Belief and Responsibility

[VizierX]

Irrelevent.

Its very relevant. The claim that 1+1=2 and that God exists are fundamentally different. Mathematics is in the realm of deductive reasoning and isn't about the world. Read that entry on the difference between analytic and synthetic proposition. Equating the two as somehow similar is just ignorant.

The point was that you don't just arbitrarily choose what to believe (as pascal's wager would have you do). You have to be convinced first. If you are not convinced of something that is actually true you are merely misinformed, and at worse excessively ignorant.

This is very debatable. Humans are primarily pragmatic rationalists. We very often adopt beliefs for their pragmatics or instrumental utility. Refer to James' Will to Believe - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Will_to_believe

 

[Skavau]

Its very relevant. The claim that 1+1=2 and that God exists are fundamentally different. Mathematics is in the realm of deductive reasoning and isn't about the world. Read that entry on the difference between analytic and synthetic proposition. Equating the two as somehow similar is just ignorant.

How is it relevant when the main point of discussion is about whether you should be punished or not what you think?

This is very debatable. Humans are primarily pragmatic rationalists. We very often adopt beliefs for their pragmatics or instrumental utility. Refer to James' Will to Believe - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Will_to_believe

This isn't entirely relevant. This appears to be talking about societal reinforcement of beliefs. I accept that societies (specifically those that have an agenda or objective for their population to all conform to the nations ideals) passively reinforce socially acceptable viewpoints. A crude example is long hair on men. You could be locked out of some aspects of society for having long hair as a male, so you naturally have it cut to fit in and eventually as many do come to the conclusion that it is not merely practical for men to have short hair, but somehow morally preferable. Totalitarian stats do this on a much larger scale and consequently have much larger success, and comformity.

But irrespectively, the key point in this Will to Believe lecture is that it appears that must be some sort of motivation to believe. It does not state that you can just force yourself to believe in things out of whimsical desire - which is the contention in the original post, that you cannot.

In any case, it hardly verifies the idea that people ought to be punished for thought-crime.

 

[VizierX]

How is it relevant when the main point of discussion is about whether you should be punished or not what you think?

The syllogism is crap. If even a single premise is shown to be lacking then the conclusion cannot be trusted.

This isn't entirely relevant.

Its very relevant. Humans aren't the crude epistemic evidentialists that you suppose. We are much more pragmatic. We very often adopt beliefs that lack evidence and test them out in our lives. In fact this is exactly how Science is conducted.

This appears to be talking about societal reinforcement of beliefs. I accept that societies (specifically those that have an agenda or objective for their population to all conform to the nations ideals) passively reinforce socially acceptable viewpoints. A crude example is long hair on men. You could be locked out of some aspects of society for having long hair as a male, so you naturally have it cut to fit in and eventually as many do come to the conclusion that it is not merely practical for men to have short hair, but somehow morally preferable. Totalitarian stats do this on a much larger scale and consequently have much larger success, and comformity.

I have no clue what you are talking about. James' argument there is about crude evidentialism.

But irrespectively, the key point in this Will to Believe lecture is that it appears that must be some sort of motivation to believe. It does not state that you can just force yourself to believe in things out of whimsical desire - which is the contention in the original post, that you cannot.

Do you not desire to know the truth?

In any case, it hardly verifies the idea that people ought to be punished for thought-crime.

What's wrong with being punished for thought-crime?

 

[Skavau]

Its very relevant. Humans aren't the crude epistemic evidentialists that you suppose. We are much more pragmatic. We very often adopt beliefs that lack evidence and test them out in our lives. In fact this is exactly how Science is conducted.

You're right. I already, if you've observed any of my posts pointed out what people go into states of denial when they are faced with unwelcome conclusions about reality. I already talked about cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias.

I have no clue what you are talking about. James' argument there is about crude evidentialism.

I was blithering on that it appears to be some sort of attempt for a society to setup a placebo effect in order to influence the beliefs of others.

Do you not desire to know the truth?

Sure.

What's that got do with being able (which I don't think you are) to believe anything?

What's wrong with being punished for thought-crime?

Is this a serious question? Do you believe that it is sometimes acceptable to torture (as is traditional concept of hell) people for what they think? If so, give examples.

 

[سيف الله]

Salaam

This is courtesy of RandyE again

Hi, I was hoping for a Christian perspective.

I can't comment on the free will thing since I don't see what my argument has to do with Free Will (it actually has nothing to do with free will).

This is incredible, since the entire argument concerns free will! Its point is that we cannot "choose" a particular belief. Is that no longer his point? Or does he not understand that is free will: the power of choice? A belief, if it is held, is either chosen or thrust upon you. Which is it?

To answer about universal things such as 1+1=2 (There is, I believe, a culture which does not have any concept of numbers so they don't have a 1+1=2 FYI) some things are universal because their evidence is overwhelming.

This doesn't address the argument, it simply glosses over it. Moreover, it begs the question by assuming that there are things that are "overwhelming" and the word is used in reference to the faculty of the will. If "overwhelming" only means we should believe it in order to be rational, then he effectively concedes his point as lost. If it means it overcomes the will, it's simply begging the question of the issue at hand.

Further, what defines what is convincing? If beliefs are only formed by a physical process, how incredible is it that we recognize such beliefs as true? Why should we? The very term "convincing" literally carries no more meaning here than saying "the unavoidable reaction of a physical process of atoms." Plantinga shows that such a physical process of belief-holding actually functions as a defeater of anyheld beliefs, including the held belief that physicalism is true. On physicalism, it just so happens that the processes that result in universal beliefs just so happen also to be true? How can we even know that, much less embrace its rationality? Why are there no universally-held beliefs that are also ridiculously and demonstrably false?

With at least equal probability, we should see widely-held beliefs that are as easily falsifiable as 1+1=37, yet held by over 99.9% of the population. Anything further is begging the question against free-will beliefs.

Now there are indeed beliefs that are held universally that are "overwhelming" to rationality. This means one would have to suspend rationality or simply be deluded. Yet on physicalism, is such a person really deluded? I don't see why. After all, they come to hold their beliefs precisely the way I do; how could we really know we happen to be the fortunate ones who are correct?

Finally, this flies in the face of psychology, which has long held that people can delude themselves. In effect, they can lie to themselves long enough to where they actually believe the lie they told! There are far too many problems and coincidences, and interestingly enough: there's no real reason to attempt to convince me otherwise. If my view is correct, there is no problem, and if yours is, then the physical process in place for me to hold that belief obviously has not fired.

 

[Skavau]

Hi Junon. I have no idea of your perspective as it is far less black and white in Christianity. Do you believe that hell exists and the boundaries predetermined by whether you accept Jesus Christ as your saviour?

This doesn't address the argument, it simply glosses over it. Moreover, it begs the question by assuming that there are things that are "overwhelming" and the word is used in reference to the faculty of the will. If "overwhelming" only means we should believe it in order to be rational, then he effectively concedes his point as lost. If it means it overcomes the will, it's simply begging the question of the issue at hand.

Why do you say 'should' here?

If belief is always choice-based then there can be no should, only could.

Further, what defines what is convincing? If beliefs are only formed by a physical process, how incredible is it that we recognize such beliefs as true? Why should we? The very term "convincing" literally carries no more meaning here than saying "the unavoidable reaction of a physical process of atoms." Plantinga shows that such a physical process of belief-holding actually functions as a defeater of anyheld beliefs, including the held belief that physicalism is true. On physicalism, it just so happens that the processes that result in universal beliefs just so happen also to be true? How can we even know that, much less embrace its rationality?

How does Plantinga show this? Methinks that you are missing the purpose of this argument. It is to show that people's beliefs are not motivated by arbitrary desire and that everyone's beliefs have an underpinning that if held strongly, cannot just be changed or removed by request or desire (such is the pointlessness of pascal's wager by consequence).

And on the Wager, do you believe that the wager is valid by the way? If not - (as I don't expect you do) why not?

Why are there no universally-held beliefs that are also ridiculously and demonstrably false?

Why would there be? If a belief is easily demonstrably false then that knowledge of its falsification would have been acquirable and people would have been compelled on the basis of new information to change their position.

In the absence of far-reaching new information, small cultures in still undeveloped nations still hold on to their mythological beliefs. They will do so until they develop and are shown that much of it is demonstrably false.

Now there are indeed beliefs that are held universally that are "overwhelming" to rationality. This means one would have to suspend rationality or simply be deluded. Yet on physicalism, is such a person really deluded? I don't see why. After all, they come to hold their beliefs precisely the way I do; how could we really know we happen to be the fortunate ones who are correct?

I don't believe anyone in this thread has claimed that we all use the exact same methods at all to come to beliefs, nor has anyone claimed that identical arguments based in rationality will always convince people all of the time.

Finally, this flies in the face of psychology, which has long held that people can delude themselves. In effect, they can lie to themselves long enough to where they actually believe the lie they told! There are far too many problems and coincidences, and interestingly enough: there's no real reason to attempt to convince me otherwise. If my view is correct, there is no problem, and if yours is, then the physical process in place for me to hold that belief obviously has not fired.

That is not the argument.

And yes, I've already talked about people leading themselves into denial. If they go so far as to talk themselves into their own dishonesty then they've convinced themself through repetition and some placebo effect that reinforced it each time (usually). They haven't just, arbitrarily decided to believe their own false claims.

 

[Italianguy]

Not sure why Atheists are here? If you don't believe...what do you care about anyones answers anyway? Are you looking to be a part of a faith?

No ones answers are ever going to be sufficeint to you. Are you trying to get believers to disbelieve their faith? I am pretty sure your not supposed to do that here, i could be wrong?

If you don't believe, thats fine....but why the questions and arguments if no ones answers ever help you to understand? We believe what is written, what is taught, what was spoken. You need physical proof, we have faith.

God be with you, and i say that wether you like it or not, because I belive one day you will be convinced.

 

[Skavau]

Not sure why Atheists are here? If you don't believe...what do you care about anyones answers anyway? Are you looking to be a part of a faith?

I like to converse on these forums out of interest. My objective if any on here is to defend Secularism and how important I think it is for everyone. At other times my interest at times is to try and end people's bigotry towards others.

No ones answers are ever going to be sufficeint to you. Are you trying to get believers to disbelieve their faith? I am pretty sure your not supposed to do that here, i could be wrong?

I suspect attempting to convert anyone here to anything other than Islam is prohibited. Irrespectively, no, I am not trying to do that. I respect and understand that people's faiths are important to them. One of the main things I defend is everyone's rights to their respective faiths (or lack of). That is a part of Secularism so valuable.

If you don't believe, thats fine....but why the questions and arguments if no ones answers ever help you to understand? We believe what is written, what is taught, what was spoken. You need physical proof, we have faith.

This topic was setup as a debate over already understood concepts.

God be with you, and i say that wether you like it or not, because I belive one day you will be convinced.

Heh, I'm on a Muslim forum. If I was going to be offended by theistic greetings or messages of goodwill I would've left by now.

Irrespectively the gesture is, as always, appreciated.

 

[Italianguy]

I like to converse on these forums out of interest. My objective if any on here is to defend Secularism and how important I think it is for everyone. At other times my interest at times is to try and end people's bigotry towards others.


I suspect attempting to convert anyone here to anything other than Islam is prohibited. Irrespectively, no, I am not trying to do that. I respect and understand that people's faiths are important to them. One of the main things I defend is everyone's rights to their respective faiths (or lack of). That is a part of Secularism so valuable.


This topic was setup as a debate over already understood concepts.


Heh, I'm on a Muslim forum. If I was going to be offended by theistic greetings or messages of goodwill I would've left by now.

Irrespectively the gesture is, as always, appreciated.

Your welcome

respectfuly,

Italianguy

 

[Lynx]

Its very relevant. The claim that 1+1=2 and that God exists are fundamentally different. Mathematics is in the realm of deductive reasoning and isn't about the world. Read that entry on the difference between analytic and synthetic proposition. Equating the two as somehow similar is just ignorant.




This is very debatable. Humans are primarily pragmatic rationalists. We very often adopt beliefs for their pragmatics or instrumental utility. Refer to James' Will to Believe - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Will_to_believe

It's always fun to throw around some nice traditional philosophy jargon but I am not equivocating; your response, however, is nothing more than a trivial objection. You can replace 'not believe in 1+1=2' with any other synthetic statement. You can put the 'sky is blue' if you want in place which is nice and synthetic. Also, I am pretty sure Godel would have something to say about the 'deductive' nature of arithmetic. But that's not relevant.

BTW, it is quite possible to not believe in analytical truths (consider proofs that are not understood at first glance).


Junon:

This is incredible, since the entire argument concerns free will! Its point is that we cannot "choose" a particular belief. Is that no longer his point? Or does he not understand that is free will: the power of choice? A belief, if it is held, is either chosen or thrust upon you. Which is it?

Well what I have in mind is something like the inability to lift up a giant boulder and then being punished for it. Even if one wants to one isn't able to and therefore it would be unjust to punish this person for not lifting the boulder. So using the term 'free will' is a bit misleading IMO. But even if you want to consider this a free will debate then I don't care I would just avoid it because it adds unnecessary ambiguity because I don't want to have a side debate on the meaning of 'free will'.

As for the rest of your post I am not sure what bearing it has on my argument. If you can cite me the Plantinga paper that you seem to be quoting from then I will try to read it and hopefully comment on it. Or I can wait for the response you will provide to Skavu in hopes of better clarifying the discussion.

Italianguy:

I ain't trying to find proof that God existence (btw, I don't require physical proof hence my reliance on a syllogism that requires only armchair debate).
This is just a healthy discussion to be clarify things like justice/the nature of beliefs. And who knows who will benefit from reading this thread.

 

[AlbanianMuslim]

I refuse to dignify anyone with a response who says "I aint" or someone who begins a sentence with "And." Im sorry I just cant. It breaks my heart to see such terrible english.

 

[Lynx]

I refuse to dignify anyone with a response who says "I aint" or someone who begins a sentence with "And." Im sorry I just cant. It breaks my heart to see such terrible english.

Lol. I love typing out I ain't. It has a nice ring to it ~.~ I never say it though in conversation.

 

[سيف الله]

Salaam

Thanks again to RandyE for his response

Well what I have in mind is something like the inability to lift up a giant boulder and then being punished for it. Even if one wants to one isn't able to and therefore it would be unjust to punish this person for not lifting the boulder. So using the term 'free will' is a bit misleading IMO. But even if you want to consider this a free will debate then I don't care I would just avoid it because it adds unnecessary ambiguity because I don't want to have a side debate on the meaning of 'free will'.

As for the rest of your post I am not sure what bearing it has on my argument. If you can cite me the Plantinga paper that you seem to be quoting from then I will try to read it and hopefully comment on it. Or I can wait for the response you will provide to Skavu in hopes of better clarifying the discussion.

The paper is Plantinga's response to Dawkins; interestingly I found it on Dawkins' website. Your analogy describes free will as it is applied. For the "rock" is choosing to believe, and the inability is presumably...inability. So, analogously, you're saying it's the inability to believe; which demands an answer to the question, "how can one believe?" If beliefs can be chosen, then there is no overriding inability, at least none that we've seen. If they cannot be chosen, then the debate directly concerns free will.

This doesn't address the argument, it simply glosses over it. Moreover, it begs the question by assuming that there are things that are "overwhelming" and the word is used in reference to the faculty of the will. If "overwhelming" only means we should believe it in order to be rational, then he effectively concedes his point as lost. If it means it overcomes the will, it's simply begging the question of the issue at hand.

Why do you say 'should' here?

If belief is always choice-based then there can be no should, only could.

I said "in order to be rational." If beliefs are choice-based, we can be rational, and in order to be rational we should (past tense of shall, but in this case used as an "ought to") align our beliefs with the evidence. I see no reason why if beliefs are based on choices that we cannot choose to be rational; further, rationality has standards that must be adhered to. So, in order to be rational, we should....

How does Plantinga show this? Methinks that you are missing the purpose of this argument. It is to show that people's beliefs are not motivated by arbitrary desire and that everyone's beliefs have an underpinning that if held strongly, cannot just be changed or removed by request or desire (such is the pointlessness of pascal's wager by consequence).

And on the Wager, do you believe that the wager is valid by the way? If not - (as I don't expect you do) why not?

The wager is a red herring; I'm simply defending the power to choose. Interestingly, your argument doesn't address formation of beliefs, but the psychological need not to relinquish deep ones. So long as beliefs can be formed with a choice, it need not matter how deeply-held they are. Further, this explanation (free will) is the most sufficient explanation of why scant evidence works for person A of near-equal intelligence and background whereas even rigorous evidence isn't good enough for person B.

Why would there be? If a belief is easily demonstrably false then that knowledge of its falsification would have been acquirable and people would have been compelled on the basis of new information to change their position.

In the absence of far-reaching new information, small cultures in still undeveloped nations still hold on to their mythological beliefs. They will do so until they develop and are shown that much of it is demonstrably false.

But that's just the point! Why should we expect this, given naturalism? Why does it just so happen that when presented with falsification for a belief, people abandon it? It is not a necessary truth that such happens, nor is it necessarily advantageous in evolution (as there are plenty of times when ignorance truly is bliss). But even if it were always advantageous, that still doesn't tell us why it just so happens that physicalism produces correct results. On sheer physicalism alone, the probabilities are the same we should see people holding beliefs in spite of new evidence; even if they recognize the evidence is true. That we don't see it, and that true belief-correspondence is so fantastically improbable given the parameters on physicalism, it seems we should reject it.

That is not the argument.

And yes, I've already talked about people leading themselves into denial. If they go so far as to talk themselves into their own dishonesty then they've convinced themself through repetition and some placebo effect that reinforced it each time (usually). They haven't just, arbitrarily decided to believe their own false claims.

That seems incredulous to me. If they talked themselves into it, did they not want to talk themselves into it? In order to maintain consistency, the answer must be "no." But then what caused it? It seems obvious they wanted to believe it, and so they did.

 

[سيف الله]

Salaam

Not sure why Atheists are here? If you don't believe...what do you care about anyones answers anyway? Are you looking to be a part of a faith?

No ones answers are ever going to be sufficeint to you. Are you trying to get believers to disbelieve their faith? I am pretty sure your not supposed to do that here, i could be wrong?

If you don't believe, thats fine....but why the questions and arguments if no ones answers ever help you to understand? We believe what is written, what is taught, what was spoken. You need physical proof, we have faith.

God be with you, and i say that wether you like it or not, because I belive one day you will be convinced.

One has to admire their evangelical zeal. Always wondered why Athiests seem so attracted to religious forums, maybe its the 'opposites attract' thing

Wouldnt worry too much about these debates, they've gone on for a very long time and probably continue till the end of time :skeleton:

My objective if any on here is to defend Secularism and how important I think it is for everyone

Secularism (or more accurately secular culture) strikes me as hostile to the religious believer.

Just check out the NSS website or anything written by Dawkins and co, or perhaps the steady marginalisation and death of Christianity in Britain. Muslims should be very wary of it, (interestingly the Pope and perceptive Christains have voiced similiar concerns as well).

But yeah we'll discuss this elsewhere sometime, lets not derail this thread :nervous:

 

[Skavau]

The wager is a red herring; I'm simply defending the power to choose. Interestingly, your argument doesn't address formation of beliefs, but the psychological need not to relinquish deep ones. So long as beliefs can be formed with a choice, it need not matter how deeply-held they are. Further, this explanation (free will) is the most sufficient explanation of why scant evidence works for person A of near-equal intelligence and background whereas even rigorous evidence isn't good enough for person B.

It is not a red herring. I ask you about the Wager because it has a lot of relevance in this thread. This thread, is essentially in part about the perceived injustice of hell. It claims that torturing people for eternity based on 'thought-crime' is perfectly morally acceptable. The proposition that belief is not a choice and it is motivated by many factors is just a part of that argument.

Pascal's Wager, as you know, claims that people ought to just change their beliefs to something that would be more beneficial to them. Do you think that this is valid? If you don't think that it is valid then I take it you would think that beliefs ought to be grounded in sincerity.

And indeed, I still do not know your position on hell. It is as I said, far less obvious what a Christian thinks about the afterlife than it is a Muslim. Do you believe that the 'unsaved' as it were are destined for hellfire? Does hellfire exist in your understanding?

But that's just the point! Why should we expect this, given naturalism? Why does it just so happen that when presented with falsification for a belief, people abandon it?

Surely this is so close, and yet so far?

Because it is impossible to maintain a belief when 'undeniable' evidence is presented for its redundancy. If I was to observe now that it was raining outside I could not sincerely claim that it is a bright and sunny day.

It is not a necessary truth that such happens, nor is it necessarily advantageous in evolution (as there are plenty of times when ignorance truly is bliss). But even if it were always advantageous, that still doesn't tell us why it just so happens that physicalism produces correct results. On sheer physicalism alone, the probabilities are the same we should see people holding beliefs in spite of new evidence; even if they recognize the evidence is true.

Huh?

Why would the part in bold be true in any world view?

That seems incredulous to me. If they talked themselves into it, did they not want to talk themselves into it? In order to maintain consistency, the answer must be "no." But then what caused it? It seems obvious they wanted to believe it, and so they did.

Of course they 'talked themselves into it'. They reinforced it with a persistent self-induced placebo effect. If however, your statements were entirely valid about belief then they could have just talked themselves into it instantly. There would have been no need to work on it.

 

[Skavau]

One has to admire their evangelical zeal. Always wondered why Athiests seem so attracted to religious forums, maybe its the 'opposites attract' thing

tut tut

Typical misspelling. I expected better from you!

Secularism (or more accurately secular culture) strikes me as hostile to the religious believer.

Just check out the NSS website or anything written by Dawkins and co, or perhaps the steady marginalisation and death of Christianity in Britain. Muslims should be very wary of it, (interestingly the Pope and perceptive Christains have voiced similiar concerns as well).

But yeah we'll discuss this elsewhere sometime, lets not derail this thread

^o)

 

[سيف الله]

Salaam

Another reply from RandyE

[It is not a red herring. I ask you about the Wager because it has a lot of relevance in this thread. This thread, is essentially in part about the perceived injustice of hell. It claims that torturing people for eternity based on 'thought-crime' is perfectly morally acceptable. The proposition that belief is not a choice and it is motivated by many factors is just a part of that argument.

My apologies; I'm not actually in this but another forum, as you may know. I was primarily concerned with the ability to choose one's belief, in general.

Because it is impossible to maintain a belief when 'undeniable' evidence is presented for its redundancy. If I was to observe now that it was raining outside I could not sincerely claim that it is a bright and sunny day.

That just begs the question against free will. This is offered as proof of the assertion "one cannot choose his beliefs." But if we asked why this proof was proof, the response would be "because one cannot choose his beliefs."

Why would the part in bold be true in any world view?

Physicalism, or physical determinism, tells us actions are done necessarily, as a result of certain processes that make an action or held belief or thought guaranteed and not as a result of choice. If physicalism were true, we should expect to see certain beliefs held even in spite of overwhelming evidence; even if they recognized the evidence as true: there should be at least some physical process that results in a belief being held even while recognizing it as true. They believe the evidence is true and that it points in a direction opposing their viewpoint, but these people would still believe their views. There's nothing stopping purely contradictory positions from both being held on physicalism. Now under choice there are still people who hold beliefs stubbornly; but they hardly hold both to be true. They think something is wrong with the evidence, or its application, or both (whether rationally or not). They at least believe they are acting rationally. Further, on physicalism we should expect even extremely small things to move very intelligent people, even if they are non-sequiturs. Physicalism doesn't guarantee (and indeed cannot) truth-conformity or rationality. It is a blind process.

Everything in our experiences points to free will. Even your responses. Even if you believe your current belief was physically determined, you certainly believe what you're typing in response is a product of your mind, and not merely a physical process. In short, even you think you're typing what you want. And how did you come to form your belief in physicalism itself? Why is it that no one can seem to come up with the formulas which guarantee belief? Finally, why is it any beliefs are actually true? How can we know? If what we know and believe is physically determined, how can we be sure that physical determinism isn't wrong, and thus our entire worldview? The answer is simple: our collective experiences and senses all inform us reality exists, and is knowable. Yet all of our experiences inform us free will exists, and all we have on physicalism is assertions.

Of course they 'talked themselves into it'. They reinforced it with a persistent self-induced placebo effect. If however, your statements were entirely valid about belief then they could have just talked themselves into it instantly. There would have been no need to work on it.

But did they choose to talk themselves into it? If the answer is "no," then why did they have to talk themselves into it? Shouldn't they just already believe it? Cognitive dissonance (embracing something as true while not believing it) is a defeater of physicalism. Physicalism has no room for such considerations, while free will does. After all, they "want" to believe its true, and that's why they repeat it. Answering "they repeat it to themselves because that's how physicalism works" doesn't answer a major question: why?

 

[Lynx]

Salaam

Another reply from RandyE



My apologies; I'm not actually in this but another forum, as you may know. I was primarily concerned with the ability to choose one's belief, in general.



That just begs the question against free will. This is offered as proof of the assertion "one cannot choose his beliefs." But if we asked why this proof was proof, the response would be "because one cannot choose his beliefs."



Physicalism, or physical determinism, tells us actions are done necessarily, as a result of certain processes that make an action or held belief or thought guaranteed and not as a result of choice. If physicalism were true, we should expect to see certain beliefs held even in spite of overwhelming evidence; even if they recognized the evidence as true: there should be at least some physical process that results in a belief being held even while recognizing it as true. They believe the evidence is true and that it points in a direction opposing their viewpoint, but these people would still believe their views. There's nothing stopping purely contradictory positions from both being held on physicalism. Now under choice there are still people who hold beliefs stubbornly; but they hardly hold both to be true. They think something is wrong with the evidence, or its application, or both (whether rationally or not). They at least believe they are acting rationally. Further, on physicalism we should expect even extremely small things to move very intelligent people, even if they are non-sequiturs. Physicalism doesn't guarantee (and indeed cannot) truth-conformity or rationality. It is a blind process.

Everything in our experiences points to free will. Even your responses. Even if you believe your current belief was physically determined, you certainly believe what you're typing in response is a product of your mind, and not merely a physical process. In short, even you think you're typing what you want. And how did you come to form your belief in physicalism itself? Why is it that no one can seem to come up with the formulas which guarantee belief? Finally, why is it any beliefs are actually true? How can we know? If what we know and believe is physically determined, how can we be sure that physical determinism isn't wrong, and thus our entire worldview? The answer is simple: our collective experiences and senses all inform us reality exists, and is knowable. Yet all of our experiences inform us free will exists, and all we have on physicalism is assertions.



But did they choose to talk themselves into it? If the answer is "no," then why did they have to talk themselves into it? Shouldn't they just already believe it? Cognitive dissonance (embracing something as true while not believing it) is a defeater of physicalism. Physicalism has no room for such considerations, while free will does. After all, they "want" to believe its true, and that's why they repeat it. Answering "they repeat it to themselves because that's how physicalism works" doesn't answer a major question: why?

I am sorry maybe I am missing the point here. What exactly are you trying to demonstrate? I can read and understand what you are saying but I am slow to realize your conclusion. Are you saying that belief is a choice? If so, I am not seeing how you have come to that conclusion. I was not trying to beg the question earlier (i.e., belief isn't a choice because one cannot choose to believe in something) that is, I felt this statement could be tested by each individual. Try to believe in something and you will be unable to. But I feel like you know this so what exactly are you trying to say. And I was looking for the Plantinga article on the Dawkins website. I didn't do a thorough search but I didn't find it anyway. If you could provide the title or the link to the paper, that would be great.

 

[Skavau]

Another reply from RandyE

Who or what is RandyE?

My apologies; I'm not actually in this but another forum, as you may know. I was primarily concerned with the ability to choose one's belief, in general.

Okay then. Know that I am still interested in your answers to these questions as it will determine whether you consider belief something that should be considered on grounds of evidence or something that should be trivial.

If you deem the Wager invalid, consider that belief ought to be based on specific considerations and recognise that there can be no such thing as 'thought-crime', then we disagree about very little - only the semantics and specifics of belief.

That just begs the question against free will. This is offered as proof of the assertion "one cannot choose his beliefs." But if we asked why this proof was proof, the response would be "because one cannot choose his beliefs."

Actually if you asked me how is that evidence of not being able to choose your belief then I would simply repeat that if it was I could effectively convince myself that it was sunny without any reason.

So if belief is always a choice, I open the window and observe that it is raining - how could I convince myself that it was sunny precisely?

Physicalism, or physical determinism, tells us actions are done necessarily, as a result of certain processes that make an action or held belief or thought guaranteed and not as a result of choice. If physicalism were true, we should expect to see certain beliefs held even in spite of overwhelming evidence; even if they recognized the evidence as true: there should be at least some physical process that results in a belief being held even while recognizing it as true.

Huh?

I've asked you this already. Why would we expect to see large groups of people embracing ideals they know to be untrue, or in the face of overwhelming evidence if physicalism is true? Why would we not if your ideals are true?

They believe the evidence is true and that it points in a direction opposing their viewpoint, but these people would still believe their views. There's nothing stopping purely contradictory positions from both being held on physicalism. Now under choice there are still people who hold beliefs stubbornly; but they hardly hold both to be true. They think something is wrong with the evidence, or its application, or both (whether rationally or not). They at least believe they are acting rationally. Further, on physicalism we should expect even extremely small things to move very intelligent people, even if they are non-sequiturs. Physicalism doesn't guarantee (and indeed cannot) truth-conformity or rationality. It is a blind process.

I don't think you get what exactly me and Lynx are saying. We're stating primarily that beliefs have to have some basis in themselves over trivial arbitrary choice. If they do not, then all concepts such as cognitive dissonance and being convinced through evidence or reason have no meaning.

We are not arguing or claiming anything you are saying in the above.

But did they choose to talk themselves into it? If the answer is "no," then why did they have to talk themselves into it? Shouldn't they just already believe it? Cognitive dissonance (embracing something as true while not believing it) is a defeater of physicalism. Physicalism has no room for such considerations, while free will does. After all, they "want" to believe its true, and that's why they repeat it. Answering "they repeat it to themselves because that's how physicalism works" doesn't answer a major question: why?

You can choose your biases. Someone who talks themselves into something, over time is attempting to defy the evidence.

And by the way that is not cognitive dissonance. Cognitive Dissonance is the state of holding two contradictory ideas as true at the same time. People can often go into this phase when they discover new information that conflicts with something else they already believe to be true. If belief was always a choice, then you could not ever slip into such a state of confusion.