Originally Posted by zeinaess
If you say: “How is Divine Determining (kadar) compatible with the power of choice (juz'i ihtiyar)?”
The Answer: In seven ways...
• The First
: The All-Just and Wise One, to Whose wisdom and justice the universe testifies with the tongue of order and balance, gave to man a power of choice of unknown nature which would be the means of reward and punishment for him. Just as we do not know many of the numerous aspects of the All-Just and Wise One’s wisdom, our not knowing how the power of choice is compatible with Divine Determining does not prove that it is not so.
• The Second
: Of necessity everyone perceives in himself a will and choice; he knows it through his conscience. To know the nature of beings is one thing, to know they exist is something different. There are many things which although their existence is self-evident for us, their true nature is not known by us... Thus, the power of choice may be included among these. Everything is not restricted to what we know. Our not knowing does not mean they do not exist
• The Third
: The power of choice is not opposed to Divine Determining, indeed, Divine Determining corroborates the power of choice. Because Divine Determining is a sort of Divine Knowledge. Divine Knowledge is connected with our will and choice, in which case it corroborates it, it does not nullify it.
• The Fourth
: Divine Determining is a sort of knowledge. Knowledge is dependent on the thing known. That is, it is connected with however it will be. The thing known is not dependent on knowledge.
That is, the principles of knowledge are not fundamental in order to direct the thing known from the point of view of external existence. Because the essence of the thing known and its external existence looks to will and relies on power. Also, pre-eternity (azal) is not the tip of a chain reaching into the past which may be taken as fundamental in the existence of things and a compulsion imagined in accordance with it. Rather, pre-eternity holds the past, the present, and the future all at once, looking at them from above like a mirror. In which case, to imagine an end to past time which stretches back within the sphere of contingency, to call it pre-eternity, and to suppose that things enter that knowledge of pre-eternity in sequence, and that oneself is outside it, and to reason in accordance with that is not right. Consider the following example in order to explain this mystery:
If there is a mirror in your hand and the space to your right is supposed to be the past and the space to your left, the future, the mirror only holds what is opposite it. Then with a movement it holds both sides, but it cannot hold the greater part of them. However low the mirror is held, to that extent less will appear in it. But the higher it rises, the extent of what is opposite it expands, until it can hold both sides in their entirety at the same time. Thus, whatever occurs in the spaces depicted in the mirror in this position cannot be said to precede and follow one another, or to conform to or oppose one another. And so, Divine Determining is from pre-eternal knowledge, and in the words of the Hadith, pre-eternal knowledge is At an elevated station which from an elevated view-point encompasses everything that has been and will be from pre-eternity to post-eternity. We and our reasoning cannot be outside of it so we can be like a mirror to the space of the past.
• The Fifth
: Divine Determining has a connection with cause and effect. That is, this effect will occur through this cause. In which case, it may not be said that “Since so-and-so’s death is determined at such-and-such a time, what fault has the man who fired the rifle through his power of choice, for if he had not fired it, he still would have died?
: Why may it not be said?
: Because Divine Determining specified that so-and-so’s death would occur through the man’s rifle. If you suppose that he did not fire the rifle, then you are supposing that Divine Determining had no connection with it, so with what would you decree his death? If you imagine cause and effect to be separate like the Jabriyya, or you deny Divine Determining like the Mu’tazilites, you leave the Sunni School and enter among the heretics. In which case, we people of truth say: “If he had not fired the rifle, we do not know whether he would have died.” The Jabriyya say: “If he had not fired it, he still would have died.” While the Mu’tazilites say: “If he had not fired it, he would not have died.”