format_quote Originally Posted by
Noora_z3
Thai muslims experiance lots of descimination in their country, this is not jok, or not some emotional statment. I have heard eye-witness talking bout the suffuring, the killin n all, u know how it started?! it started by muslims demonstration, some demonestrated peacefuly n a handfull created some disruption, apparently, the security force cought them n loaded them in a samll Van, u know how? one human layer obove the other, I think they were like 70 of them, all of them died even before reaching the jail.
Thats how voilenc started in that area n it was ugly.
Well no that is not how violence started in the area. I would not be surprised if Thai Muslims did suffer discrimination, but I doubt they suffered very much as Thailand was and is a fairly easy going country without significant minority problems. However the present round of violence long pre-dates the incident you have in mind
A resurgence in violence by Pattani separatist groups began in 2001. Some experts have suggested this occurred under the influence of foreign Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, though such connections have never been fully substantiated and remain highly contentious. Some reports suggest that a number of Pattani Muslims have received training at al-Qaida centres in Pakistan, though many experts believe, to the contrary, that the Pattani separatism has little or nothing to do with global jihadism. Others have claimed that the Pattani insurgents have forged links with groups such as the religious-nationalist Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and the secular Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia.
Attacks after 2001 concentrated on installations of the police and military, schools and other symbols of Thai authority in the region were burned. Local police officers of all ranks and government officials were the primary targets of seemingly random assassinations, with 19 policemen killed and 50 insurgency-related incidents in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat by the end of 2001.
At first the government blamed the attacks on "bandits," and indeed some outside observers believe that local clan, commercial or criminal rivalries do play some part in the violence in the region. As recently as July of 2002 in the wake of over 14 policemen dying in separate attacks since the beginning of the year, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra publicly denied the role of religion in the attacks, when quoted as saying he did not "think religion was the cause of the problems down there because several of the policemen killed were Muslim" [1]. Interior Minister Purachai Piemsomboon attributed the attacks on the police to the issue of drug control, as the "police are making serious efforts to make arrests over drugs trafficking."
While earlier attacks were typified by drive-by shootings in which patrolling policemen were shot by gunmen on passing motorcycles, this quickly escalated to well coordinated attacks on police establishments, with police stations and outposts ambushed by well-armed groups who subsequently flee with stolen arms and ammunition. In 2002, 75 insurgency-linked attacks amounted to 50 deaths among police and army personnel. In 2003, officials counted 119 incidents. The mounting scale and sophistication of the insurgency eventually prompted the government into a recognition that there was a serious issue in the southern provinces.
On January 4, 2004, unidentified gunmen raided an army ammunition depot in Narathiwat Province in the early morning, and made off with over 100 rifles and other ammunition. In the midst of doing so, all four senior-ranking soldiers guarding the installation were murdered. This incident quickly escalated into large scale violence, with insurgents killing 600 people in a series of bombings and shootings aimed mainly at the police and the military, but also many civilians. Some bombings were directed at non-Muslim Thai residents of the area, leading to an exodus which has damaged the regional economy and increased its isolation from the rest of Thailand. Much of Thailand's current prosperity, based on tourism, has passed the south by, and it remains one of the poorest parts of the country.
The Thai response to the insurgency was hampered by a lack of training in counter-insurgency methods, lack of understanding of local culture, and rivalries between the police and the army. Many local police are involved in the local drug trade and other criminal activities, and army commanders from Bangkok treat them with disdain. The army responded to insurgent attacks with heavy-handed raids on Muslim villages, which only resulted in reprisals. Insurgents provoke the inexperienced Thai government into disproportionate responses, generating sympathy among the Muslim populace.
The growth of the Pattani insurgency coincided with the election of Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime Minister of Thailand in January of 2001. Although there is no overt secessionist party in the south, voters in the southern province overwhelmingly voted for the Democrat Party and against Thaksin's Thais Love Thais party, at both the 2001 and 2005 elections, leading Thaksin to treat the area as "enemy territory." Thaksin sent more troops and police into the area, reducing support from moderate Muslims.
In 2002, Shinawatra stated, "There's no separatism, no ideological terrorists, just common bandits." By 2004 he had reversed his position, and has come to regard the insurgency as the local front in the global War on Terrorism. Martial law was instituted in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat in January of 2004, and violence increased, with 200 Muslims killed by troops during the year. In April, troops killed over 100 Muslim men in Yala province who attacked well-defended police stations with only light weapons, in what police described as "suicidal" attacks.
The insurgency continues, with a bomb attack in Songkhla on April 3, 2005, and a major attack being launched on the provincial capital of Yala in July. In response, Thaksin issued a decree giving himself sweeping powers to direct military operations, suspend civil liberties, and censor the press. This action sparked protests from liberal sections of the Thai media and opposition parties.
Estimates of the strength of the insurgency vary greatly. In 2004 General Panlop Pinmanee said that there were only 500 hard-core insurgents. Other estimates say there as many as 15,000 armed insurgents. Some Thai analysts believe that foreign Islamist groups are infiltrating the area, and that foreign funds and arms are being brought in, though again, such claims are balanced by an equally large body of opinion suggesting this remains a distinctly local conflict.
A striking aspect of the South Thailand insurgency is the anonymity of the people behind it and the absence of concrete demands. Although Thailand held relatively free elections in February of 2005, no secessionist candidates contested the southern electorates, and the militant groups appear to have no interest in politics. In July, the chairman of the Narathiwat Islamic Committee was quoted, "The attacks look like they are well-organized, but we do not know what group of people is behind them."
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The Tak Bai incident
In October of 2004 the town of Tak Bai in Narathiwat province saw the most publicized incident of the insurgency. Six local men were arrested, accused of having supplied weapons to insurgents. A demonstration was organized to demand their release and the police called in army reinforcements. The army used tear gas and water cannons on the crowd, and shooting started in which seven men were killed.
Hundreds of local people, mostly young men, were arrested. They were made to take off their shirts and lie on the ground. Their hands were tied behind their backs. Later that afternoon, they were thrown by soldiers into trucks to be taken to an army camp in the next province of Pattani. The prisoners were stacked five or six deep in the trucks, and by the time the trucks reached their destination three hours later, in the heat of the day, 78 men had suffocated to death.
This incident sparked widespread protests across the south, and indeed across Thailand, since many non-Muslim Thais were appalled at the army's behaviour. Thaksin, however, gave the army his full support, and no-one has been charged with any offence in relation to the Tak Bai incident. His first response was to defend the army's actions, saying that the 78 men died "because they were already weak from fasting during the month of Ramadan."
so the violence had been going on for three years before the Tak Bai killings.