By Khaled Mamdouh, IOL Staff Writer
CAIRO, April 6, 2006 – (IslamOnline.net) - Joshua Muravchik is a resident scholar with the conservative US think tank, American Enterprise Institute (AEI). The neoconservative writer and author of The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism [published by AEI in 1996], believes the United States should have used more "power" when it attacked Iraq. He also says the Americans "should have left" the Arab country relatively quickly. As for Iran, Muravchik believes a US military strike against the Islamic Republic's "nuclear installations" is "pretty likely."
In his interview with IOL, which took place during a business visit to Cairo to prepare for his coming book on democracy and reform in Egypt,
Muravchik said he believed the only way out for peace in the Middle East was the two-state solution, with Arab East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state. While acknowledging that he believes Israel does possess "nuclear powers," he justified that by claiming the existence of the Jewish state is "under threat."
Being a strong believer in the idea of "exporting democracy" to the Middle East, he also touched on the current debate in Washington about the foreign policy that led to the Iraq invasion-turned-occupation, saying there are "three camps."
Neoconservatism
Question: The notorious "neocon" thinkers and writers seem to be dominating the US foreign policy recently, how do you plead?
Answer: Originally the term neoconservatism was applied during the 1970s to a group of writers who were not an organized group but of a similar mindset and often writing to the same papers and magazines … who were liberals on the left or moderate left. Or some were even a little further to the socialists, and it was applied to them. It was not a name that they chose [for] themselves, it was applied as an insult by our enemies.
[During] the seventies in the United States, the main political debate was on the war in Vietnam. …In turn [that war] inspired a debate about a bigger issue which is whether America has been too anti-communist and that has got us into trouble in the war in Vietnam and most liberals in the 1970s said, "Yes, we had been too fanatically anti-communist and we had to think about this in a new way."
But there was a group of liberals who said, "No, communism is a terrible evil, an evil empire and that regardless of what would happen in Vietnam, we should be very militantly anti-communism." I was part of that group.
In that debate, the other dominant liberal group that was becoming less anti-communist started to call us neoconservatives, [they said to us,]"You people are such fanatic anti-communists, you do not deserve to be called liberals any more. You are neoconservatives."
Since we thought of ourselves as liberals, we thought it was not fair to put that label on us, but since there were more of them than of us, the media started to use that term the way they used it. So, over a few years we surrendered and accepted the label. That's the origin.
With the cold war over in 1989, the term disappeared and it only came back in the last couple of years with the debate about Iraq.
Q: You, like most neocons, were avid supporters of invading Iraq. Three years later, Francis Fukuyama, William Buckley, Andrew Sullivan, George Will, and many others, seem to be retracting their support. Where do you stand?
A: have to divide the question on where I stand now and where I stood in 2003. I think you'd find most probably all of the people you named now would not agree with Congressmen who are calling for swift US withdrawal – that we should just leave Iraq today.
Even people who say, "On second thought, we should not have done this." [These people] say now we have to deal with the situation. "If we just leave, there will be a civil war in Iraq," therefore we have to try to leave when we can, but under better circumstances.
Q: What about you?
A: If you are asking me if we have to do it all over again, where do I stand now.
My feeling about it is not much different than it was then. I was never sure, I'm not sure now and never was sure that going to Iraq was the right move for us. I do support strongly the idea of going to war on terrorism and as I described that yesterday (during a symposium with IOL staff) that it's like the cold war. That terrorism is a great evil, a great threat to the civilized world and that it has to be fought, and that would mean fighting over a long period of time, sometimes militarily and more often politically and very much with intelligence operations and the whole variety of tools that we might have available to us.
And it was obvious, I think, to everybody in the US, that there was a pretty big consensus that we needed to attack the Taliban in Afghanistan because it was providing home to Bin Laden and I think the American public would have still accepted that attack today.
The September 11 attacks came from a group that was based in Afghanistan. It was clear that if we want to [launch] a counterattack on Al-Qaeda [we'll have to attack Afghanistan]. So, Afghanistan was the obvious first target.
But after Afghanistan, "What should be the next step?" The next step in the war against terrorism was not obvious, and the decision to attack Iraq, I did not know then and I do not know now whether it was the right decision but I supported it and I do not regret that I supported it because I am not in the government. I did not have the chance to participate in making that decision.
Three Camps!
Q: But you and other neocon writers and scholars participated in shaping the minds of decision-makers in the administration for and in adjusting the public mind to support it!
A: Yes, that's true. I pushed for having a vigorous war against terrorism. What I am saying to you about Iraq is. …In World War II, I'd have pushed for getting into the war earlier than we did. Not waiting for Pearl Harbor [Japanese attacks on US troops at Pearl Harbor pushed the reluctant United States to join the Allies against the German-led Axis troops].
Debates were later held on grand military strategy in fighting the war [still making reference to World War II]. To me, I have no opinion on grand military strategy. It's possible it was a mistake to go to Iraq … and that we should have, instead, saved our strength to squeeze Iran which government also supports terrorism … All I am trying to say is in a moral sense, I do not regret supporting the war in Iraq. In a strategic sense I am not sure now and I was not sure then that it was the right decision to make. And I think you could say that today, there are three camps in American debate about neocons.
Q: Camps among neoconservatives?
A: I did not mean three camps among neoconservatives. I was just trying to define neoconservatism, in a very simple sense. The first camp [as far as the debate over Iraq is concerned] is conservatives and these call for larger use of US military strength, but seem to have narrow definition of US national interest. Liberals seem to have a broader definition of national interest and to achieve more idealistic goals in the world but they are very reluctant to use force.
Neocons are in between. They tend to agree with liberals [on using military might] but have a broader definition of national interest and to achieve more idealistic goals, but what they share with cons and not with liberals is the willingness to use military force.
Q: How do you see the clear change of heart, concerning Iraq, among most neocons then?
A: Buckley never was a neocon. He is a traditional conservative. I think that Buckley always objected to the war in Iraq for conservative reasons. My sense was that he was always against it.
The idea of bringing democracy to the Middle East seems to Buckley and many others to be more fanciful, because they always argue that democracy has to rest on a certain cultural basis that the West has but the Middle East does not have.
Buckley was historically a traditional conservative, but in his later years he has become very eclectic. So, he could at one moment take a very traditional conservative stand and at another could be more similar to a neocon.
Sullivanis really a case by himself. Sullivan was, in a sense, a more traditional conservative, he has been for long a traditional Catholic conservative. But he is also a leading advocate of gay rights. This made him a special kind of neo con.
And Sullivan, I think, that in the end he does not regret supporting the war. May be that he had learned many lessons that he had made mistakes but still in the end it might have been the right thing to do.
Fukuyama, of all that group, Fukuyama was the one that was more truly a neocon, and I am surprised by Fukuyama because I haven't read his book [America at the Crossroads] yet, but he is, I don't know what to say, a friend told me that Fukuyama was against the war from the beginning.
Q: But that was not what he wrote!
A: No, it's confusing to me. I think the debate now is there was a conservative argument that puts this great emphasis on the culture … as to the idea of bringing democracy to this region … the culture is so different from ours.
It's just a naïve idea and that's the essential idea that [makes me say] that all of these guys are making the same mistake.
Democracy in the Middle East
I do not want to speak for them, but I think that there was a lot of format in the Middle East, whether we help cause it or not, right now of many people in this region wanting democracy, and I am more inclined to say that we handled Iraq wrongly, and to say that it was a crazy idea to say that it would become democratic.
My own argument would have to go in with much bigger force so that we could have provided security for the Iraqis after the invasion.
I think the worst thing was that we knocked the regime of Saddam and there was chaos in Iraq and ordinary Iraqis suddenly lived in a terrible situation where they did not have a tyrant but they did not have any law to protect them.
And, of course, it was our fault! I think some people in the Pentagon were too clever about how we could go in, and I do not think the Iraqis, even they were grateful to us for getting rid of Saddam, like to be occupied. So, I think if we'd gone in with a very big force, we would have gotten rid of Saddam.
All I am saying is that we should've been able to leave [Iraq] relatively quickly. But I think on the political side, we've done badly. We went to a series of elections where each one more power has been fully in the hands of Iraqis. We might have had a better result than what we've had so far.
Iranian File
Q: Let move onto another related issue, that of Iran. Many observers see frightening similarities now to the period leading up to the Iraq invasion, but the target now is Iran, do you agree with them?
A: What's not similar to Iraq is that there is zero possibility the United States will try to occupy Iran. But there is a possibility to use military force.
Q: You mean a military strike against nuclear sites?
A: Yes, a military strike against Iran's nuclear installations. I think it is possible and pretty likely.
Q: Pretty likely?
A: I think so. Because at this point with Ahmadinejad[Iranian president] being so belligerent and with the Iranian governments pursue of this nuclear weapons' program for 20 years.
Q: Don't you mean nuclear program?
A: No, nuclear weapons program!
Q: The Iranians are denying it?
A: Yes, they are denying it, but they are lying. They've acknowledged they were lying to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] for 18 years.
Q: They opened up all their nuclear installations to the IAEA?
A: No, they didn't open everything to the IAEA.
Q: Sorry to interrupt, but this line of rational seems to correspond to the Iraq case! Iraqis were denying the weapons of mass destruction [WMD] charges, you insisted, and eventually it turned out you were the lying party!
A: [A long period of silence] It turned out things were more complicated than that. It turned out…
Q: Well, You said Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. Saddam denied this. You guys invaded the country and found nothing!
A: Well, it is also true that he was lying. He was lying about part of it. One of the reasons why we were sure is that we had clear evidence that he had been lying about weapons of mass destruction. Over a period of years, we had one of his sons in-law who left Iraq and came to Jordan [in August 1995, two daughters and a son-in-law defected to Jordan, but later return to Iraq on promises of forgiveness. Saddam Hussein had the men killed] saying they had been involved in a biological weapons program that had been hidden.
Q: In regards to Iraq, it turned out there had been so many false reports.
A: There were false reports and there was evidence the US Intelligence believed to be true but was not true. But, also, while it is not true that there were no WMD in Iraq, there are reports that show how Saddam Hussein was lying about the WMD program. Not reports from Iraqi dissidents, but ones that were found in Iraq, and the story about the development of chemical and biological weapons in the mid-1990s are confirmed.
Q: Are we now talking about the mid-1990s or only three days before the invasion in 2003 when UN weapons inspectors were actually inside Iraq and they had not found anything? Now, three years after the invasion, the Americans are saying, "We were wrong." Isn't it possible that you are now wrong about Iran's nuclear program as well?
A: Yes [A long pause of silence].
Q: Is there a remote chance that the Iranians are just seeking peaceful nuclear activities as they are saying?
A: Is there any chance? [Long period of thoughtful silence]. Theoretically I suppose so. But as I said, things are more complicated than that.
Israel
Q: Because Israel is involved? Is Israel the only issue as far as Iran is concerned?
A: No, Israel is not the only issue, but it is of course part of it.
Q: What about Israel's own nuclear arsenal?
A: [A long period of silence again] Well, there is a dramatic difference between Israel and Iran. The president of Iran said they wanted to wipe Israel off the map and he said [he wanted to do the same to] the United States, too. But statements by every Israeli government have been just the opposite. Every Israeli government has said that "we would not be the first to use such weapons." So, it's exactly the opposite of what the Iranians say.
Q: You are telling me that Israeli governments are peace-loving, unlike their Arab neighbors?
A: Israel is, to my knowledge, is the only state in the world whose very existence is challenged by some of its neighbors who say that they want it to cease to exist. So, that puts it in a very different situation from other countries.
Peace in Palestine
Q: Apart from the fact that Israel is the only state that did not, does not, and will not implement dozens of UN Security Council resolutions related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as an apparent pro-Israel, American neocon, do you see a possibility for a way out in the Middle East?
A: I think there is a possibility for a way out of this impasse in the Middle East. I think there could be answers for the three big [issues] — borders, Jerusalem, and [Palestinian] refugees. In terms of borders, I think the borders would roughly [be moved to] the 1967 borders, with some changes, as they were discussed in Camp David and Taba, as well as some of the private peace initiatives. Small changes might involve exchanges of territory in both directions.
Q: What about occupied East Jerusalem, for example?
A: Jerusalem, or Al-Quds, is separate. I think that the Palestinians very passionately want Al-Quds to be the capital of their state, so, I think it must be. And there is a basis for dividing Jerusalem [between Israel and a future Palestinian state].
I think the Arab part of Jerusalem should be the capital of the Palestinian state. Despite the complicated situation on the ground, I think there is a possibility for compromise, and by compromise I mean on both sides, not just to satisfy one side.
I think the issue is that there is very little room for Israel to make compromises over is the issue of right of return [in regards to Palestinian refugees]. Because Israel wants to be a Jewish state, so if all of the Palestinian Arabs who used to live there and have the right of return did return, then there would be two states, both an Israeli and a Palestinian state, but both would be Arab states.
I think that more ground will have to be conceded on the Arab side than on the Israeli side on the issue of refugees. So, I guess the right of return will have to be [the right of Palestinian refugees to return] to the Palestinian state and for compensation [to be paid out] to the people who lost their property. I think in that there is an outline for a possible solution.