Parallel universes ...

[Chuck]

But as soon as you detemine that the entire infinite number of choices must exist, then (by definition) their existence is pre-determined. All that is left is not to determine what will happen, but who it will happen to. And that is the result of random chance selection of you to a particular universe.

Look lets say there is a dice with numbers 1 to 6, if I choose 4 and in the other parallel universe it is chosen 5, I don't see it as no free will. Free will would be if I want to choose 4 but i can't choose 4.

i guess we have to agree to disagree.

 

[Grace Seeker]

Look lets say there is a dice with numbers 1 to 6, if I choose 4 and in the other parallel universe it is chosen 5, I don't see it as no free will. Free will would be if I want to choose 4 but i can't choose 4.

i guess we have to agree to disagree.

I agree with that.

But, again you have limited the number of univeses to just two so that there remains a choice. If there were to be exactly the same number of univeses as there are faces on the dice, and all of the options must be played out, then the random roll of the dice would determine which universe you were in. I agree if one does not have to play out all of the options, then choice exists. But if all of the options do have to be played out, it is in that case that I argue that choice no longer exists for fate is determined by the random selection of which universe you happen to be in.


So, I guess the first question is not whether or not their is free will, but how many universes are there?


Good to muse over the imponderibles with you.

 

[Dagless]

Look lets say there is a dice with numbers 1 to 6, if I choose 4 and in the other parallel universe it is chosen 5, I don't see it as no free will. Free will would be if I want to choose 4 but i can't choose 4.

In this view you are separating yourself with the you from the other universe. Like you are 2 different people who made 2 different choices. Since the reality branches from your action (or his, depending on how you look at it) you would be the same person. Therefore you would be judged for both decisions. You could say "I chose 4", but you would also be judged for choosing 5. Supposedly.

 

[Chuck]

In this view you are separating yourself with the you from the other universe. Like you are 2 different people who made 2 different choices. Since the reality branches from your action (or his, depending on how you look at it) you would be the same person. Therefore you would be judged for both decisions. You could say "I chose 4", but you would also be judged for choosing 5. Supposedly.

You are too mixing other things. Now the judgement, shouldn't judgement of each parallel universe would be different?

 

[Chuck]

This guy explains better:

Q24 Does many-worlds allow free-will?

Many-Worlds, whilst deterministic on the objective universal level, is
indeterministic on the subjective level so the situation is certainly
no better or worse for free-will than in the Copenhagen view.
Traditional Copenhagen indeterministic quantum mechanics only slightly
weakens the case for free-will. In quantum terms each neuron is an
essentially classical object. Consequently quantum noise in the brain
is at such a low level that it probably doesn't often alter, except very
rarely, the critical mechanistic behaviour of sufficient neurons to
cause a decision to be different than we might otherwise expect. The
consensus view amongst experts is that free-will is the consequence of
the mechanistic operation of our brains, the firing of neurons,
discharging across synapses etc and fully compatible with the
determinism of classical physics. Free-will is the inability of an
intelligent, self-aware mechanism to predict its own future actions due
to the logical impossibility of any mechanism containing a complete
internal model of itself rather than any inherent indeterminism in the
mechanism's operation.

Nevertheless, some people find that with all possible decisions being
realised in different worlds that the prima facia situation for free-
will looks quite difficult. Does this multiplicity of outcomes destroy
free-will? If both sides of a choice are selected in different worlds
why bother to spend time weighing the evidence before selecting? The
answer is that whilst all decisions are realised, some are realised more
often than others - or to put to more precisely each branch of a
decision has its own weighting or measure which enforces the usual laws
of quantum statistics.

This measure is supplied by the mathematical structure of the Hilbert
spaces. Every Hilbert space has a norm, constructed from the inner
product, - which we can think of as analogous to a volume - which
weights each world or collection of worlds. A world of zero volume is
never realised. Worlds in which the conventional statistical
predictions consistently break down have zero volume and so are never
realised. (See "How do probabilities emerge within many-worlds?")

Thus our actions, as expressions of our will, correlate with the weights
associated with worlds. This, of course, matches our subjective
experience of being able to exercise our will, form moral judgements and
be held responsible for our actions.

http://kuoi.com/~kamikaze/doc/many-worlds-faq.html

 

[Dagless]

Nevertheless, some people find that with all possible decisions being
realised in different worlds that the prima facia situation for free-
will looks quite difficult. Does this multiplicity of outcomes destroy
free-will? If both sides of a choice are selected in different worlds
why bother to spend time weighing the evidence before selecting? The
answer is that whilst all decisions are realised, some are realised more
often than others - or to put to more precisely each branch of a
decision has its own weighting or measure which enforces the usual laws
of quantum statistics.

This seems incorrect at a very basic level.
The fact that some outcomes occur more often than others is only down to the effect of there being so many universes, not down to free will.

Even if someone decides to play Russian roulette with a six shooter which contains 5 bullets (leaving one empty) we can STILL say that he survives in more universes than he does not survive.

This is not because of free will (since his will is obviously to kill himself, leaving only a <17% chance of survival), it is due to there being more "possible outcomes" where he does not die (included in these are scenarios where he does not even come into contact with a gun let alone decide to play Russian roulette). He has no control over which outcomes are realised more than others. The universal statistics will not change no matter what he does (whether he is good or evil or neither).

 

[Chuck]

The quote has confused you more. Anyhow.

Even if someone decides to play Russian roulette with a six shooter which contains 5 bullets (leaving one empty) we can STILL say that he survives in more universes than he does not survive.

Don't really know, since all this is just theoretical. It depends on which theory you are looking at. Usually, people believe choice will be different in each one, so only in one he will die and cease to exist early than the other. The person in the parallel universe is not exactly same, actions are different.

Here is the question for you. Lets say, if tomorrow scientist prove that parallel universe exists than that would mean you don't have freewill?

 

[Dagless]

The quote has confused you more. Anyhow.

Why? Was my answer wrong in any way?

Don't really know, since all this is just theoretical. It depends on which theory you are looking at. Usually, people believe choice will be different in each one, so only in one he will die and cease to exist early than the other. The person in the parallel universe is not exactly same, actions are different.

Yes, but we know for sure that he will die playing Russian roulette fewer times than he will die other ways. This is a fact simply because there are more other ways to die. No amount of "will" can change that fact.

Here is the question for you. Lets say, if tomorrow scientist prove that parallel universe exists than that would mean you don't have freewill?

It would depend on whether there were an infinite number, if they were formed at decision points (as we are discussing), if they could be influenced, etc. etc. Ironically there is probably a small percentage of parallel universes which know parallel universes exist... so I guess somewhere somehow this is already being addressed/has been addressed/will be addressed.

 

[Chuck]

Why? Was my answer wrong in any way?

You went off. Quote is talking about statistics in QM and gave the reference to HS in QM: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert_space#Quantum_mechanics

In layman terms, author summarizes:

Thus our actions, as expressions of our will, correlate with the weights
associated with worlds. This, of course, matches our subjective
experience of being able to exercise our will, form moral judgements and
be held responsible for our actions.​

Yes, but we know for sure that he will die playing Russian roulette fewer times than he will die other ways. This is a fact simply because there are more other ways to die. No amount of "will" can change that fact.

You missed the main point. He is not same in the parallel universe. Do you think if superman existed and in a parallel universe he was evil. Is it the same superman?

It would depend on whether there were an infinite number, if they were formed at decision points (as we are discussing), if they could be influenced, etc. etc.

Interesting seems close to what I've been saying all along. And what difference it make if it was or was not infinite?

Ironically there is probably a small percentage of parallel universes which know parallel universes exist... so I guess somewhere somehow this is already being addressed/has been addressed/will be addressed.

There is no real proof of MWI. There is a saying among physicists that there are real physicists and than there are theoretical physicists.

 

[Dagless]

You went off. Quote is talking about statistics in QM and gave the reference to HS in QM: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert_space#Quantum_mechanics

In layman terms, author summarizes:

Thus our actions, as expressions of our will, correlate with the weights
associated with worlds. This, of course, matches our subjective
experience of being able to exercise our will, form moral judgements and
be held responsible for our actions.​

Correlation is all well and good, but the quote I commented on was implying that some decisions being more realised than others somehow influenced/lead to the observed probability... whereas its the other way around.

You missed the main point. He is not same in the parallel universe. Do you think if superman existed and in a parallel universe he was evil. Is it the same superman?

Its debatable. He will be superman in every way and born from the action of another superman.

There is no real proof of MWI. There is a saying among physicists that there are real physicists and than there are theoretical physicists.

There is no real proof for a lot of things. Doesn't stop us discussing them though

 

[Grace Seeker]

Here is the question for you. Lets say, if tomorrow scientist prove that parallel universe exists than that would mean you don't have freewill?

If they prove that there is a parrallel world, no.
If they prove that there are several parallel worlds, no.
If they prove that there are an infinite number of parallel worlds, it all depends.

If some of those parallel worlds can be exact replicas of other worlds, so that not all possibilities are exercised, then we still have a finite number of choices and it may be that we are actually making choices. But if it is determined that all of the infinite possible number of scenarios must be realized, then which one I realize is merely the result of randomn placement in my particular universe and free-will (while perhaps still appearing to be my experience) has become no exisistent in a multi-verse in which randomn placement (not actual choice) is the key determining factor in the apparent choices I would perceive myself to be making.