuls of the 2005 election realized the electoral weight of the Sunni vote, and the first to recognize such a change was Mustafa Moein, who competed with Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mehdi Karroubi, and Ahmadinejad.

If elected, Moein pledged to appoint the first Sunni minister in the history of the Islamic Republic. As a result, he won 874,000 votes, 479,000 of which were from the governorates of Sistan and Baluchistan. These two governorates are usually regarded as an indication of the electoral preferences of Sunnis because most of their residents belong to the Sunni minority.

Notably, Sunnis have more than two million votes divided among Kurdistan, Khorasan, West Azerbejan, Gilan, Gilstan, and Ahvaz. However, because those governorates are inhibited by both Sunnis and Shiites, it is difficult to know the electoral preferences of Sunnis in them.

The votes won by Mustafa Moein in the 2005 election made it clear that the Sunni social leadership was able to convince Sunnis to rally behind the candidate who addressed their problems.

Furthermore, the Sunni masses showed an increasing tendency to follow their leadership when Moein lost the presidential race and a second round was held between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani. Although Rafsanjani is unpopular among Sunnis, particularly those living in coastal areas because they were harmed by his investment projects, 155,000 voters from Sistan voted for Rafsanjani.

External Pressure

The other reason behind the increasing significance of the Sunni vote is the regional and international pressure on the Iranian system, and the government’s need to pacify the mainly Sunni residents of border areas. It is important to note that Sunnis in Iran are concentrated in the border areas while the Shiite Persian majority lives in the big cities.

The emergence of a self-governed region in Iraqi Kurdistan, the independent state of Turkmenistan, and Baluchi armed groups in Pakistan that cooperate with Al-Qaeda next to Iran’s border areas have struck fear into the Islamic Republic’s leadership, urging it to reconsider the way treated the Sunni minority. Thus, need for an increased space for maneuvering with regard to regional developments and external pressure has urged the system to adopt a more lenient approach towards Sunnis.

The ascendance of Obama to power and the changing international political environment necessitates stabilizing the situation in the Sunni Baluchi areas because the international silence about the government’s oppression will not last for long. So, each presidential hopeful has been attempting to attract the biggest number of Sunni votes.

During his visit to the city of Zahedan, Mehdi Karroubi met with Molavi Abdul-Hamid – one of the most prominent Sunni figures in Iran, and announced that if elected, he would revitalize the constitutional articles that protect minorities’ rights.

Also, he has pledged to end persecution against them on the political, economic, and cultural levels, to allow them to assume senior government positions and to use their local languages, and to eliminate all the obstacles in the way of Sunnis who aspire to study in prestigious Iranian universities.

Karroubi has not undertaken to appoint a Sunni minister in his government. However, he has promised to do what is more than this: putting an end to the security-oriented approach towards Sunnis and considering them Iranian citizens rather than agents for foreign powers.

Who Would Sunnis Vote for?

Mehdi Karroubi’s attempts to appeal to Sunni voters have urged other candidates to follow the same path. Mirhossein Mousavi visited the Kurdish city of Mahabad, declaring that the first thing he would do if elected is proposing a bill to the parliament to increase the powers of local councils.

Yet, what distinguishes Mousavi from Karoubi is that the former makes only the promises he can make. All the pledges Iran’s former prime minister has made are part of his general electoral program, such as the public housing project and eliminating corruption.

Significantly, Mousavi has undertaken to build the first big mosque for Iranian Sunnis, who make the Friday prayer in foreign embassies.

After visiting Mahabad, he went to Sistan and met with Molavi Abdul-Hamid, who has become a magnet for presidential candidates who aspire to Sunni votes. Since Mousavi’s visit, rumors haven going around about Abdul-Hamid abandoning Karroubi and supporting Mousavi in the upcoming election.

It is totally improbable that Sunnis vote for Ahmadinejad, who started his tenure with a sense of bitterment about their support for his competitors. And his intelligence background has dominated his approach towards them; under Ahmadinejad, oppression against the Sunnis of Baluchistan heightened.

After Karroubi and Mousavi’s visits to Sunni areas, Mujtabi Thamara Hashemi, head of Ahmadinejad’s electoral committee, went to Zahedan to meet with Abdul-Hamid, who refused to see him at the beginning. After the meeting, Molavi announced that he would not support Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad has failed at appeasing Sunnis during his last year in office by creating the position of the Advisor for Sunni Affairs because it was too late already to contain the Sunni anger against him.

On the other hand, Mohsen Rezaei has not made any effort whatsoever to attract Sunni voters because he knows that this would be wasted effort; it is illogical that Sunnis vote for him after what they experienced with a former Revolutionary Guards officer.

Thus, most of the Sunni votes in Iran will go to Mirhossein Mousavi and a small portion of them will go to Karroubi. And if a second round is held between Karroubi and another Conservative candidate, they will vote for Karroubi.

All in all, Sunnis in Iran have managed to pass the weakness period they have lived for 30 years, and they have come to have their civil society organizations that are politically active. Despite all the constraints, Sunni voters have become able to unify their stance, forming an electoral weight that cannot be ignored. Molavi Abdul-Hamid has become a significant leader of the Iranian Sunni minority, who is capable of striking a balance between the different candidates in Iran’s upcoming election.

What is even more important is that Sunnis in Iran have managed to improve their status without the support of any external forces.

Dr. Fathi al-Maraghy is an expert on the Iranian Political System in al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. He is one of the founders of Mokhtarat Iraniyya (Iranian Selections) publication. Al-Maraghy, who travelled to Iran several times, speaks Farsi fluently.

http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/S...rs%2FMAELayout



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afzalaung
06-19-2009, 05:19 PM
Why are we turning this into another reason for a sunni-shia conflict. isnt it enough with the differences we've got?
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north_malaysian
06-19-2009, 11:50 PM
LOL... it has nothing to do with Sunni-Shia conflict....

It just that Mousavi and Karroubi promised to be tolerant to the Sunni minorities... and both of them are devout Shia Muslims...

If these people managed to be the president of Iran, they'll make a very wonderful tolerant world between both Sunnis and Shiis...

Ahmadinejad? I dont think that he think that the 20% Sunnis are important...
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Sampharo
06-20-2009, 07:16 AM
Shia (with the exception of Zaidi Jaafari fiqh followers and some minority sects) has hating and ****ing sahaba and those who follow Sunnah to be part of their rituals. It will be very hard to bridge differences with that.
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north_malaysian
06-20-2009, 11:22 PM
It started as "Mousavi vs. Ahmadinejad", now it became "Ayatollah Rafsanjani vs. Ayatollah Ali Khameinei"...
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mohsen1985
06-23-2009, 01:33 PM
Well, I live in Tehran and I don't know a lot about the Sunni inhabited areas of Iran, how they live, if they have any problems or not, etc... but I know that Mr. Karoubi had promised to appoint Sunni leaders (governors, mayors, etc...) for the Sunni inhabited areas. In Ahmadinejad's government there's Shia' leaders for the 100% Sunni inhabited areas.

Anyways, these arguments just raise unneeded and unnecessary hatred/conflict between the two sects, which shouldn't exist in the first place.


In my opinion I'm a Muslim first, Allah is my lord, Prophet Mohammad (pbuh) is my prophet, and the Holy Quran is my book, being a Shia or a Sunni is just more "details" into religion. Any Shia thinking he/she is better than Sunnis or vice versa is just plain ignorance and the influence of the enemies of Islam trying to divide the Muslims.
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nocturnal
06-23-2009, 04:58 PM
Sunni politicians shouldn't be capitalizing on these election disturbances to advance their own political interests. Ahmadinejad has never been hostile to Sunnis or any other minority sect and in his speech after his re-election, stated unequivocally that Iranians are one people Sunni/Shia/Muslims/Non-Muslims.

I think its quite strange that the opposition, who have cast aspersions on the integrity of this election are posturing in this irresponsible way, when their own reformist icon like Khatami was elected under the auspices of the same election officials who administered previous elections that elicited no such disturbance. This was even the case when Rafsanjani conceded defeat to President Ahmadinejad in 2005. Why then, can they not accept similar credible results now? and if they cannot relent and graciously accept defeat, then why can they not produce credible evidence of electoral fraud.

Any fraudulent electoral machinations, would be against the most sacred of tenets that underpin the Islamic Republic, its political structure and institutions. I find these allegations totally unfounded and unsubstantiated, and the West should cease its interference in Iran's affairs.
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KooKoo
06-23-2009, 08:05 PM
Originally Posted by nocturnal

Any fraudulent electoral machinations, would be against the most sacred of tenets that underpin the Islamic Republic, its political structure and institutions. I find these allegations totally unfounded and unsubstantiated, and the West should cease its interference in Iran's affairs.
Iran too should "cease its interference in" other countries' affairs, correct? :)
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The_Prince
06-23-2009, 08:09 PM
Originally Posted by KooKoo
Iran too should "cease its interference in" other countries' affairs, correct? :)
Iran wouldnt have to if the west stopped. :)

USA, supports Israel, causes lots of problems in Mid-east, Iran reacts, helps mid-eastern groups who want to end western-Israeli influence and problems in the mid-east.
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KooKoo
06-23-2009, 08:12 PM
Originally Posted by The_Prince
Iran wouldnt have to if the west stopped. :)

USA, supports Israel, causes lots of problems in Mid-east, Iran reacts, helps mid-eastern groups who want to end western-Israeli influence and problems in the mid-east.
True, but Iran's 'helping hand' isn't really helping the region that much. :blind:
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north_malaysian
06-24-2009, 01:18 AM
Originally Posted by nocturnal
Any fraudulent electoral machinations, would be against the most sacred of tenets that underpin the Islamic Republic, its political structure and institutions. I find these allegations totally unfounded and unsubstantiated, and the West should cease its interference in Iran's affairs.
How about shooting the protesters dead? is it Islamic?

Why Ahmadinejad is so afraid with youtube, facebook that they have to ban those websites? I've heard that the recent victim is twitter...

why there are 3,000,000 extra votes in 50 cities?
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