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sister herb
09-13-2013, 07:44 PM
Published on Friday, 13 September 2013 08:36 .LON009D wa
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PNN

PLO Negotiations Affairs Department issued on Thursday, a new fact sheet entitled "Twenty Years of Oslo". The sheet also includes a speech by PLO's chief negotiator, Saeb Erekat.

'Twenty Years have passed since the celebrated Arafat-Rabin handshake on the White House lawn. Twenty years have passed since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority. Twenty years have passed since the formal start of the peace process. This year marks twenty years of shattered hopes and unfulfilled obligations, of promises betrayed and an illegal colonization process that not only continues to intensify, but has inched us ever closer towards permanently ending any hope for a peacefully negotiated two-state solution.

On September 13th, 1993 the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements between Israel and the PLO ("Oslo I") was signed. However, Israeli bulldozers kept bulldozing, and with every illegally placed stone, the hope for peace faded. Since 1993, Israeli settlers have tripled in number, their settlements choking and separating East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank and fragmenting the West Bank itself into loosely connected cantons. This publication spells out how the Oslo Process metamorphosed into a process of colonization, taking us ever further from a just and lasting solution to this conflict.'

To maintain the security of these settlements and to feed their large appetite for Palestinian land, Israel built an intricate system of control and subjugation: hundreds of checkpoints were placed and dotted across the West Bank, segregated bypass roads were constructed for settler use only, separate legal systems for settlers and Palestinians were maintained, and an annexation wall was built, eating-up a further 9% of West Bank. This publication spells out how the Oslo process metamorphosed into a process of colonization, taking us ever further from a just and lasting solution to this conflict.

http://english.pnn.ps/index.php/poli...-years-of-olso
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sister herb
09-14-2013, 11:07 PM
Oxfam International: Palestinians’ life worse now than before Oslo
[ 14/09/2013 - 03:18 PM ]

OCCUPIED JERUSALEM, (PIC)-- On the 20th anniversary of the Oslo peace accords, Oxfam International said life for millions of Palestinians is worse now than it was 20 years ago, as the government of Israel has expanded its settlements in the occupied territory and increased its control over Palestinian land and lives.

Oxfam, an international aid agency, said in a press release, "Since 1993, Israel has doubled the number of settlers from 260,000 to over 520,000 and expanded the area controlled by settlements to over 42 percent of Palestinian land. A system of checkpoints and other restrictions on Palestinian movement and trade has divided families and decimated the economy".

The agency warned a similar pattern is already emerging during the current peace talks. In the past six weeks, Israel has approved the construction of at least 3,600 more settlement homes in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and demolished at least 36 Palestinian homes. In the past 20 years, Israel has demolished 15,000 Palestinian buildings, including homes, water systems and agricultural facilities.

"The hope that the Oslo process brought has come crashing down with two decades of obstruction and broken promises. While parties are negotiating peace, actions on the ground are making the lives of Palestinian civilians in particular ever more difficult, and jeopardizing the chance of reaching a solution. A peace process naturally calls for give and take from all parties, but it is Palestinian civilians who have overwhelmingly paid the cost," said Nishant Pandey, head of Oxfam in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel.

Actions over past 20 years have impeded the Palestinian economy to a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars a year. The Gaza economy alone has lost around $76 million annually as up to 35 percent of its agricultural land is prevented from being cultivated, and the government of Israel has reduced the waters available to Palestinian fishermen from the 20 nautical miles agreed at Oslo to just six nautical miles today. Exports from Gaza have dropped by 97 percent since the economic blockade was put in place in 2007.

http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/en/d...DmxaMGGca7o%3d
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sister herb
09-15-2013, 07:12 PM
The Oslo Accords: A gigantic disaster for the Palestinians


[ 15/09/2013 - 04:42 PM ]

By Khalid Amayreh in occupied Palestine

A few days ago, I asked a Palestinian lawyer from my hometown, Dura, if it was possible for me to file a suit case against "The State of Israel" in a Palestinian court.

On 25 February, 1953, Israeli troops murdered virtually my entire family, including my three paternal uncles as well as three other relatives. In addition to the cold-blooded murder, the Israeli army then seized our entire property upon which our life depended to a large extent, including 250-300 sheep, condemning my family to live in a state of abject property for more than thirty years. No apology or mea Culpa or acknowledgment of guilt or responsibility has ever been made by the State of Israel.

The Lawyer, Muhammed Rabai' stared at me, saying: "Mr. Amayreh, it seems your knowledge in matters of law is modest. The Oslo Accords gave Israel all the assets and gave us all the liabilities."

He went on: “You have to make a clear distinction between law and justice. Even if Israeli soldiers or terrorists or settlers murdered your entire family, you still wouldn’t have the right to sue Israel in a Palestinian court."

As a defensive reflex, I asked the esteemed lawyer why was it that any Israeli Jew or non-Israeli Jew could sue any Palestinian or Arab entity in an Israeli court without any problem.

"Where is the principle of parity and equality?," I protested.

Eventually, Rabai', gave me a lecture on the legalistic dimensions of the Oslo Accords.

Then he said, with frustration detected in the tone of his speech: "The strong is shameless."

This story is one of thousands of other similar or graver stories encapsulating the utter injustice and inequity inflicted on the Palestinian people and their just national cause as a result of the scandalous accords known as the Oslo Agreement.

I remember that a few days after the conclusion of the infamous agreement, I wrote an Arabic article, describing the agreement as "a body with numerous deformities and defects, however you look at it, you will be offended and affronted."

I also remember I asked the late Faisal Husseini how the PLO was gullible enough to accept such a scandalously oblique deal?

Husseini knew the agreement was thoroughly deformed from its head to its tail. He probably knew more than I did about the scandalous aspects of the Accords which the Palestinian leadership and also Israel wanted to keep secret. But his mouth was muzzled for political reasons and he couldn't say all he knew about the agreement and the circumstances leading up to its acceptance by the PLO leadership.

Eventually, Husseini said this: True, the baby is deformed …but it is our child."

I also asked a number of PLO leaders who were visiting al-Khalil a few months after the Oslo accords were reached why the PLO leadership recognized Israel without receiving a reciprocal Israeli recognition or without even having Israel saying where its borders lie.

To my chagrin, I only received the following laconic answer to all my questions: "Yes I agree with you… that was a mistake that we unfortunately made."

Twenty long years have now passed since the conclusion of the hapless agreement. And there is an absolute consensus among Palestinians, regardless of their political orientation, that the agreement was a disaster for the Palestinian people and their national cause.

The PLO and its mostly mendacious media outlets and other mouth-pieces sought to give the impression that the agreement would lead to the establishment of a viable and territorially contiguous state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with Jerusalem as its capital.

The mantra was invoked by the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat rather ad nauseam that many Palestinians began to ridicule Arafat for his rhetorical overindulgence and for his utter unrealism.

Arafat didn't always make a meticulous distinction between reality and fantasy. On several occasions, he declared Palestinian towns he visited in the 1990s "liberated, liberated, liberated" even though Israeli occupation soldiers were manning roadblocks and checkpoints a few blocks away from where Arafat was speaking.

Vague agreement

There is no doubt that the Oslo Accords were a vague agreement par excellence. The PLO viewed the accords as an initial stage toward ending the Israeli occupation and achieving independence and statehood.

The Israelis, for their part, viewed the agreement as an arrangement that would allow Israel to maintain control of the West Bank without paying a costly political and economic price.

But in this case, it is only the strong party that enforces its interpretation of the vague agreement. Needless to say, this is exactly what Israel did and has been doing.

Indeed, Israel has maintained effective control over every nook and cranny in the West Bank. It retained a carte blanche to arrest any Palestinian, from an ordinary individual to the highest ranking elected political official. This happened while much of the world kept thinking that the Palestinians were finally free of Israeli occupation and domination.

The current Palestinian leadership, though less captivated by the empty rhetoric that generally characterized Arafat's discourse, is yet to free itself completely from the historical Palestinian leader's legacy and style of thinking.

For example, the "Palestinian Authority" (PA) sees nothing embarrassing or objectionable in referring to itself as "the state of Palestine" when the PA entity is lacking almost everything that would make a state look like a state, including recognized borders, freedom from foreign occupation, sovereignty, and free, unfettered economy.

As to the PA itself, it is no more than a pathetic police state without a state, an entity that keeps itself afloat thanks to handouts and politically-motivated "aid" from the United States, Israel's guardian ally, and the European Union.

In fact, the crippling financial crisis that initially made the PLO accept the scandalous Oslo Accords in 1993 is now forcing the present Palestinian leadership to sit down in futile talks with Israel despite the aggressive continuation of Jewish settlement activities all over the West Bank, especially in East Jerusalem.

A few months ago, Ahmed Qurei', who negotiated the Oslo Agreement on behalf of the PLO, was quoted as saying that 20 years of peace negotiations with Israel yielded a very fat Zero.

In light, one is prompted to ask if the PLO-PA leadership has learned any lessons from the Oslo fiasco and whether it would repeat the 20-year experiment!

http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/en/d...HdrN5482cb4%3d
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سيف الله
09-17-2013, 10:17 AM
Salaam

Just some more background on the current state of the (misnamed) peace process.

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سيف الله
10-03-2013, 06:06 PM
Salaam

Another update.

Norman G. Finkelstein is a well-known American writer of Jewish origin, and has particularly gained recognition for his works on the Israel-Palestine conflict. He has replied to the questions of the World Bulletin.

Finkelstein is best known for his famous book ‘The Holocaust Industry’, which claims that the holocaust was misused by the US and Israel to legitimize their politics. He also believes the Holocaust has been used by the Jewish lobby in the US in different ways as a money making tool.

Finkelstein is the author of eight books that have been translated into 50 languages.
Levent Basturk - I will ask about the Palestinian peace process right now, the one being initiated, I know that you are in favor of a two state solution. But do you expect that, from what Kerry initiated, there’s going to be a solution on the way, or there will be some problems, or some steps were wrongly taken and it won’t reach anywhere?

Dr. Norman Finkelstein - First of all some clarity, I am not in favor of a two state solution. I don’t think these questions should be asked or answered in terms of personal preferences. Political questions can only be answered and asked in terms of what’s politically feasible at a given point in time— that it’s more feasible and somehow approximates justice. The only feasible solution right now is two states because there’s no international support for anything else. You look at the UN, you look at the International Court of Justice, you look at human rights organizations, they’re all saying the same thing— two states. And there’s no evidence that this particular consensus is changing. It’s a quite hard consensus, that two states is the way to solve the conflict, the Israel-Palestine conflict. So I do not express my own personal preference. It’s based on an assessment of the balance of political force in the world, and the balance is in favor of two states and I see no evidence of a shift to one state. There’s nothing I see that suggests that political opinion, public opinion, legal opinion, human rights opinion is shifting in favor of one state. All I see so far, right now, it’s a hardened two state consensus. As for Kerry and the US, they’re not interested in two states. They’re interested in one state for Israel, a larger state than it is currently. And the Palestinians will be left with some fragments of territory, and at some point a suggestion, a recommendation will be made to confederate those fragments of territory with Jordan, and these fragments of territory will get to exercise some form of local autonomy. That’s the US position. The US-Israel position is to extinguish Palestinian self-determination by annexing part of Palestine, the designated unit for Palestinian self-determination, annexing part of Palestine to Israel and the other part will probably be confederated to Jordan.

So in that sense what we really have right now is not a real peace process negotiation?

No, what you have right now is that Palestinians have never been weaker politically than they are currently, The the implosion of the Arab world, the defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood, which means the defeat of Hamas, the political hopelessness of the Palestinian people and the complete corruption of the Palestinian Authority contributes this weakness. Therefore there’s an opportunity now, because they’re so weak, to impose on them a settlement that will serve US-Israeli interests and deny Palestinians their basic interests.

Then, in a sense, the coup in Egypt has strengthened Israel’s hand.

It’s strengthened them in two ways. Number one, Sisi is just another version of Mubarak, which was one of Israel’s main allies. And secondly, the Palestinian organization Hamas made a tactical error by putting all of their eggs in the Muslim Brotherhood basket, and now the Muslim Brotherhood has been defeated.

Do you mean that the position they have taken during the Syrian conflict on the side of the Turkey-Egypt axis was a major strategic mistake on their side?

So double mistake, because Egypt completely collapsed and Turkey now sees more common interest with Israel to get in the Syrian conflict, so Turkey right now is in the process of completely restoring relations with Israel. At the expense of the Palestinians, they will work with Israel in order to get their way in Syria.

Do you really think that is the position Turkey is going to take?

All the reports are that Israel and Turkey are healing all of their divisions, and that Turkey now regards Syria as the bigger issue than the Palestinians. And then Israel and Turkey are basically agreed on Syria.

How about recent comments that Hamas, right now, is again trying to realign its position and trying to get close to Iran and Hezbollah. Do you see that, or it’s just a speculation?

I think they will try, but the fact that they were so disloyal, the support that they are going to get from Hezbollah and Iran will be significantly less.

Hamas is desperate for anything right now so they don’t have that many options. And there’s an expression in English, beggars can’t be choosers, and Hamas is in the situation of a beggar now and it doesn’t have that many choices.

In Egypt, right now, the Muslim Brotherhood is out of the equation. Is the current Egyptian administration going to choose not to do anything regarding the Palestinian issue?

Right, they’re going to do more than nothing, they’re going to be a positive, negative force.

Then what’s happening to Gaza right now is an indication of that?

What they’re trying to do in Gaza is two things. They want to make the situation economically intolerable so that the people of Gaza overthrow Hamas. And also they want to reestablish Palestinian Authority control, so one of the things they’re trying to do right now is reestablish Palestinian Authority control of the Rafah entry. So basically just like Sisi sees now a historic opportunity to destroy the Brotherhood, the Palestinian Authority sees a historic opportunity to destroy Hamas. Both of them think, and they may be right, that these are big opportunities.

What are the prospects of that?

A lot of it is very hard to say. So long as the attention is distracted on Syria, Sisi could do pretty much anything he wants. Nobody’s stopping him.

So the Syrian conflict is a game changer in the entire region.

Syria is a complete disaster, total disaster.

Dr. Finkelstein, thank you for giving us the opportunity to have this interview with you.

http://www.zcommunications.org/interview-with-norman-finkelstein-on-mideast-by-norman-finkelstein.html
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سيف الله
12-12-2013, 11:25 PM
Salaam

Another interview

Peace - or Palestinian Surrender? An Interview with Norman Finkelstein

Norman G. Finkelstein is a man of contradictions. He is the Brooklyn-born son of concentration camp survivors who has enraged American Jews by denouncing the cynicism of what he calls the 'Holocaust industry.' He is a polemicist and inveterate contrarian who demolishes his opponents by scouring footnotes and soberly checking facts. He is an academic prodigy who, due to his notorious controversies, no longer has a university position. Though few will agree with everything he says, he is one of America’s indispensable public intellectuals.

In this wide-ranging interview with Review 31 to mark the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, the author of nine books – from Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict (1995) to Knowing Too Much: Why the American Jewish Romance with Israel is Coming to an End (2012) – reveals yet another seeming contradiction. After decades as one of the most high-profile supporters of the Palestinian cause, he turns his fire on the 'silly, sectarian, cultist politics' of the pro-Palestinian movement, decries the 'collaborationist' Palestinian leadership and defends Israel’s right to a peaceful existence as part of a two-state settlement. At the same time, he pulls no punches on the revived 'peace process', dismissing it as an attempt to impose a 'historic defeat' on the Palestinians.

But perhaps most surprisingly of all, Finkelstein also says he now believes an end to the conflict is within reach – and explains why he thinks Israel’s occupation could be ended, and a Palestinian state established, in the foreseeable future.
How optimistic are you that the current negotiations sponsored by John Kerry will lead to the end of the Israel-Palestine conflict?

The goal of the current talks is to impose the longstanding Israeli terms of settlement on the Palestinians. From the last phase of the Camp David negotiations at Taba, Egypt, in 2001 to the present, Israel has presented basically the same map regarding the territorial aspect of the conflict. It wants to annex 9-10% of the occupied West Bank, what it calls the 'major settlement blocs.' It's the route of the Wall that Israel has been building inside the West Bank, which senior officials have called Israel's 'final border,' and which will annex 9.5% of Palestinian territory.

If Israel prevails, the putative Palestinian 'state' will be stripped of some of the most arable land in the West Bank, as well as critical water resources, and it will be severed from the urban center of East Jerusalem, which is the hub of Palestinian life (Greater Jerusalem accounts for 40 percent of the Palestinian economy). What remains of the West Bank will be fragmented into several pieces, more or less resembling the bantustans in apartheid South Africa, which were also divided into 'major' and 'minor' fragments. On the refugee question, Israel will only accept an international mechanism to 'rehabilitate' Palestinian refugees where they currently reside, 'resettle' them in third countries, or 'repatriate' them in the West Bank bantustans.

Each party to the conflict has a different motive for participating in the current talks. The Palestinians have no choice except to attend, because the US pays the Palestinian Authority's bills (and bribes). Israel needs to pretend it is negotiating in order to deflect international (especially EU) sanctions. President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry are hoping that they can pull a peace agreement rabbit out of the hat to redeem Obama's failed presidency and feather Kerry's cap. Whether they will succeed is not clear. The calculation is, between the implosion of the Arab world, Hamas's dire straits after the coup against its Muslim Brotherhood benefactors in Egypt, the despondency and depoliticization of the Palestinian people, and the thralldom of the Palestinian Authority, it might be possible to impose a historic defeat on the Palestinians. At the end, the US will offer a huge 'aid' package (billed as a 'Marshall Plan'). Right now, Israel and Egypt (under Sisi) are colluding to make life unbearable in Gaza, so the Gazans will rid themselves of Hamas, in exchange for material relief from the Palestinian Authority.

Recently you've surprised some people by saying that you believe the outlook for a two-state deal has improved in recent years. What would such a deal look like, and what conditions could you foresee bringing it about?

The consensus terms for resolving the conflict have endured for nearly four decades now: two-states on the 1967 border, and a 'just' resolution of the Palestinian refugee question based on the right of return and compensation. The difference is that in recent years there have also been important shifts in public opinion in the West. The Europeans have grown weary of the Israel-Palestine conflict – in particular, the intransigence and bellicosity of the Israeli government. American public opinion, including American Jewish public opinion, has also grown more critical of Israeli policy. American Jews, who are significantly liberal in their politics, find it increasingly difficult to reconcile their liberal credo – the rule of law and equality under the law, the use of diplomacy and international institutions instead of force of arms to resolve interstate conflicts – with how Israel carries on. American Jews now know too much about the realities of the conflict to lend Israel blind support. If this public opinion can be galvanized in a mass movement, it could enable a resolution of the conflict on the consensus terms.

But the critical variable is the Palestinians themselves. If they embark on a mass nonviolent civil disobedience campaign, sufficient pressure can probably be brought to bear on Israel such that it will be forced to withdraw to its legal borders and a reasonable solution can be found to the refugee question. To desegregate the American South, it required a mass movement among African-Americans in the South struggling for their elementary Constitutional rights. This movement galvanized mainstream Americans, who were appalled by the brutality of Southern racists quelling the nonviolent struggle. The domestic outrage (as well as the international embarrassment) then compelled an otherwise reluctant Federal government to impose desegregation on Southern whites. Analogously, a mass nonviolent Palestinian movement will almost certainly evoke a violent Israeli reaction (which is what happened during the first intifada that began in 1987), and this brutal response will in turn galvanize international public opinion and thereby compel the United Nations to impose the law-based consensus terms on Israel.

Your support of the two-state solution and Israel's right to exist has left you out of step with pro-Palestinian activists in the west, among whom there seems to be a growing consensus that a two-state deal is either unattainable, undesirable, or both. What's your response to such views?

It is not unusual for the demands of a movement to become more extreme the less likely a settlement appears. The attitude is, If we can't even get half a loaf, why not ask for the whole loaf? In my opinion, however, the half-loaf is in fact within reach, whereas the whole loaf is not.

My differences with the Solidarity movement are less pronounced than it appears at first glance. The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which now occupies center-stage among Palestine activists, claims to anchor its goals in international law. On this critical point, there's no disagreement. Everyone starts from the premise that the strongest card Palestinians have to play in the court of public opinion is international law. The settlements are illegal, the occupation of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza is illegal, the denial of refugee rights is illegal.

The flaw in the BDS movement is that it selectively upholds only Palestinian rights, and ignores Palestinian obligations. Under international law, Israel is a state. If you want to appeal to public opinion on the basis of international law, you can't suddenly become an agnostic on the law when it comes to Israel. However, that's exactly what BDS does: it claims to have 'no position' on Israel, whereas international law does take a position on Israel. To be consistent, BDS must either recognize Israel or cease to claim that it is anchored in international law. It cannot both appeal to international law and fall silent on Israel's rights under that same law.

Are you frustrated that, just at the moment that (in your view) a two-state solution looks increasingly attainable, those who might have created a movement in support of that goal are abandoning it?


'Emigré' politics are always petty and personalized when 'The Revolution' is in ebb. Because there's no leadership or mass struggle right now in Palestine, any Tom, Dick or Harry can step into the breach and claim to represent 'Palestinian civil society.' Western leftists and liberals are prone to being guilt-tripped by 'people of color' playing the race card, who claim to be the 'vanguard of the Revolution.' If you dissent, you are then labeled a white-Jewish-liberal-colonial-imperialist-Zionist-whatever. I remember this sort of 'Mau-Mauing' (as Tom Wolfe memorably dubbed it) from the days of the Black Panthers, and admit to having fallen into the trap back then. But I am now way too old for these silly, sectarian, cultist politics. My guess is, if and when the Palestinian struggle re-emerges, it will set plausible goals and all the one-state talk will vanish like snow on a spring afternoon.

It's almost 20 years since the signing of the Oslo Accords, which led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority. How do you assess the part the PA plays in the current state of affairs?


The main lesson Israel learned from the first Intifada (1987-1993) was that it couldn't on its own police the occupation. The numberless human rights violations committed by the occupying army isolated Israel internationally, while the deployment of Israeli troops for 'crowd control' in the occupied Palestinian territories meant less time devoted to training the army for combat. The purpose of Oslo, as Prime Minister Rabin repeatedly stated at the time, was to relieve Israel of the burdens of occupation by creating a collaborationist Palestinian regime and police force. In this critical respect, Oslo must be reckoned a remarkable success. There are fewer complaints nowadays about Israel's human rights record because in the new division of labor the Palestinian security and police forces repress, incarcerate and torture the Palestinian resistance. Meanwhile, Israel used the Oslo 'peace process' to deflect its incremental annexation of the West Bank. So, for example, whenever Israel was called to account for settlement expansion, it replied that settlements are a 'permanent status' issue that hasn't yet been resolved. The essence of Oslo was that it served as a façade behind which Israel entrenched the occupation and sought to make it irreversible.

Your work has never failed to stir controversy, and you've been the subject of some famously hostile attacks from Israel's supporters in the US. Do you regret any of the stances you’ve taken, or the language you’ve used, over the course of your career?

I first became active in June 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon. For the first 25 years of my involvement, it hardly made a difference what tone was adopted, because no one was listening. One's role was mostly to bear witness, but it was also a cry in the wilderness, trying to shake people out of their complacency, so the language used back then might appear strident in retrospect. Now, there's a significant public ready to listen, so there's an obligation to be more careful in the language one uses. At the moment I struggle over how to stay principled yet still reach out to a broad public that includes many liberal American Jews and even some Israelis.

Is it possible to support a two-state solution and the 'right of return' of millions of Palestinian refugees (which, by transforming its demographics, would effectively spell the end of Israel as a state)?


It would be disingenuous to deny that Palestinians have a right of return under international law, but it would be equally disingenuous to deny that implementation of this right poses thorny practical (and also principled) problems. In my opinion, the focus should shift from what a solution looks like to creating a mechanism enjoying legitimacy that could then propose a 'just' solution. Concretely, it means assembling a committee of respected moral authorities – say, Bishop Tutu, Jimmy Carter, John Dugard, Noam Chomsky, representatives from Al-Haq, B'Tselem, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch – who can hear out all sides in public deliberations and then make a recommendation.

Of course, Palestinians would have a final say, but I am confident that if a reasonable proposal is made by people manifestly acting in good faith, and if it is in the context of an agreement that creates an authentic Palestinian state on the 1967 border with East Jerusalem as the capital, Palestinians will, if reluctantly, accept it, just as they accepted the two-state settlement in November 1988.

Do you consider the concept of a 'Jewish state' inherently illegitimate? And is Israel's self-definition as a Jewish state necessarily an obstacle to the two-state vision you speak of?

The 1947 UN Partition Resolution speaks to a Jewish (and Arab) state, but doesn't elucidate what in practice such a State denotes. It does explicitly stipulate, however, that such a State cannot prejudicially discriminate against the minority population. The peace treaties that Israel signed with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) make no reference to recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. The Oslo accords (1993, 1995) make no reference to recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. President Bush's Roadmap to Peace (2003) makes no mention of recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. The first time Israel articulated this demand was during the 2007-9 Annapolis negotiations, and then Prime Minister Netanyahu ran with it.

The reasonable inference is that Israel has conjured the demand in order to provide another pretext for not negotiating a final settlement, and also to provide it with a bargaining chip during negotiations, as in: You drop the Right of Return, We drop recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. The qualitative difference between these demands should be obvious. The Palestinian demand is anchored squarely in international law, whereas the Israeli demand lacks any basis in international law: not even the US officially recognizes Israel as a Jewish state.

It is impossible for Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state for the simple reason that there's no consensus even among Israelis what it means to call Israel a Jewish state: for example, secularist and devout Jews have a very different appreciation of the notion of Israel as a Jewish state. What is more ominous, if Palestinians were to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, it might sanction denying Palestinian Israelis their basic rights as citizens, or even their ethnic cleansing.

Whether a state can be both Jewish and democratic is a complex question. Suffice it to say that many, perhaps most, States in the world today wrestle with the challenge of reconciling their ethnic/religious/national identities with accommodating the ethnic/religious/national identities of internal minorities. What’s beyond dispute is that, in the name of its Jewishness, Israel discriminates against its non-Jewish minorities in multiple, often egregious and shocking ways that cannot be reconciled with any democratic theory.

http://www.zcommunications.org/peace-or-palestinian-surrender-an-interview-with-norman-finkelstein-by-norman-finkelstein.html
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سيف الله
01-12-2014, 07:08 PM
Salaam

Another update.

US Secretary of State John Kerry was in the Middle East again this week, conducting intensive talks with Israeli and Palestinian officials and other regional actors. His aim, it has been widely reported, is to reach a "framework agreement" as a prelude to a final settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Norman Finkelstein is the co-author, with Mouin Rabbani, of How to Solve the Israel-Palestine Conflict (OR Books, forthcoming). I spoke with him about the significance of the negotiations, as we enter what may be a decisive phase in the Palestinians' long struggle for self-determination.


You’ve been warning for some time now that the Israeli-Palestinian talks being brokered by Secretary of State Kerry might, unlike many prior rounds of negotiations, actually produce a deal to end the conflict. Its content would amount to Israel’s long-standing terms of settlement. What’s your assessment of where the diplomatic process is currently at?

A “framework agreement” will shortly be reached, and a final settlement will probably be signed in the last six months or so of President Obama’s term in office. When the Kerry process was first announced I was virtually alone in predicting that it would actually go somewhere; now, it’s widely assumed. Many respected Israeli commentators now take for granted that an agreement is just a matter of time.

In recent weeks the Kerry talks have apparently focused on Israel’s demands for (i) an enduring military presence in the Jordan Valley and (ii) Palestinian recognition of it as a “Jewish state.” The Palestinians will negotiate some face-saving deal on the Jordan Valley involving a US-Israeli joint presence for a period of time. The Jordan Valley was already essentially resolved at the Annapolis negotiations in 2008. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is raising it now only so he can later claim to be making a “heart-wrenching concession”—Israel is adept at “conceding” things to which it has no title in the first place—by allowing for only a temporary US-Israeli presence along the border. It’s been received wisdom for years—even pro-Israel hack Dennis Ross concedes it in The Missing Peace—that the Jordan Valley has no strategic value.

On the “Jewish state,” the agreement will probably resolve on the formula: Israel as the state of the Jewish people and its citizens, Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people and its citizens. It will afford (legal) protection for Israel’s Palestinian citizens, but will negate the right of return for Palestinian refugees, which is what Israel really cares about. Palestinian President Abbas can then claim it as a victory because he secured the rights of Palestinians in Israel.

The whole thing is diabolical. The Israelis—with, of course, active and critical US connivance—have managed to completely shift the debate and shape the agenda. The only issues now being discussed are the Jewish state and the Jordan Valley, which, in terms of the international consensus for resolving the conflict, never figured at all. (Even in prior bilateral negotiations presided over by the US, such as at Annapolis, these were at most peripheral issues.) The key issue (apart from the refugees), in terms of the international consensus and in prior bilateral negotiations, has been the extent of the land swap along the border: Will Israel be allowed to annex the major settlement blocs and consequently abort a Palestinian state? But the debate has completely shifted, because annexing the settlement blocs is a done deal.

The framework agreement will probably just speak of land swaps in terms of percentages, and merely insinuate—as the Clinton Parameters did—Israel’s annexation of the major settlement blocs without divulging the precise details. But it is striking that in all of the discussion over the last several weeks, Ma'ale Adumim—i.e., the largest settlement bloc that effectively bisects the West Bank—has never even come up. Because it’s already been resolved, in Israel’s favour.

And a final deal will follow?


A lot of politicking still has to be done, a lot of marketing, a lot of hysteria in Israel—its usual, Oscar-winning performance. It will take the full three years that remain of Obama’s presidency, climaxing in a Camp David-like summit (Obama also loves drama, speechifying is his forte and he’s probably already contemplating which hip black leather jacket to wear), before the final deal is sealed.

One of the principal obstacles at this point to reaching an agreement, in my opinion, is not the details, because those are basically known: the annexation of the settlement blocs by Israel and the annulment of the right of return. One of the big stumbling blocks, oddly enough, is inertia.

If you date the political origin of the conflict back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration (before then Zionism was basically a self-help operation), you’re talking about a century-long conflict. When a conflict endures for such a protracted period of time, huge numbers of individuals and institutions develop a vested interest not in its resolution but instead in its perpetuation; what’s now called, only half-facetiously, the Peace Industry. Many are now consumed by the dreadful prospect that after a full century, it might actually end. It does send shivers down the spine: the Israel-Palestine conflict might be over. All those UN special sessions and special committees; all those Ramallah-based NGOs, Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations, and conflict-resolution getaways; all those IMF, World Bank, Crisis Group reports; all those academic programs—Israel Studies, Holocaust Studies—which sprung up to justify Israeli policy (none can lay a claim to intellectual content, and most have been subsidized by wealthy right-wing Jews); all those film festivals, scholarly studies, memoirs and “poetry”; all those Washington-based Israel “think”-tanks; all those Palestine solidarity activists, groups, websites, researchers, and analysts (present company included).... A huge, sprawling superstructure has been built on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and consequently a major obstacle to an agreement is now the fear and trembling across the political divide that it might actually be coming to a denouement. It’s not quite conceivable, is it?

But presumably inertia on its own can merely delay; it can’t prevent.

I agree.

What is Kerry doing to shore up support for an agreement?

As Palestinian political analyst (and my co-author) Mouin Rabbani has observed, the big difference between President Clinton and Secretary of State Kerry is that Clinton ignored everyone outside the United States; he imagined that he alone, without any external assistance, could be the kingmaker. Kerry, on the other hand, has in a very deliberate fashion set about lining up all the ducks. The Saudis, Arab League, European Union—the Palestinians are being surrounded and besieged. So are the Israelis, but to a much lesser extent because it’s essentially Israel’s terms of settlement that are being imposed.

The Europeans in particular are turning the screws. Every day there’s another report of an individual or collective European initiative severing ties with Israeli entities linked to the illegal settlements. My guess is, the threats currently emanating from Europe are being coordinated with Kerry, in order to convey, not so much to the Israeli government (for all his emoting, Netanyahu is on board), but to Israeli holdouts, that the settlement project outside the Wall has no future prospects. Within Israeli politics, those supporting the Kerry process—here’s an irony worth savouring!—have exploited the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement to the same end: “If we don’t settle now, BDS is just around the corner.”

And the various Arab states?


The Palestine issue has, at least, temporarily, died as a mobilising factor in the Arab-Muslim world. It’s fairly easy now for the US to get Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Iran either on board or to set Palestine aside. Iran hasn’t said anything about the Kerry negotiations so far, and probably doesn’t much care. Syria is a null factor. Egypt is playing a positively nefarious role, as it tries (in cahoots with the US, Israel and the Palestinian Authority) to depose Hamas by tormenting Gazans. Saudi Arabia figures that by playing ball with the US on Palestine it can score points with the US on Syria-Iran. Turkey has its own agenda that for a while did (e.g., at the time of the Mavi Marmara), but no longer does, include Palestine. It is preoccupied by Erdogan’s blunder on Syria and his fear that, in the event of an American rapprochement with Iran, Turkey will drop a notch on the regional totem pole, whereas he has harboured visions of a reborn Ottoman Empire.

The Palestine issue had political resonance in the Arab-Muslim world mostly because it was popular on the so-called street. But people don’t much care now. They’re focused, rightly or wrongly, on other tragedies, such as Syria. In places like Libya, where people used to give at least lip-service to Palestine, they obviously have other things on their minds right now. Kerry is no genius, but certainly he shrewdly assessed the lay of the land when he concluded that now was the perfect moment to impose a settlement on the Palestinians.

It has been interesting to see everyone wooing Israel’s foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman. Suddenly he’s the toast of the town in Washington, the British foreign minister is meeting with him, etc.

It cuts both ways, because Lieberman wants to be Israel’s next prime minister. So it’s time to shed the nightclub bouncer persona (the New York Times recently reported that Lieberman reads weighty tomes on history; sure, and on weekends I do pirouettes in the Bolshoi…) and to don the persona of a Responsible Statesman. So, he’ll go along with a Kerry agreement. He’s already signalled his acquiescence, even enthusiasm, this past week. He’s also been muttering about transferring Israel’s Palestinian citizens to a new Palestinian state, but that won’t go anywhere. It would violate basic norms of international law by sanctioning the right of established states to redraw internal borders in order to denationalize unwanted minorities. Nobody’s going to buy that.

How serious are recent moves by Hamas and Fatah towards reconciliation?

One possibility is that the Palestinian Authority is playing a silly game of threatening the United States and Israel, “If you aren’t more forthcoming, we’re going to reconcile with Hamas and won’t deal with you anymore.” The second possibility is that Hamas wants a piece of the pie, and so will form a National Unity government that will guarantee it something in the final agreement. The third and, according to Mouin, most plausible possibility is that Abbas wants to neutralise Hamas by bringing it on board, thereby also reviving his claims to represent all Palestinians, while Hamas supports a reconciliation to bring it out of the cold after the disastrous developments in Egypt.

How binding will a framework agreement be upon future negotiations?


Nothing is inexorable, but there will be a lot of momentum behind it. The juggernaut will be hard to stop. For all the pieces to fall into place, a new Israeli coalition will probably have to form, a government of National Unity led by Netanyahu. Israeli public opinion polls show that a majority of Israelis would support the probable Kerry proposal. Hebron will have to be evacuated. Of course, there will be the usual Israeli anguish, but it won’t be difficult to pull off. The IDF can just march out, and say to the four hundred meschugge Jewish settlers, “You want to stay? You can stay”—alone, amidst the 150,000 Muslim Hebronites.

Does the Palestinian leadership have the capacity to resist?


I can’t, for the life of me, see how the Palestinians can extricate themselves at this point. There’s such a broad array of political forces ranged behind the Kerry process that the Palestinians are trapped. Abbas and his imbecile sidekick Saeb Erekat are playing good cop/bad cop. Abbas says “yes, this agreement might work,” whereas Erekat whispers to the media—you know, the “senior Palestinian negotiator who doesn’t want to be identified”—that “oh, this agreement is horrible, it’s terrible, it’s awful, they can shove it.” Erekat thinks that’s being clever, it’s putting pressure on the Americans, as if anyone on god’s earth gives a flying fig what Erekat has to say about anything.

The Palestinians are cornered, they’re isolated. When you’re in such desperate straits, of course, you must play your strongest cards. A real leadership would, first of all, level with the Palestinian people, “We’re in a bind, we’re being steamrollered, stampeded. We need you, we need to draw on all our collective resources and reserves to resist”; and second, it would call on Palestine’s supporters abroad, “We’re about to be clobbered, we need your help.” I can’t say it would turn the tide, though, as you know, the Palestinian cause has sufficient resonance abroad that if Palestinians were to say, “We’re facing the moment of truth now, we might be extinguished,” it could perhaps, in conjunction with a mass civil revolt among the Palestinians themselves, do something. It could become a factor.

But the Palestinian leadership is irredeemably corrupt, incompetent and stupid (petty and megalomaniacal, Abbas lost interest in Palestine long ago—he just wants the Nobel), while Palestine’s supporters abroad are, to put it politely, not acting smartly. They think the big issue now is the American Studies Association vote for an academic boycott of Israel and debating the virtues of academic freedom at a Modern Languages Association conference. (Watch what happens if and when BDS supporters try to introduce the academic boycott in a solid, established academic discipline such as History, Philosophy, or any of the Natural Sciences, where, among many other factors, Jews figure prominently. It won’t be a pretty sight.) But that’s the state of Palestine solidarity right now. They carry on as if the Kerry process is a meaningless sideshow, something that can be safely ignored. But it’s a very big difference, as Mouin and I have pointed out, whether the Wall is illegal or whether it is a legal border. Why? It would turn what are currently illegal Jewish settlements into ordinary Israeli towns; Israel could legally confiscate Palestinian land and evict Palestinians from their homes. In India or China, when the government wants to build a big hydroelectric dam, it removes 100,000 people in one fell swoop. They expel masses of people from their homes, and the international community sits by mute. It’s the sovereign right of a country—it’s eminent domain.

The moment the Wall is re-baptized a border, the settlements behind it become a dead issue. They’re Israel’s sovereign territory. And of course most of the world will be glad to be rid of the Israel-Palestine conflict. They’ll be happy when the dotted line is signed. What are you going to do then? An American Studies Association boycott of The World?

Once the framework agreement is signed, won’t it still be very difficult to implement? For example, for Abbas to agree to a formula that effectively nullifies the refugee question—that will be an extremely hard sell among Palestinians.

What can the Palestinians do? Israel just wants the refugee question excised from the international agenda; it wants a document stipulating, “That’s no longer Israel’s responsibility.” If Kerry succeeds, they’ll get it. Especially if they get “Israel as a Jewish state plus its citizens” in the framework agreement, which nullifies the refugee question. How can the Palestinians stop it? They’re totally in thrall to European and American money right now. Yasser Arafat signed the 1993 Oslo agreement because the PLO was financially strapped after he aligned with Saddam Hussein during the First Gulf War. (The Gulf states retaliated by cutting off their subsidies to the PLO.) It was either agreeing to Oslo or—as it was put back then—“bye, bye PLO.” History is now repeating itself. He who pays the piper calls the tune.

At the popular level, though, Palestinians have influence over their own leadership.

The Palestinians have no leverage over the Palestinian Authority. The people are politically inert while the Palestinian police are quite effective now at quashing isolated dissent. It’s possible that Abbas will get a bullet in his head, which would probably slow things down because there’s no obvious immediate successor. But setting that possibility aside, I don’t see where Palestinians can exercise leverage. It’s not as if the refugees in Lebanon or Jordan can do very much. They haven’t been able to effect anything since Oslo, except languish in the camps.

What about Palestinians in the occupied territories? They won’t stand for a renunciation of the right of return.


This scenario is more romantic theory than current reality. The place is hopelessly fragmented. Gaza itself is alien to the West Bank now. What did the West Bankers do when Gazans were being massacred in 2008-09? Were there large demonstrations? We have to be realistic about the current situation. There’s no concerted will among Palestinians. They’re real, living persons, not a myth. Right now, the people’s spirits are shattered. Of course, a little spark can change things. I noticed a Haaretz article by Amira Hass some weeks back hinting at the possibility that a real popular resistance might yet emerge. It’s pointless speculating but, as of now, there aren’t visible signs that Palestinians are ready, able or willing to resist an imposed solution. Quite the contrary, if the final agreement is sufficiently nebulous to the untutored eye (like the 1993 Oslo agreement), and is sweetened with a huge “aid” package, Palestinians might, however reluctantly, go for it. The US/EU will have three years to soften the Palestinians, turning tight the economic screws, but not so tight as to cause the whole edifice to snap.

If a final agreement on Israel’s terms is signed, how big a set-back will it be for the struggle for Palestinian self-determination?

It would be almost irreversible. Many activists don’t want to acknowledge it, but these sorts of agreements and codifications can have real consequences. Didn’t the 1947 Partition Resolution, backed by Israeli wherewithal and will, already prove the point? There’s no obvious reason why you can’t have an agreement whereby a new border is drawn between Israel and the Palestinian territories, especially if such an agreement is ratified by the UN Security Council, which it almost certainly will be. Israel has the wherewithal and will to make that new border stick. Indeed, it already is a fact, except juridically. A political settlement would crown the already existing facts on the ground with the jewel of legality. It is a significant step, turning an illegal wall into a permanent, internationally recognized border; and it’s not beyond Israel’s reach. From then on, what claim will the Palestinians have beyond that border? None.

In your forthcoming book with Mouin, you recommend steps that Palestinians, solidarity activists and others should take to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict in a just and durable way. Will those steps, then, have to happen within the next three years? After that, will it be too late?

For anything to happen, it must begin among the Palestinians in the occupied territories. That would command international attention—though again, we have to be realistic about the political lay of the land right now. World attention is focused on Syria and Iran. There’s going to be the meeting in Geneva. It will be very hard for Palestinians to seize the political spotlight at this point. But that’s the only thing that can stop or slow down the juggernaut. Everything else is meaningless, it’s Nero fiddling while Rome burns.

http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/the_end_of_palestine_an_interview_with_norman_g._f inkelstein
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سيف الله
01-22-2014, 09:04 PM
Salaam

Another update

Israeli-Palestinian Talks: An Update

As U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry recently observed, we are at a 'critical point' in the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict. In a New Left Project interview earlier this month, Norman Finkelstein presented an in-depth analysis of where the Israeli-Palestinian talks being brokered by Kerry are heading, the gist of which was: in the absence of a revived Palestinian movement, the U.S. and Israel will successfully impose Israel's terms of settlement on an unprecedentedly weak Palestinian leadership, inflicting an in-all-likelihood decisive defeat on the Palestinians' decades-long struggle for self-determination.

As diplomacy picks up pace and an agreement draws nearer, we will publish periodic updates on the situation from Finkelstein. The following is adapted from a conversation with NLP's Jamie Stern-Weiner.
There have been, since our previous discussion, three major developments worth noting.

(1) Israel's appetite has increased with eating

Things have been moving along more or less as Secretary of State Kerry hoped, except he has made one miscalculation. Like myself, Kerry assumed that if he adopted the consistent positions Israel took during the 2008 Annapolis negotiations, he would have the Israelis in his back pocket. He didn't anticipate the dynamic whereby with each mouthful, Israel's hunger increases. Seeing how weak the PA is, and how accommodating Kerry is, some Israelis now figure, why not ask for more?

So they throw in a demand for a fourth settlement bloc; they throw in Palestinian recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state”; they throw in annexation of the Jordan Valley—none of which was salient in the Annapolis negotiations. At Annapolis, the Israeli position on the Jordan Valley was exactly what Kerry is now offering—the presence of an international force, while minor technical disputes such as control over the electromagnetic spectrum still had to be resolved. But some Israelis are now thinking, What the hell, we've got the room, why not ask for the whole house?

What's more, they might be right. The Palestinians are politically so weak, perhaps Israel really can get a lot more. Kerry will not accept egg on his face again after his humiliation during the Syrian chemical weapons crisis. There will be probably be a balancing act: on the one hand, Kerry will try to incorporate a part of Israel's enlarged demands, while, on the other, the Europeans will continue to turn the screws on Israel.

(2) Inside Israel, the politicking phase has begun

Inside Israel, different interest groups and lobbies are aligning themselves. One group that has come to the fore in recent days are what Noam Chomsky calls the “rational capitalists.” For these very wealthy business elites, “Israel” is just a pinprick on the map. They have a more grandiose vision. They want to create something akin to a Greater Middle East Co-Prosperity Sphere, with Israel playing the role of Japan. There has been a significant rapprochement recently between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and not a day passes without a report of Israeli officials travelling to some meeting in the Gulf. These rational capitalists now see an opportunity to realise their regional (even global) ambitions by ending the conflict with the Palestinians. They don’t want a stupid little thing like the Jordan Valley to stand in the way of an opening in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

But the stake that a lot of Israelis have developed in an on-going conflict also shouldn’t be underestimated. Defence Minister Ya'alon, who has been mouthing off about Israel retaining the Jordan Valley, is a good example. Ya'alon is perfectly aware that the Jordan Valley has zero strategic value. But he has outsize influence in Israeli society because he's a military man in a highly militarised society. If the vision of Israel's rational capitalists is realised and a settlement is reached, his influence will be somewhat diminished. And so he has a stake in maintaining an atmosphere of low-intensity conflict.

This touches on a broader political issue. In my opinion, a lot of people misunderstand politics as being determined by an overriding motive. Take the US-led attack on Iraq in 2003. The standard question back then was, What is Bush's motive? Some people said it was oil; others said it was the Israel Lobby; others pointed to the arms industry. But in politics, I don't think it's right to look for a single, decisive motive. What you have, instead, is a confluence of interests, the preponderance of which weighs on one side or the other in the political scales. In the case of Iraq, Karl Rove wanted an invasion for a narrow political objective: to see Bush re-elected. Politics has its own autonomy; it's not simply reducible to economic interests. Then there were those who were in it for the oil, or who saw great opportunities in occupying (and rebuilding) Iraq. Then, there were those who saw it as an opportunity to assert U.S. power on the world stage, or to reshape the map of the Middle East. There was a confluence of interests, the preponderance of which favoured an attack. It’s probably even true that a psychological element—Bush’s tortured relationship with his father—played some role in the decision to attack. It sounds petty, but in politics, if you’ve got a lot of power, the petty can play a big role. Palestinian President Abbas’s quest for a Nobel and exacting retrospective revenge on the late PLO chairman Yasser Arafat (who humiliated him) are probably factors in his calculation.

In Israel right now, the various interest groups are lining up on one side or the other. So, the rational capitalists and centrist politicians like Tzipi Livni favour an agreement, while the settler stalwarts, Zionist ideologues and elements of the military establishment oppose it. Then there are people like Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Lieberman, for whom it is a primarily political issue. Netanyahu wants to remain in power and Lieberman wants to succeed him, so they have to balance the competing interest groups and also be careful not to offend Washington.

(3) The Palestinians remain a null factor

The third factor is noteworthy by its absence: the Palestinians. The Palestinians know they're being steamrollered. In all the coverage now, they're basically a footnote. Arafat used to shuffle from one Arab and European capital to another whenever a crisis developed. He clocked more air miles than Henry Kissinger. Today, we have the desperate Palestinian leadership shuttling—but to where? To the Al Quds Committee. For Christ’s sake, has anyone even heard of the Al Quds Committee? It's a claque of octogenarians who sit around all day with their tea and shisha. Now it’s reported that Abbas is headed for Russia. As if Putin at this moment gives a hoot about Palestine. For the first time since its emergence a century ago, the Palestine question has been reduced to its puny geographical dimensions: a “provincial” struggle. I hate to repeat that awful cliché, but if Arafat was a tragedy, this is farce cubed. It is very telling that Abbas's right-hand man Saeb Erekat considers the Ha'aretz journalist Jack Khoury a bigger ally than the Palestinian people. He whispers in the ears of Ha'aretz to vent Palestinian grievances. But to the Palestinian people? Nothing. And from all indications, the people don't care.

The poles of the debate are now being established as, on one extreme, the Kerry proposal (in essence, the Israeli position at Annapolis), and on the other extreme, those within Israel who don't want to give up anything. The Palestinian position has vanished from the debate. Palestinians will protest when the steamroller runs over them, at which point everyone will say, “Are you still talking about the settlement blocs? That was already agreed upon.” And the Palestinians will then appear to be the spoilers.

What is the upshot of these three factors? A framework agreement will be reached shortly. Tzipi Livni and Yitzchak Molcho wouldn't have gone to Washington otherwise—they're down to the details now. The Palestinians are due to visit next week, when they'll be given their marching orders.

The Palestinian leadership will continue to posture, out of its usual alloy of stupidity and desperation. In Israel, the politicking will continue. As happened in South Africa during the 1980s, the rational capitalists will split off from the ideological true-believers. Interest blocs will crystallize and there will probably be an election. My guess is, those in favour of ending the conflict will win.

Some supporters of Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) interpret the recent hysteria in Israel about the threat of an international boycott as their victory. In Israeli politics, as discussed, the different interest groups are lining up: the settlers to retain all the settlements (not just the major settlement blocs in which 85% of the settlers reside), the rational capitalists because of regional (and global) ambitions, the defence establishment because of domestic prestige and perquisites—and no one because of BDS. These Israeli billionaires are not worried about an American Studies Association vote. They're not even worried about an EU boycott of settlement products; their ambitions are much bigger than a can opener factory in Ariel. They're not being browbeaten by BDS, they're using BDS to mobilize public support for their own narrow agenda. BDS is as significant a factor as the Al Quds Committee.

http://normanfinkelstein.com/
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سيف الله
02-09-2014, 09:57 PM
Salaam

Another update

Israel said set to accept Kerry’s framework proposals

Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat rejects Israel as a Jewish state, claims his ancestors were in Jericho 5,500 years before Joshua


Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu (R), Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon (L) and Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman in the Knesset, November 13, 2013. (Photo credit: Flash 90)

Israel is set to give its wary assent to US Secretary of State John Kerry’s framework peace proposal as the basis for continuing talks with the Palestinian Authority through to the end of 2014, Channel 2 news reported on Saturday night.

The TV report said Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon and Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman are all inclining to accept the US framework terms, some of which were detailed by Martin Indyk, the State Department’s lead envoy to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, in a conference call with American Jewish leaders on Thursday. The framework document would have to be finalized in the next few weeks, ahead of a scheduled fourth and final phase of Palestinian prisoner releases set for March, the report said.

The US framework document, whose terms will not have to be signed off as fully binding by the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, provides for talks on Palestinian statehood based on the pre-1967 lines with land swaps to enable 75 to 80 percent of settlers to come under Israeli sovereignty, relates to Israel as the Jewish state, provides for compensation for refugees but no Palestinian “right of return,” and does not go into detail on the fate of Jerusalem, Indyk indicated.

Well-placed political sources told The Times of Israel at the weekend, meanwhile, that Netanyahu’s agreement to continue peace talks on the basis of the framework proposal need not provoke a coalition crisis with the right-wing Jewish Home party. Provided the framework deal was not binding and was not brought to a government vote, the sources said, the party’s leader, Economy and Trade Minister Naftali Bennett, would likely not choose to bolt the coalition over it.

Reports in recent weeks have indicated that the Palestinian Authority is set to reject the framework document, but these reports have not been confirmed.



Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator over the weekend again ruled out the notion of Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Speaking at a Munich conference, on a panel with his Israeli counterpart Tzipi Livni, Erekat said the demand was unacceptable: “When you say ‘accept Israel as a Jewish state’ you are asking me to change my narrative,” he claimed, asserting that his ancestors lived in the region “5,500 years before Joshua Bin-Nun came and burned my hometown Jericho.”

Several Israeli right-wing politicians castigated Kerry on Saturday for comments he made at the same event, the Munich Security Conference, warning Israel of dire consequences if the current peace effort fails. Kerry said he was utterly certain that the current status quo was “not sustainable… It’s illusionary. There’s a momentary prosperity. There’s a momentary peace.” But that would end if the talks failed, he said, noting that already Israel was facing increased delegitimization and boycott threats. (A series of banks and pension funds in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Holland have announced a cessation of dealings with Israeli banks and companies in recent days because of those firms’ West Bank activities.)



Kerry said failure to reach a peace deal would damage Israel’s capacity to be “a democratic state with the particular special Jewish character that is a central part of the narrative and of the future.”

The secretary also responded to last month’s highly critical comments about him by Ya’alon, who apologized after being quoted calling him “obsessive” and “messianic” in his push for peace. Kerry said he was “surprised” by the reports, and that rather than being obsessive or fanatical, he and his team were “just working hard, because the consequences of failure are unacceptable.”

In response to the secretary’s warnings about the delegitimizing and boycotting of Israel, Bennett, the economy and trade minister, accused Kerry of incitement and of serving as a “mouthpiece” for anti-Semitic elements attempting to boycott Israel. To Kerry “and all advisers,” Bennett wrote in a Facebook post, “the Jewish people are stronger than the threats against them.” He added that the Jews would not “surrender their land” as a result of economic pressure.

“Only security will bring economic stability, not a terrorist state close to Ben-Gurion Airport. We expect our friends around the world to stand by our side to face the anti-Semitic attempts to boycott Israel, not to be their mouthpiece,” Bennett added. ”In any case, we knew how to stay strong in the past and we will now as well.”



Housing and Construction Minister Uri Ariel (Jewish Home) was also quick to respond to Kerry’s comments. ”Kerry said today that Israel’s economic prosperity and security are an illusion, and that if peace talks fail, Israel will be boycotted. But the truth is that the only illusions are the peace slogans Kerry is trying to sell to Israel. Slogans that cover up an existential threat to the State of Israel,” Ariel posted late Saturday on his official Facebook page. ”The Palestinians can hardly believe how lucky they are to have such a ‘fair’ mediator,” he added. “This is what incitement looks like.”

Likud MK Tzipi Hotovely, meanwhile, said Kerry’s “threats of an unprecedented boycotts” were “attempts to intimidate Israel in an effort to impose a dangerous agreement that runs contrary to the position of the Israeli government.” She said such an agreement, would “jeopardize Israel’s security,” and be “worse than any economic boycott.”

Likud MK and deputy minister Ofir Akunis also lambasted Kerry for his remarks, saying they were indicative of Washington’s “aggressive policy towards Israel.” He added, “We were here before Kerry, we’ll be here after him as well.”

Israeli government sources quoted by Channel 2 urged Kerry to pressure the Palestinians not Israel, and said that his warnings to Israel only made the Palestinians more obdurate in their positions.

http://normanfinkelstein.com/2014/noose-tightens-another-notch-its-nearly-checkmate-for-the-palestinians-if-they-say-no-they-will-be-declared-the-spoilers/
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