U.S. is in imminent danger of Banana Republic style hyperinflation
"Highly placed sources in banking and business circles in Europe and South America warn that unless the U.S. government moves quickly to control the spending which is ballooning its deficit, America is in imminent danger of South American Banana Republic style hyperinflation." ---Jack Anderson
Foreword: The many parallels between 1924 Germany and present-day United States are cause for concern. We have not yet reached the depths to which Germany descended in that era, but few can look at the constant depreciation of the dollar since the early 1970's and fail to be alarmed. It seems we differ from 1924 Germany only in the duration between cause and effect. While the German experience was compressed over a few short years, ours has been more protracted. I think this has occurred for two good reasons: First, American central bankers have learned enough from the German experience to delay and extend the consequences of printing too much fiat money. Second, Germany was a small state isolated from the rest of the world --- a pariah nation of sorts --- and, as a result, it had a difficult time finding a market for its government bonds. German deficits had to be financed internally --- an impossibility which greatly accelerated the printing of fiat currency.
Up until recently, the United States enjoyed a strong world-wide demand for its government bonds, so the negative affects of government deficits were subdued. But now low interest rates, and a growing fear among G-7 nations that U.S. deficits are out of control, has greatly curtailed foreign bond purchases. The Fed has been forced to monetize an ever larger portion of the debt as a result. This is the modern equivalent of "printing money". Whether or not we are out of control seems to be a matter for debate. The trend, however, is alarming. The largest deficit during the Nixon years was $ 23.4 billion; Ford --- $ 73.7 billion; Reagan --- $221.2 billion; Bush --- $290 billion; Clinton --- $350 billion. This, to say the least, is a frightening progression.
As this report points out, the correlation between deficits and inflation is sacrosanct ---deficits lead to inflation and uncontrolled deficits lead to uncontrolled inflation. Whether or not there will be a Nightmare American Inflation remains to be seen. Let it be said though that the trend is not favorable. The survivors of the German debacle did so by purchasing gold and rare coins early in the process. As a citizen and an investor, the best you can do is prepare, and then hope against hope that it doesn't happen here. This report of Germany's hyperinflation, originally published in 1970 by Scientific Market Analysis, could play an important part in that preparation process. There is little doubt it will affect your thinking. ---MK
Introduction
If history teaches anything, it is that government cannot be trusted to manage money. When currency is not redeemable in gold, its value depends entirely on the judgment and the conscience of the politicians. (That is the situation in this country today.)
Especially in an economic crisis or a war, the pressure to inflate becomes overwhelming. Any alternative may seem politically disastrous. Whether it be the Roman emperors repeatedly debasing their coinage, the French revolutionary government printing a flood of assignats, John Law flooding France with debased money, or the Continental Congress issuing money until it was literally "not worth a Continental," the story is similar. A government in financial straits finds its easiest recourse is to issue more and more money until the money loses its value. The entire process is accompanied by a barrage of explanations, propaganda and new regulations which hide the true situation from the eyes of most people until they have lost all their savings. In World War I, Germany--like other governments--borrowed heavily to pay its war costs. This led to inflation, but not much more than in the U.S. during the same period. After the war there was a period of stability, but then the inflation resumed. By 1923, the wildest inflation in history was raging. Often prices doubled in a few hours. A wild stampede developed to buy goods and get rid of money. By late 1923 it took 200 billion marks to buy a loaf of bread.
Millions of the hard-working, thrifty German people found that their life's savings would not buy a postage stamp. They were penniless. How could this happen in a highly civilized nation run at the time by intelligent, democratically chosen leaders? What happened to business, to wages and employment? How did some people manage to save their capital while a few speculators made fortunes?
The Years 1914-1921
When the war broke out on July 31, 1914, the Reichsbank (German Central Bank) suspended redeemability of its notes in gold. After that there was no legal limit as to how many notes it could print. The government did not want to upset people with heavy taxes. Instead it borrowed huge amounts of money which were to be paid by the enemy after Germany had won the war, Much of the borrowing was discounted and monetized by the Reichsbank. As explained later, this amounted to issuing straight printing press money.
By the end of the war, the amount of money in circulation had increased four-fold. In view of this, the extent of inflation was less than one might have expected. The consumer price index had risen 140% by December 1918. This was equal to the inflation during the same time in England, a little more than in the United States, but less than in France. Yet the floating debt of the Reichsbank had increased from 3 billion to 55 billion marks!
Why was inflation kept within bounds? For the same reason that it got off to a slow start in the Unites States during World War II. Necessities were rationed and luxury goods were not easily available. Millions of men were at the front and not in the market for goods. Civilians worked hard and had little leisure for spending. People saved money against peace time, and in some cases to evade taxes. But the fuel for inflation was accumulating in the form of vast hoards of money.
The harsh reparation payments imposed on Germany led the mark to depreciate against foreign currencies. Also, the new democratic socialist leaders had promised the people all types of bounties--increased wages, reduced hours, an expanded educational system, and new social benefits. But all this meant a vastly increased demand on a limited production capacity.
For these reasons inflation resumed after the peace until by February 1920 the price level was five times as high as it had been at the armistice. Yet during this same time the amount of currency in circulation had only doubled. Prices were in fact rising much faster than the rate at which money was being printed. Therefore, reasoned the officials, the price inflation could hardly be blamed on the government. Actually, as we shall see, the ebb and flow of confidence can play a big role in the short-term trend of prices. Confidence in the mark had weakened. At the same time, and as a consequence, billions of hoarded marks came out of hiding and entered the marketplace. The accumulated fuel was burning.
By February 1920 this inflationary episode had run its course. For the next fifteen months the price index held stable. The mark actually gained in value against foreign currencies, so that prices of imported goods fell by some 50%. Here was a golden opportunity to establish a stable currency. However, during these fifteen months the government kept issuing new money. The currency in circulation increased by 50% and the floating debt of the Reichsbank by 100%, providing fuel for a new outbreak.
In May 1921, price inflation started again and by July 1922 prices had risen 700%. The Reichsbank continued printing new currency, although more slowly than the rate at which prices were rising. In fact, all through this period the issue of currency proceeded at a fairly smooth steady rate, while the price index moved up in great surges, interspersed by periods of stability.
After July 1922 the phase of hyperinflation began. All confidence in money vanished and the price index rose faster and faster for fifteen months, outpacing the printing presses which could not run out money as fast as it was depreciating.
Wholesale Price Index
July 1914
1.0
Jan 1919
2.6
July 1919
3.4
Jan 1920
12.6
Jan 1921
14.4
July 1921
14.3
Jan 1922
36.7
July 1922
100.6
Jan 1923
2,785.0
July 1923
194,000.0
Nov 1923
726,000,000,000.0
The Years 1922-1923 -- Hyperinflation!
From Mid-1922 to November 1923 hyperinflation raged. The table above tells the story. Seemingly Reichsbank officials believed that the basic trouble was the depreciation of the mark in terms of foreign currencies. In late 1922 they tried to support the mark by purchasing it in the foreign exchange markets. However, since they continued printing new currency at a feverish rate, the attempt failed. They merely succeeded in buying worthless marks in return for valuable gold and foreign exchange.
All hope of checking the collapse of the mark vanished in January 1923 when the French--alleging treaty violations--occupied Germany's key industrial district, the Ruhr. Germany subsidized the occupied companies and financed an expensive program of "passive resistance." New billions of marks were printing to finance these heavy new costs. By late 1923, 300 paper mills were working top speed and 150 printing companies had 2000 presses going day and night turning out currency.
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