Well I hope he didn't really got banned for that cause it seems like a genuine sincere question. To answer it, Ranma didn't quite understand what I meant. What I was saying was that when you have the definition "act of God" then according to Islam everything is a miracle. Then ranma replied, but not everything seems like a miracle (like a baby dying). However this reply isn't really accurate. He says if everything is a miracle according to definition (B), then doesn't that pose a problem with events like a baby dying, which obviously doesn't fall under definition (A). Well I think that it goes without saying that both definitions of a miracle are not compatible. Either you semantically prefer definition (A) in which case the word will have a totally different meaning to you; or you hold definition (B). You cant start of with one definition, and then go on to say that all miracles under that definition are flawed because they do not follow the other definition.
Now to answer the question even more in depth with an example; consider a man hitting a child with his car because he was speeding. The man cannot accelerate the car without God wanting it. When the brain sends a signal trough the body towards the foot to press on the gas pedal, your body relies on the forces of physics. If you believe like I do that the forces of physics are the habitual act of God, then in a way you could say that god makes his foot press the gas pedal in accordance to the driver's will. However this doesn't mean that God is responsible! God also gave this driver free will and common sense. What we reached here is a combination of two philosophical questions, the problem of evil and the problem of predestination vs. free will.
It's a little bit of topic, but for those who do need a reply on those two questions that pose here:
The riddle of Epicurus a.k.a. the argument from evil.
There exist many variations and spins on this but the original riddle goes like this:
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?
The weakness obviously lies in slippery slope deduction on the second premise. It completely leaves out the possibility that there might be a deeper underlying motive for an able God not want to ban evil without him being considered malevolent. The problem is freedom of Choice. Much evil comes from mankind's free will. If you believe -like I do- that life is a test; then God would defeat his own purpose by preventing evil! Stopping evil would prevent free will. Of course, not all evil of the world can be traced back to human choices. But when we consider those evils mankind has no hand in, then the "evilness" is relative. We can often imagine alternative motives, without resorting to judging our creator as malevolent. Death for example, gets a whole new perspective if seen as a transition rather then an end. And then finally a third type of evil, in general all sorts of hardships and suffering that don't serve a direct purpose can also gain a new perspective if seen in the context of life being a test. There's a huge difference between a poor man who doesn't steal and a rich man who doesn't steal. From that perspective one could consider being poor as a blessing rather then a curse.
Free will vs. predestination
* Free will vs. fate
When people think about fate or destiny being inevitable; they usually assume it is inevitable despite of our choices rather then because of our choices. To illustrate this with an example. Say a person sits at a diner, deciding whether he'd have coffee or tea. Lets say hypothetically that if he'll take the tea, he'll get sleepy and get run over by a car when exiting the diner as opposed to when he takes coffee which will make him jumpy enough to avoid being hit. When you add fate into the picture, many people will be inclined to think that if the person is destined to be run over, then he will inevitable be run over despite his choice of coffee or tea. In that view, any personal choice can be rendered as irrelevant, and free will is a pipe dream. However there is an alternative view. One could say that the person is destined to be run over because he chooses to have tea. In that view, destiny doesn't deny choice. But rather our choice creates a destiny. Of course some might say that this is a play on words and that in this view, destiny and fate loose there value. But that argument is strictly semantical. Perhaps the value I propose is contradictory to contemporary semantics, but can we honestly claim to know what the semantical value was of a word more then a millennium ago? If anything it seems to make more sense that the value of the word has been simplified over the ages because people had trouble understanding it. If we cannot prove the opposite, then this alternative view should at least be kept into consideration.
* Free will vs. predestination
Predestination ties in very closely to fate and destiny. However, it is a very specific form of destiny and fate. The prefix "pre" stresses that this destiny is already set prior to it happening, and perhaps also known prior to it happening. Again, there's a big semantical problem here that I explain in the page dedicated to time. the word "already" is nonsensical in that sentence because it is a word derived from a presentists point of view. If we include layers of time into this objection, we find that the statement becomes: "At the time1 that I haven't made a choice yet1 the future1 is already2 determined." So it isn't really "already" decided in the sense that we have no saying in it, since that already refers to secondary layer of time. It is already2 decided because an observer outside of time1 would see which course of action we will1 take. That has no bearing on the causality of this time. And it certainly doesn't mean our window of opportunity to choose has passed. The reason the future is set is because our choices are know. In other words, our choices are included into the determination, so the determination does not negate us having a choice.
* Free will vs. causal determinism
The problem that physical causality has with free will; is that it suggests our will is not free at all. If you view the brain as a biological machine which responds to electrical impulses and chemical balances of hormones, then the end result -your choice- can be predicted by the laws of nature. This somehow strips the concept of person input and freedom. This used to be one of the reasons why I considered myself atheistic in the past. As I reconsidered these arguments later in life however, I came to the conclusion that no proof nor indication can be found in the fields of neuro-psychology that confirms this view. First of all we need to consider what causality actually is. As I illustrated here science still has no clue of what causality actually is. We only examine the events that are correlated, not the correlation itself. And on this page I've shown how our views on time could fundamentally change our concept of causality. So just because the results are causal, is not enough to conclude that they aren't our personal, free wills. Furthermore our current knowledge on the human mind is way to limited. There is definitely still more then enough room for interpreting the mind as free. Right now we have no idea how the brain stores memories, how we make decisions, and so on. All we have researched so far is that there is a certain correlation between certain area's of the brain and certain thoughts. We've established this by monitoring brain activity during certain thoughts the test subject has. But the interpretation given to the results are very biased. Many assume that since the area is correlated, that must mean that activity in that area causes or triggers a certain thought. And what about the influence of electrons in our brains? It has been suggested that chaos theory apply to our brain. Chaos theory is the theory that a very small process -in this case the behavior of an electron- can have a determinant influence on the outcome of a much larger event. This is sometimes also called the butterfly effect. How does this affect causality? Well, we don't know yet how causal the behavior of electrons actually is! Is their behavior strictly random, or is there an underlying cause for it? Of course I grant that us humans do experience basic, instinctive impulses and desires that drive us. And because of those impulses we actually have a lot less freedom than some wish to think. However, we can deny these urges by choice! Take fasting for example. Denying ones basic urges to eat for a full day. We have yet to understand how such a choice works on a neuro-psychological level. And that is what true freedom of choice means. That is why someone who choses to ignore his lusts and urges, and instead choses to follow religion acquires the greatest degree of freedom one can have. Because what you do then is ignore your causal body, and follow your spiritual soul. In other words, the choice boils down to this: be a slave of your urges, and needs, or be a slave of God.
* Free will vs. omniscience of God
The argument goes, if our creator is omniscient; he knew exactly what we would eventually do. He thus created some of us despite knowing very well they 'd fail. Or even more convincing, he made us in such a specific manner and environment that we would inevitably fail. This isn't actually an argument against free will, but rather an argument against the responsibility of our free will. As I illustrated before, predestination does not negate free will and personal input. The argument here isn't that we were created without a choice. The argument here is that we were created with choice despite that our creator knew some of us would end up making the wrong choice! This is very twisted. If predestination doesn't negate free will, it shouldn't negate responsibility either. Just because God knew in advance, doesn't mean it isn't our choice and our responsibility. This is in fact the other side of the free-will-coin. Free will comes hand in hand with responsibility, and trying to push responsibility to our creator, is in a way rejecting free will, not denying it. The argument is not saying "I don't have it", but rather saying: "I don't want it".