format_quote Originally Posted by
Keltoi
Interesting. From what I understand Grozny was pretty much rubble. How was this victory achieved? I don't want a "proud Chechen" response, if you know what I mean, I'm looking for a detached explanation of why this victory came about.
Well nobody could explain how Basayev managed to get back Grozny from the Russians. Even the American military was very impressed with what Basayev accomplished and even called him "one of the most intelligent military strategics of modern times". Anyways I searched a little and managed to find this which is pretty long but which I founf quite interesting. Anyways I hope it helps to answer your question somehow.
The Chechen Strategy (1994-96):
"This is a centuries-old tactic of the mountain people strike and withdraw, strike and withdraw …to exhaust them until they die of fear and horror"
Dzohar Dudayev, The President of Chechnya, Dec 1994
"They fought like lions"
Commander of the Russian SOBR (Rapid Reaction Unit) describing Chechens, January 17th 1996 (Gall and De Waal)
"We have no foreigners among our ranks, Muslims are one nation and Muslim countries are one homeland"
Shamil Basayev, Ex-Chechen Prime Minister, Sep 1999 (Sadek 8)
"Strategic thinking does not occur in a vacuum, or deal in perfect solutions; politics, ideology, geography shape peculiar national strategic cultures" (Murray 3). In the Chechen case, ideology, history and geography were very important determinants of the Chechen strategy. The Islamic creed and ideology provided the Chechens with a moral force that succeeded in reversing all rational predictions. History added to the moral force the desire for independence from, and the hatred to surrender to, the great power that humiliated them over centuries, Russia. Geography forced the Chechens to pursue a strategy of guerilla warfare, stiff resistance and to order withdrawals as the very last choice.
The Chechen strategy simply aimed for destroying the Russians will to fight. They understood that they couldn't match the Russians physically and therefore they depended on immaterial force (moral force) and Guerrilla warfare. They knew that if the Russians were not willing to fight, then they (Chechens) would get their security and 'unilateral' freedom. They hoped to get their 'full' freedom through future negotiations.
"Islam has remained a strong force among the Chechens. The Islamic University in Grozny was founded in 1991 and in 1994, 4000 Chechens made pilgrimage to Mecca" (Bremmer and Taras 103). Even during the massive bombing of Grozny, the Chechens would gather and perform their religious duties. At the beginning of Grozny's bombing, the Chechens were "in good spirits, flush with weapons and new volunteers" (Gall and De Waal 205). This what Clausewitz called the "national spirit of the army"(Clausewitz 253). Clausewitz concluded that in mountain warfare "where every one down to the common soldier is left to himself", the significance of the "national spirit" or "faith" would be very clear and that was the case with the Chechen army (Clausewitz 253).
The elite of the Chechen forces was the Islamic "Abkhaz" battalion which was led by the Commander Shamil Basayev and which fought the Russians in Abkhazia (Georgia) and Nagorno-Karabkh (Azerbaijan). The moral force was clear in the actions of the Abkhaz battalion, a group of 500 men who would arrive during fierce fighting "to sort it out…and [who] would leap straight over the barricades where other fighters were crouching" (Gall and De Waal 206). "As soon as they went in all hell would let loose, the fight would suddenly escalate. They were like firemen. Then they would move to the other place," says the photographer Patrick Chauvel who accompanied them during action. Moral force was also reflected in Masa'dov's words: "I can only wonder at the strength with which my men fight. The Russians attack us with planes, then artillery, then tanks, leveling the houses before them. Yet still my men emerge from the rubble to fight on…[we want] to show that not only that we want our independence, but that we are willing to die for it" (Loyd 2). Underestimating moral force made the Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev convince "the members of the Security Council that the operation was going to be a 'bloodless blitzkrieg' that would not last any longer than December 20th " (Finch 3). Clausewitz describes such attitude (ignoring the moral force) as being 'foolish' (Clausewitz 251).
Guerilla warfare was another mean which was used by the Chechens to accomplish their strategic goal. "This is a centuries-old tactic of the mountain people strike and withdraw, strike and withdraw …to exhaust them until they die of fear and horror" said Dudayev to explain the general guidelines of the guerilla tactics to his people (Gall and De Wall 227). Such a mean was very effective against the Russians who were very much exhausted as happened to the Soviet Russians in Afghanistan and "self-exhaustion in war has killed more [soldiers] than any foreign assailants" (Hart 355). I should mention that the "hit and run" tactics were not always pursued due to the geographical factor which affected the Chechen military strategy. The Chechens could not easily withdraw from regions under attack by Russians and they had to stand, face to face, and defend almost every town and village. This is because the country is small and if they kept on withdrawing and then attacking again (hit and run tactics), the Russians could have reached the mountains (south of Chechnya near the Georgian borders where the strongholds of the Chechen fighters) in a few weeks. Therefore although their small number compared to the Russians, they had to stop or, at least, postpone the Russian advance to their mountainous strongholds in the south and keep the war in Central Chechnya.
A change in the Chechen Guerilla tactics occurred after the massacres of Samashki and Vedeno. The battlefield was changed and the Guerilla tactics were transferred to the Russian mainland. On June 13th 1995, Shamil Basayev, an Engineer and a Chechen field commander, led a daring raid inside Russia. He wanted to force the Russians to withdraw from Chechnya, stop the bloodshed and to start immediate negotiations. Together with about 150 fighters, Basayev entered the Russian borders and aimed for Moscow, specifically, to the Kremlin (Finch* 11). However his convoy was discovered by the Russian police forces near Budennovsk (a city of 100,000 located 120-KM from the Chechen borders) where a battle took place and several Chechens were wounded. "Basayev would not abandon his men" and therefore he headed to the nearest hospital in Budennovsk (Finch* 5) where he captured 1500 civilian, policemen and militiamen hostages for 8 days of "terror, anxiety and surreal negotiations" (Finch* 5). Basayev released "some 150 pregnant women and children" and finally by June 18th, "In one of the most surreal events of modern media, the Russian Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, began to conduct telephone negotiations with Basayev "on live Russian TV" (Finch* 6). The Russian Prime Minister finally agreed to stop the combat and begin negotiations at once. However, such negotiations broke down and after a few days fighting started all over again. This operation opened the door for a similar raid in Kizlar (Daghestan) in January 1996 which targeted the helicopter base in the city. The Chechens suffered from helicopters' attacks and had to take a serious action about that. The operation was led by Dudayev's son in law, Salman Raduyev. Contrary to Budennovsk, where Basayev was acting on his own and where Dudayev condemned the action, Dudayev apparently backed this raid. Although the results were not as impressing as Budennovsk, the Kizlar raid was a message to the Kremlin that they will never be safe from Chechen strikes inside Russia and the Russian Federation.
There were some Chechen humanitarian actions that helped the Chechen strategy to reach its goal (breaking the will of the Russians, whether soldiers or people to fight). The Chechens, most of times, treated the Russian POW remarkably humanely. On January 3rd 1995, a fight broke out between an elite group of 25 Russian paratroopers, who were sent to the south of Grozny to cut off the retreat path of the Chechen fighters, and a group of 37 Chechen villagers armed with hunting rifles (Gall and De Waal 225). Amazingly, the Chechen villagers succeeded in capturing the whole group. For two days the Russians did not have anything to eat, so the Chechens gave them food and telephoned their mothers to come and pick them up (Gall and De Waal 226). These were the orders given to the Chechens by Dudayev and Basayev, who met dozens of Russian mothers, led by the 'heroic' mother Valentina Krayeva, who were coming to pick up their sons (Russian soldiers and officers captured during fighting).
The total success of the Chechen strategy was in August 1996, when Basayev led a genius three-pronged-attack on the Russian forces in Grozny. With less than 3000 fighters, Basayev recaptured Grozny and took around 10,000 Russian soldiers as POWs. The attack was devastating for the Russians. "500 Russian servicemen were killed, …1407 wounded and…182 missing in action" (Gall and De Waal 350). The Russians threatened again to massively bombard Grozny. However a successful peace initiative led by Alexander Lebed, the new Secretary of the National Security Council aborted the Russian threats. Alexander Lebed wanted to stop any future "embarrassment" to the Russian armed forces that were humiliated especially during the recapture of Grozny. In November 1996, Aslan Masa'adov, the Chechen Prime Minister (back then) and Alexander Lebed signed a cease-fire agreement that was claimed to be "the document putting an end for 4 centuries of hostilities". The Mas'adov-Lebed agreement was followed by series of agreements in which Russia accepted to pay reparations to Chechnya (although never paid as agreed) and to postpone the question of full independence to the year 2001. In the next day after signing the cease-fire agreement, photos of Basayev and Lebed playing Chess in Grozny was published by Russian newspapers as well as international and Arabic ones. The Chechens had won the war and Basayev won the Chess game.
http://www.amina.com/article/finapropw.html