Derailing Chilcot: The red herring of post-war planning in Iraq

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Salaam

Interesting. Lets see how the pathetic Blair wriggle his way out of this.

When it comes to the Iraq invasion, the British establishment have conveniently asked the wrong questions

“If they can get you asking the wrong questions,” the American novelist Thomas Pynchon once wrote, “they don’t have to worry about answers.”

When it comes to the US and UK’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent occupation, the British establishment have conveniently and repeatedly asked the wrong questions.

Quoting a senior, unnamed source, last month the Times newspaper reported that Tony Blair, former foreign secretary Jack Straw and the former head of MI6 Richard Dearlove “will face serious ‘damage to their reputations’ from the Chilcot report into the Iraq War, which has delivered an ‘absolutely brutal’ verdict on the mismanagement of the occupation”. According to the Times “the section [of the inquiry’s report] on the occupation will be longer than that on the build-up to” the invasion, and the Times reporter blogged that the section on the occupation “is where some of the most damning verdicts are drawn”.

As they have done with every previous public utterance he has made in recent years, the Guardian happily provided Blair with a platform in June to pre-empt the inquiry’s findings – and shift the focus to the occupation and away from the most damaging and dangerous areas for the former prime minister. According to the Guardian, Blair will “argue the ultimate cause of the long-term bloodshed in Iraq was the scale of external intervention in the country by Iran and al-Qaeda”. (Come on, stop laughing, this is serious). He will also “accept that the planning for the aftermath of the war was inadequate” and admit “the West did not foresee the degree to which complex tribal, religious and sectarian tensions would be uncorked” by overthrowing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

Let’s be clear: the US-UK military occupation of Iraq – full of massive amounts of deadly violence dished out by the US and UK armed forces, torture and destructive divide-and-rule tactics – was a catastrophe for the people of Iraq. And it was hugely unpopular, with a secret Ministry of Defence 2005 poll of Iraqis finding that 82 percent "strongly opposed" the presence of coalition troops, with 45 percent saying attacks against US and UK forces were justified.

However, it is a complete red herring to suggest better planning is the crux of the issue. “The problem wasn’t the way that this was implemented, the problem was that we were there at all,” argued Rory Stewart, who served as the coalition's provisional authority deputy governorate co-ordinator in Maysan province In Iraq, in 2013:

“All these people who think ‘If only we had done this, if only if we hadn’t de-Ba’athified, if only we hadn’t abolished the army’ misunderstand the fundamental tragedy of that encounter between the international community and Iraqis… it wasn’t the detailed, tactical decisions that were made, it was the overall fact of our presence. The problem was so deep that if we hadn’t made those mistakes we would have made other mistakes. It was a wrecked intervention from the beginning, from the very moment we arrived on the ground.”

Moreover, the assumption behind the establishment’s fretting over post-war planning is that if the occupation had gone smoothly, then everything would have been OK. In reality, it would not have changed the fact that the US and UK aggressively invaded an oil-rich nation in contravention of international law, based on a pack of deceptions. It was a “crime of aggression” – as explained by the chief legal adviser at the Foreign Office at the time – whether the occupation was successful or not. Bluntly, if I plan and execute a robbery, whether it goes "smoothly" with minimal violence and resistance or is a complete mess is immaterial – it’s still a crime.

The limited, self-serving debate surrounding post-war planning in Iraq echoes the liberal media’s belief that, to quote Cambridge Professor David Runciman, the US and UK invaded Iraq “to spread the merits of democracy”. Yes, it all went wrong, but our intentions were good. This kind of thinking can lead to spectacularly convoluted and offensive conclusions, as the BBC’s John Humphrys proved in October 2012 when he asked about the British occupation of Iraq: “If a country has sent its young men to another country to die, to restore – create democracy, you’d expect, well you’d expect a bit of gratitude, wouldn’t you?”

British historian Mark Curtis has coined a term for this blinkered power-friendly framing: "Britain’s basic benevolence." Criticism of foreign policies is possible, notes Curtis, “but within narrow limits which show ‘exceptions’ to, or ‘mistakes’ in, promoting the rule of basic benevolence”.

The West’s support for democracy in the Middle East is also evidence-free. “It is presented as though the invasion of Iraq was motivated largely or entirely by an altruistic desire to share democracy,” notes Jane Kinninmont, deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House.

“This is asserted despite the long history of Anglo-American great-power involvement in the Middle East, which has, for the most part, not involved an effort to democratise the region,” she explains. “Rather, the general trend has been to either support authoritarian rulers who were already in place, or to participate in the active consolidation of authoritarian rule, including strong military and intelligence cooperation, as long as these rulers have been seen as supporting Western interests more than popularly elected governments would.”

Back to Chilcot. Blair’s government and its supporters successfully deceived – or at least bamboozled – large sections of the press and key sections of the establishment in 2002-3, in what Curtis calls “a government propaganda campaign of perhaps unprecedented heights in the post-war world”.

By steering the debate onto questions surrounding the occupation of Iraq, Blair and co, assisted by a pliant press and Chilcot, are once again shifting the narrative to their advantage. We cannot allow them to triumph over us again. Therefore, it is imperative that everyone interested in uncovering the truth and seeking justice for Iraqis keep the focus on the key issue – the deceptions, lies and legal questions surrounding the run-up to the initial invasion.

As the judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg – a key influence on the development of international law – declared, “To initiate a war of aggression… is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”

http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/2027-derailing-chilcot-the-red-herring-of-post-war-planning-in-iraq

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Salaam

Another update

Chilcot's blind spot: Oil

When the UK invaded, Iraq had nearly a tenth of the world's oil reserves -- and government documents "explicitly state" oil was a consideration before the war. Why didn't Chilcot explore it further?

The long-awaited Chilcot Report was finally released yesterday, examining the UK’s involvement in the Iraq War and occupation. Unfortunately, on the most important question, the report’s conclusions are all but silent: why did the UK go to war?

Chilcot takes at face value the Blair government’s claim that the motive was to address Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and limits its criticism to mistakes in the intelligence on WMD, and on insufficient administrative and military planning. He shows a remarkable lack of curiosity about the political factors behind the move to war, especially given the weakness (even at the time) of the WMD case.

Most important of these is oil. Buried in deep in volume 9 of the 2.6 million-word report, Chilcot refers to government documents that explicitly state the oil objective, and outlining how Britain pursued that objective throughout the occupation. But he does not consider this evidence in his analysis or conclusions. Oil considerations do not even appear in the report’s 150-page summary.

To many people around the world, it was obvious that oil was a central issue, as Iraq itself had nearly a tenth of the world’s oil reserves, and together with its neighbouring countries nearly two thirds. There was a clear public interest in understanding how that affected UK decisions. Chilcot failed to explore it.

Section 10.3 of the report, in volume 9, records that senior government officials met secretly with BP and Shell on at several occasions (denied at the time) to discuss their commercial interests in obtaining contracts. Chilcot did not release the minutes, but we had obtained them under the Freedom of Information Act: they are posted here. In usually expressive terms for a civil service write-up, one of the meeting’s minutes began, “Iraq is the big oil prospect. BP are desperate to get in there” (emphasis in original).

Also in that section, Chilcot includes references to several pre-war documents identifying a British objective of using Iraqi oil to boost Britain’s own energy supplies. For example, a February 2002 Cabinet Office paper stated that the UK’s Iraq policy falls “within our objectives of preserving peace and stability in the Gulf and ensuring energy security”. A Foreign Office strategy paper in May 2003, which Chilcot didn’t include, was even more explicit: "The future shape of the Iraqi oil industry will affect oil markets, and the functioning of OPEC, in both of which we have a vital interest".

So there was the motive; but how did the UK act on it? That same section 10.3 refers to numerous documents revealing the UK’s evolving actions to shape the structure of the Iraqi oil industry, throughout the occupation until 2009. The government did so in close coordination with BP and Shell. This full story – with its crucial context *– was told in Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq.

As the UK’s strategy evolved with changing circumstances, two priority objectives remain consistently emphasised in the documents: to transfer Iraq’s oil industry from public ownership to the hands of multinational companies, and to make sure BP and Shell get a large piece of that.

During the direct occupation of 2003-4, the UK consistently pushed oil policy towards the longer-term issue of privatisation, rather than the immediate rebuilding of the war-damaged infrastructure. The government installed Terry Adams, a former senior manager of BP, in Baghdad to begin that work.

British officials knew their plans were not what Iraqis wanted. One document in 2004, seen but not released by Chilcot, noted that the oil issue was “politically sensitive, touching on issues of sovereignty”. Without recognising any conflict, it recommended that Britain “push the message on [foreign direct investment] to the Iraqis in private, but it will require careful handling to avoid the impression that we are trying to push the Iraqis down one particular path”.

British officials actively pressed the oil issue on the interim government in 2004-5, the provisional government in 2005-6, and the permanent government of from 2006. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote to Tony Blair in July 2005 setting out the progress on those activities. He wrote that Iraqi oil “remains important for the UK commercially and in terms of energy security. Foreign investment is badly needed and we need to continue to support Iraq to create the right framework for investment, while also supporting UK companies to engage”.

During the December 2005 election, British Ambassador William Patey sought to pressure candidates to accept passage of an oil privatization law as a top priority for the new government. During 2006 and 2007 this law became the key focus of British and US political efforts in Iraq. Forcing passage of this law became a major focus of UK and US political efforts over the subsequent two years, and was closely tied to the “surge” in troops that President Bush announced in January 2007.

Deep in volume 9, when Chilcot refers to these British efforts, he presents them under the veneer of normal diplomatic activity, neglecting the reality that the UK and USA still had 150,000 troops the country, and had directly appointed the interim government. The permanent government in 2006 was established through elections the UK and USA had designed, and contested by the politicians they had promoted. Terry Adams was even commissioned to draft the contracts that would be signed with the likes of his former company.

In the end, attempts by Britain and the US to force a law through that legalised oil privatisation failed. The law was not passed, largely because of a popular Iraqi campaign against it. It was then decided to sign long-term contracts even without any legal basis for doing so. Iraq´s oil industry is largely now run – illegally – by companies like BP, Shell and ExxonMobil.

Chilcot has said he was not asked to judge whether the war was legal. Yet in his failure to examine the real motive for war, he has side-lined crucial evidence that might tell us about the legality of the war and occupation, and the culpability of senior UK officials, including Tony Blair.

http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/2042-chilcot-s-blind-spot-oil

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salaam

Another update

Chilcot Report must acknowledge tortured ‘confessions’ as reason for Iraq war

London – The Chilcot Report must recognise that Britain went to war in Iraq based on falsified information and tortured confessions from a vast network involving the US, the UK, France, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Algeria. Failing to acknowledge this reality and hold the perpetrators accountable will render the report incomplete.

The main ‘evidence’ of a link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda was a confession extracted from Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi in Egypt, after he had been severely tortured and water-boarded.

The testimony of al-Libi has since been widely discredited after it became clear that it was extracted under duress. The United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), later confirmed that the information the CIA had used, was completely incorrect.

Other false tortured testimonies formed the basis of the invasion. These included a confession – which he never saw – extracted from Abu Attiyya in Jordan, ‘evidence’ provided by Said Arif in Syria, who suffered isolation, beatings, and torture with a television cable and a tyre, and a confession under torture by Mohammed Meguerba in Algeria.

The way in which this ‘evidence’ was extracted and linked up by security agencies to paint a picture to justify the invasion of Iraq is evidence of global programme of torture, a blatant violation of due process and human rights that should be the subject of an independent investigation.

Moazzam Begg, CAGE Outreach Director, said:

“The Iraq War and the resultant rise of ISIS has at its nexus a programme of torture. Those who directed, instigated and co-ordinated this programme must be held accountable if we are to halt the cycles of violence.”

“We campaigned against Guantanamo and were castigated and labelled ‘extremist’. But our work against torture and extraordinary rendition, which all came out of the Iraq War, was ground breaking. Our mission is implementation of the rule of law. If Chilcot is to mean anything, it has to lead the architects of the War on Terror to accept their complicity in torture and rendition programmes the world over. The fight against so called ‘extremism’ has been a cover used by despots and democrats for the most horrendous human rights abuses in the modern age.”

http://cage.ngo/press-release/chilcot-report-must-acknowledge-tortured-confessions-as-reason-for-iraq-war/

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Salaam

Another comment piece.

Chilcot Report was about the process, not the strategy behind the Iraq war

The Chilcot report was all about the processes, not the ideology or values which justified the Iraq war, writes Dr Abdul Wahid.

In 2003, Britain’s political class believed that Saddam Hussein, uniquely amongst Middle East despots, was an enemy who deserved removal. “Regime change” for a government with whom they had once trade in oil and arms, and over whose mass murder they had remained silent.

Muammar Gaddafi, Hosni Mubarak and others were to remain allies – deserving of a hug and even a holiday with Tony Blair – until British interests changed to support one section of Gaddafi’s opponents at the time of the Arab Spring. In Egypt, however, Sisi was supported over Morsi – despite the latter being democratically elected.

Confused by the inconsistency? We shouldn’t be. Lord Palmerston, Britain’s Foreign Secretary in the 1840s, once famously said that, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow” – the doctrine Britain has practiced for at least 200 years.

The aim isn’t about establishing decent values in the world. Occasionally it might be to make Britain safer e.g. against Nazi Germany – but mostly, it’s to make a section of Britain’s elite richer.

Chilcot Report

Sir John Chilcot’s remit was not to explore the fundamentals of British foreign policy. It was confined to exploring the processes surrounding the Iraq war, and concluded in devastating detail the failure to question the intelligence that falsely alleged Saddam had WMD’s; the failure of cabinet discussion; the failure to exhaust diplomatic options prior to going to war; the failure for the military high command to raise concerns when the war policy was going wrong; the failure to plan for the aftermath, despite adequate warnings about the possible consequences etc.

Britain’s political class is shamed by these failures of process. But there is very little disagreement about the Britain’s foreign policies, particularly towards the Muslim world.

Alliances with the House of Saud and other Gulf regimes, the Assad family, Mubarak, Gaddafi, Karimov in Uzbekistan – have all been about maintaining British influence, so as to make “the few” richer.

Similarly, war against Saddam followed Palmerstone’s doctrine in that it was never about his crimes against his people, nor to make Britain safer, but part of a wider strategy to maintain Britain’ influence in a changing world.

Some say Blair looked “haunted” in his response to Chilcot. Others say he looked deluded. But to me it was neither. It was an explanation that the underlying policy of which this failed war was but one part – to use diplomatic and military force to secure British interests thousands of miles away – was fundamentally sound.

He argued, as he has done consistently, that 9/11 showed that “Islamist extremism” was a regional and global threat. Saddam’s Iraq – like most of the other regimes – was unsustainable in the long run and the risk of an overthrow by those “Islamist extremists” was real. The Arab Spring, he said, showed that Western intervention was necessary before events ran their own course.

Preventing real change

I do not think Blair, Bush, Cameron, Gove and others believe their own lies – that a real Islamic change in the Muslim world would be any immediate security threat to Britain or Europe.

But what they do know is that an independently minded government anywhere in the Muslim world, which decided not to play by the rules of capitalism and its current world order, would fundamentally threaten British influence and corporate interests – and that their aforementioned support for wars and odious regimes, and the lies about Islam, are all justified because of this.

Far from being a threat to peoples’ lives across the world, an Islamic government on the principles of the Prophetic model would voice a different set of values on the world stage, putting human dignity above material benefits for colonial powers.

It would question a world that is dominated by values that produce today’s global policies – where making peoples’ lives are more secure or more dignified are never the aim, just an occasionally be a “welcome” side effect.

It would not simply question wars, but the policies that keep millions enslaved in poverty.

It would not allow virtual slave labour (as in Qatar) or global health hazards (such as Zika) to justify entertainment spectacles like the World Cup or Olympics, whose primary aim is to make their sponsors richer.

Chilcot may have fulfilled his remit. But that shouldn’t stop people looking at the dark values that do not just underpin the Iraq war. Whether “Blairite” warmongering or the use of “soft power” (i.e. diplomacy, trade, overseas aid, education programs etc), the long term aim of Britain foreign policy is rarely questioned or challenged.

Its role to interfere in other countries – sometimes destabilising elected politicians, sometimes stabilising unelected dictators – is all too often either unknown, ignored or accepted.

http://5pillarsuk.com/2016/07/09/chilcot-report-was-about-the-process-not-the-strategy-behind-the-iraq-war/

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More in depth analysis of the Chilcot report.

The Great Iraq War Fraud

Last week, seven years after the Iraq Inquiry was set up, Sir John Chilcot finally delivered his long-awaited report. Although it stopped short of declaring the Iraq war illegal, and although it failed to examine the real motives for war, the report was not quite the whitewash that had been feared by peace campaigners.

Lindsey German, convenor of the Stop the War Coalition, gave a succinct summary of the Chilcot report, listing four of the main findings (each followed by our own comment):

1. There was no imminent threat to Britain from Saddam Hussein, so war in March 2003 was unnecessary.

In reality: utterly devastated by war, bombing and 12 years of sanctions, Iraq posed no threat whatsoever towards Britain or the US. The idea that there was any kind of threat from this broken, impoverished country was simply a lie; a propaganda fabrication by warmongering cynics and corporate hangers-on eager for a piece of the pie.

2. The existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was presented with a certainty that was not justified. It was never 'beyond doubt' that the weapons existed. None have been found in the subsequent 13 years.

In reality: it was completely clear, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the whole 'weapons of mass destruction' issue was a propaganda fabrication; a way of suggesting a 'threat' where none existed. Iraq only ever possessed battlefield biological and chemical weapons that were of no conceivable threat to the West. Iraq didn't even use them when the West attacked the country in 1991. Not only that, but UN weapons inspectors had overseen the near-complete destruction of even these tinpot devices between 1991-1998; only 'sludge' remained: a known fact. Iraq was of no more threat to the West in 2002-2003 than Thailand or Iceland; that is all that needs to be said. Almost everything else is superfluous: cynical propaganda which was, and is, manipulated by violent Western leaderships that think nothing of smashing other countries to bits for whatever reason they declare 'necessary'.

3. There was a failure of democratic government and accountability, with Blair keeping most of his Cabinet in the dark. This meant that he avoided telling them things which they ought to have known.

In reality: The Americans decided to exploit the dead of September 11 to wage war in the name of power and profit. Blair decided to take part in the crime, come what may, from the start. His whole intention was to make that possible, to trap Iraq into war and to use the UN to apply a veneer of legality to the monstrous crime. One million people paid with their lives, and a whole country was destroyed in the process. Bush at least had an 'excuse'; he was, after all, a hard-right president operating out of a notoriously venal, violent and corrupt Republican 'party'. (As Noam Chomsky has noted, it is wrong to consider it a legitimate party. It is merely a collection of greedy vested interests, qualifying it as a candidate for 'for the most dangerous organization in human history'.) Blair, on the other hand, was prime minister on behalf of a supposedly left-leaning Labour party rooted in supposedly genuine ethical values. His rejection of democracy in the name of war was the perfect culmination of his coup transforming Labour into another power-serving Tory party.

4. George Bush and Blair worked to undermine the authority of the UN.

In reality: Bush and Blair sought to exploit the good name of the UN to provide a cover for their crime. The intention was to use the appearance of diplomacy as propaganda justifying war. If Saddam could be trapped into appearing intransigent in the face of UN resolutions, so much the better for war. Diplomacy was only ever perceived as a means to achieve war, not peace. The whole 'weapons of mass destruction' fraud had been concocted by conspirators intent on war. Why would those same fraudsters attempt to work through the UN to achieve peace? That was the last outcome they wanted.

In an already infamous phrase, Blair told Bush that:

'I will be with you, whatever'.

Those words will haunt Blair to his grave.There is no doubt that his reputation is now in tatters, even in 'mainstream' circles. There have been follow-up calls for him to be punished by being thrown out of the Queen's Privy Council, impeached and put on trial for misleading Parliament, and charged with war crimes.

Unusually for the 'mainstream' press, Andrew Buncombe of the Independent wrote a piece focusing on the death toll in Iraq. As he notes, a study conducted by Johns Hopkins University's Bloomberg School of Public Health, published in the prestigious journal The Lancet in 2006, estimated the number of Iraqi dead at around 650,000. Even worse, a report (pdf) last year by Physicians for Social Responsibility estimated the Iraq death toll as around one million. Added to this ghastly pyramid of corpses, the Bush-Blair 'War on Terror' has led to 220,000 dead in Afghanistan and 80,000 in Pakistan. These appalling figures hardly ever appear in the 'mainstream' media. As Les Roberts, one of the Lancet authors, observes, the media is guilty of 'failing to report on uncomfortable truths.'

Burying The Facts And Stifling Dissent

As well as burying the Iraq death toll, the corporate media have been guilty of hiding or downplaying the following:

• Iraq's people and infrastructure had already been crushed by a genocidal regime of UN sanctions, maintained with especially brutal vigour by Washington and London.
• Iraq had already been essentially disarmed of any WMD, as revealed by relevant experts; notably Scott Ritter, former chief UNSCOM weapons inspector. This was known well in advance of the war, as our media alerts from October 2002 make clear ('Iraq and Arms Inspectors - The Big Lie', Part 1 and Part 2).
• In the immediate aftermath of 9-11, there was an agreed-upon Washington strategy to start wars against seven countries (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Iran) in five years, as revealed by US General Wesley Clark.
• The infamous 'Downing Street Memo' showed that the intelligence and facts were being 'fixed around' the pre-existing policy of invasion. Indeed, this was nothing less than a conspiracy to launch a war. You will struggle in vain to find 'mainstream' commentators linking any of this to Blair's 'I'm with you, whatever' pledge to Bush.
• The West's desire to control oil resources was a key motivating factor for war.
• The role of corporations and financial interests in driving government policy; in particular, the profits demanded by the 'defence' industry and arms manufacturers.
• War crimes committed by US armed forces; for example, in Fallujah.
• The devastating long-term impacts of the invasion in terms of cancer rates and congenital abnormalities.

In 2004, when we challenged media editors to critique their own abysmal performance on Iraq, we were essentially told: 'We have nothing to apologise for'. The response from David Mannion, then head of ITV News, summed up media complacency, indeed complicity, in channelling war propaganda:

'The evidence suggests we have no need for a mea culpa. We did our job well.'

Today, the body of media evidence that we have accumulated shows precisely the opposite. In particular, the bulk of BBC output on Iraq can be characterised by one word: 'Newspeak'. In 2003, a Cardiff University report found that the BBC 'displayed the most "pro-war" agenda of any broadcaster' on the Iraq invasion. Over the three weeks of the initial conflict, 11% of the sources quoted by the BBC were of coalition government or military origin, the highest proportion of all the main television broadcasters. The BBC was less likely than Sky, ITV or Channel 4 News to use independent sources, who also tended to be the most sceptical. The BBC also placed least emphasis on Iraqi casualties, which were mentioned in 22% of its stories about the Iraqi people, and it was least likely to report on Iraqi opposition to the invasion.

On the eve of the invasion of Iraq, Andrew Bergin, the press officer for Stop the War, told Media Lens:

'Representatives of the coalition have been invited to appear on every TV channel except the BBC. The BBC have taken a conscious decision to actively exclude Stop the War Coalition people from their programmes, even though everyone knows we are central to organising the massive anti-war movement'. (Email to Media Lens, March 14, 2003)

In 2003, Richard Sambrook, then head of BBC News, told staff not to broadcast 'extreme' anti-war opinion. His deputy, Mark Damazer, issued an email to newsroom staff 'listing which categories of journalist should not attend' the peace march in London in February 2003:

'These include all presenters, correspondents, editors, output editors and "anyone who can be considered a 'gatekeeper' of our output".'

David Miller, then a professor of sociology at Strathclyde University and co-founder of SpinWatch, noted afterwards:

'BBC managers have fallen over themselves to grovel to the government in the aftermath of the Hutton whitewash... When will their bosses apologise for conspiring to keep the anti-war movement off the screens? Not any time soon.'

In a speech at New York's Columbia University, John Pilger commented:

'We now know that the BBC and other British media were used by MI6, the secret intelligence service. In what was called "Operation Mass Appeal", MI6 agents planted stories about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction - such as weapons hidden in his palaces and in secret underground bunkers. All these stories were fake.'

Pilger's documentary on the propaganda role played by the corporate media, The War You Don't See, is a must-watch.

'Bringing Democracy And Human Rights' To Iraq

It is worth reminding ourselves just what some media 'gatekeepers' were saying back in 2003. The BBC's Nicholas Witchell declared of the US invasion, as it steamrollered its way into central Baghdad:

'It is absolutely, without a doubt, a vindication of the strategy.' (BBC News at Six, April 9, 2003)

Natasha Kaplinsky, then a BBC breakfast news presenter, beamed as she described how Blair 'has become, again, Teflon Tony'. The BBC's Mark Mardell agreed:

'It has been a vindication for him.' (BBC1, Breakfast News, April 10, 2003)

ITN's Tom Bradby said:

'This war has been a major success.' (ITN Evening News, April 10, 2003)

ITN's John Irvine also saw vindication in the arrival of US armed forces:

'A war of three weeks has brought an end to decades of Iraqi misery.' (ITN Evening News, April 9, 2003)

On Channel 4 News, Jack Straw, then UK foreign secretary, told Jon Snow that he had met with the French foreign minister that day:

'Did he look chastened?', asked Snow wryly. (Channel 4, April 9, 2003)

Snow did not respond when he was asked on Twitter a few days ago by one of our readers whether the Channel 4 News presenter 'felt chastened' on being reminded of this.

In 2006, we noted that 'embedded' BBC reporter Paul Wood had asserted that US and British troops had come to Iraq to 'bring democracy and human rights'. When we challenged Helen Boaden, then head of BBC News, to explain this propagandistic reporting, she sent us six pages of quotes by Bush and Blair as supposed proof of noble intent. The notion that 'we' are the 'good guys' is fully embedded in the mindsets of senior media professionals. When Boaden grew exasperated with Media Lens challenges about the BBC's systematically biased reporting on Iraq, she changed her email address and joked about it to an audience of media professionals.

Boaden was not alone in her ideological fervour, however. Many MPs bought Blair's rhetoric about 'bringing democracy and human rights' to Iraq. Investigative journalist Nafeez Ahmed notes that most of the Labour MPs now opposing Jeremy Corbyn are 'stained with the blood of Iraq'. He adds:

'nearly 100 percent of the Labour MPs who have moved to oust Jeremy Corbyn voted against an investigation into the Iraq war.'

Ahmed continues:

'Amongst the Labour MPs who had voted in 2003 on the Iraq war, an overwhelming majority who voted against Corbyn were in favour of the military invasion of the country, which paved the way for an escalation of sectarian strife, and ultimately the rise of the Islamic State (IS).

'More generally, well over half of the Labour MPs against Corbyn are supportive of British military interventions abroad.'

These so-called 'chicken coup' plotters attempting to oust Corbyn are now 'in retreat', pinning 'their hopes on a challenge by Angela Eagle, despite many believing that she will not beat Mr Corbyn because of his support among members.'

Broken Promises, Regrets And Silences

Cast your mind back to April 9, 2003. US troops had just reached central Baghdad. Recall the footage of Saddam's statue being pulled down in Firdos Square in what is now known to have been a staged public relations exercise to create a 'propaganda moment'. The US army even admitted as much later.

That night, Andrew Marr, then BBC News political editor, addressed his audience on BBC News at Ten. It is worth recounting in full what he said:

'Frankly, Huw, the main mood [in Downing Street] is unbridled relief. I've been watching ministers wander around with smiles like split watermelons.'

The fact that Marr delivered this with his own happy smile was a portent of what was to come. He was then asked by BBC news presenter Huw Edwards to describe the significance of the fall of Baghdad:

'Well, I think this does one thing. It draws a line under what had been, before this war, a period of... well, a faint air of pointlessness, almost, was hanging over Downing Street. There were all these slightly tawdry arguments and scandals. That is now history. Mr Blair is well aware that all his critics out there in the party and beyond aren't going to thank him - because they're only human - for being right when they've been wrong. And he knows that there might be trouble ahead, as I've said. But I think this is a very, very important moment for him. It gives him a new freedom and a new self-confidence. He confronted many critics.

'I don't think anybody after this is going to be able to say of Tony Blair that he's somebody who is driven by the drift of public opinion, or focus groups, or opinion polls. He took all of those on. He said that they would be able to take Baghdad without a bloodbath, and that in the end the Iraqis would be celebrating. And on both of those points he has been proved conclusively right. And it would be entirely ungracious, even for his critics, not to acknowledge that tonight he stands as a larger man and a stronger prime minister as a result.'

This was BBC 'impartiality' in action. Although reading those words today and, especially, watching the clip is jaw-dropping, such propagandist comments about Blair and Iraq were not unusual then on the BBC, and elsewhere in the national news media. The next time BBC News praises itself as 'the best news organisation in the world', just think of that clip.

In the wake of Chilcot, we reminded readers about this – arguably now infamous – Marr clip. We asked Marr for his thoughts about it now; he ignored us. However, he responded to someone else who asked him about it. He answered:

'it was rubbish but it came after weeks when I'd been predicting Baghdad bloodbath - the Iraqi army gave up'.

Gave up? Or were slaughtered under 'Shock and awe'? As for the gushing praise for Blair, Marr was silent.

Marr's successor as BBC News political editor was Nick Robinson. We reminded Marr of Robinson's mournful comment:

'The build-up to the invasion of Iraq is the point in my career when I have most regretted not pushing harder and not asking more questions'.

(Nick Robinson, Live From Downing Street, Bantam Books, London, p. 332)

Robinson had been ITV News political editor from 2002-2005. We asked Marr whether he shared his colleague's regrets. Again, the response was silence.

Of course, Robinson had earlier excused himself by saying that in his role as political editor:

'It was my job to report what those in power were doing or thinking . . . That is all someone in my sort of job can do.'

(Nick Robinson, '"Remember the last time you shouted like that?" I asked the spin-doctor', The Times, July 16, 2004)

As the US journalist Glenn Greenwald later remarked:

'That'd make an excellent epitaph on the tombstone of modern establishment journalism'.

In the same Times column, Robinson had attempted to justify his lack of scrutiny of government propaganda:

'Elsewhere on our bulletins we did report those who questioned the truth of what we were being told.'

There is scant evidence of that being the case. Those with the expertise, not just to question, but to demolish, Bush and Blair's ludicrous excuses for war were rarely seen.

In his article, Robinson had also made this solemn promise:

'Now, more than ever before, I will pause before relaying what those in power say. Now, more than ever, I will try to examine the contradictory case.'

To little or no avail, as we have seen in the intervening years. Those with the expertise, not just to question, but to demolish, Bush and Blair's ludicrous excuses for war were nowhere to be seen.

As for Blair, John Pilger had already written back in 2010 that the former Prime Minister should be prosecuted for his shared responsibility for a war of aggression that had led to the deaths of a million Iraqis. But the responsibility does not stop there:

'The Cabinet in March 2003 knew a great deal about the conspiracy to attack Iraq. Jack Straw, later appointed "justice secretary", suppressed the relevant Cabinet minutes in defiance of an order by the Information Commissioner to release them.'

Also sitting in the Blair Cabinet were Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary; Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer who released the finances to fund the war; and John Prescott, the Deputy Prime Minister. Last Sunday, Prescott tried to dodge his part in the supreme international crime by claiming that he was 'forced' to sign up to what he now concedes was an illegal war by the devious, wily Blair. Prescott, we are to believe, was duped by Blair's mendacious charm, even while millions of people saw through the lies and went out to march in protest on British streets.

As Lindsey German of Stop the War sums up:

'Thirteen years after the war, the Middle East is in flames, Britain is a more dangerous place than it was and the threat of terrorism across the region is greater. Chilcot makes clear that this was a catastrophe both foretold and avoidable.

'Chilcot would not have happened without the anti-war movement and we should not see it as the end.

'There have to be consequences for those responsible for this terrible war.'

Those responsible include not only those politicians who took this country into war, but also the media that facilitated the greatest crime of the century.

http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/2016/823-the-great-iraq-war-fraud.html