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Mohammad Morsi has passed away
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Salaam
Mohammed Morsi youngest son has died. Supposedly of a heart attack.
Mohammed Morsi youngest son has died. Supposedly of a heart attack.
Last edited:
Salaam
Like to share. Long but very enlightening article.
In 2011, I travelled to Cairo and met Mohammed Badie. Today, he sleeps on the floor of an Egyptian prison cell, sentenced to death
Since my release from Guantanamo, I have found myself naturally interested in the stories of political prisoners around the world.
I’ve met colleagues of Nelson Mandela who were imprisoned on Robben Island; Irish Republicans who took part in hunger strikes with Bobby Sands; Palestinians who were imprisoned with their family members; and former prisoners in Libya, Syria and Egypt who spent decades in prison and emerged as leaders.
One of these men is the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Badie.
Rest here
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/when-i-met-muslim-brotherhoods-supreme-guide
Like to share. Long but very enlightening article.
In 2011, I travelled to Cairo and met Mohammed Badie. Today, he sleeps on the floor of an Egyptian prison cell, sentenced to death
Since my release from Guantanamo, I have found myself naturally interested in the stories of political prisoners around the world.
I’ve met colleagues of Nelson Mandela who were imprisoned on Robben Island; Irish Republicans who took part in hunger strikes with Bobby Sands; Palestinians who were imprisoned with their family members; and former prisoners in Libya, Syria and Egypt who spent decades in prison and emerged as leaders.
One of these men is the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Badie.
Rest here
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/when-i-met-muslim-brotherhoods-supreme-guide
Last edited:
Salaam
Developing story, Protests against Sisi rule.
A sceptical take on the situation.
Developing story, Protests against Sisi rule.
A sceptical take on the situation.
Last edited:
Salaam
Like to share.
Blurb
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi says allegations of corruption against him and his army generals amount to defamation.
An Egyptian businessman who worked as a military contractor for 15 years, has posted videos online accusing el-Sisi of wasting millions of dollars of public money on palaces, villas, and hotels.
At a Cairo youth summit, the president said the Egyptian army had been ‘defamed’ but did not directly address corruption claims against himself.
Sisi playing the blame game.
Like to share.
Blurb
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi says allegations of corruption against him and his army generals amount to defamation.
An Egyptian businessman who worked as a military contractor for 15 years, has posted videos online accusing el-Sisi of wasting millions of dollars of public money on palaces, villas, and hotels.
At a Cairo youth summit, the president said the Egyptian army had been ‘defamed’ but did not directly address corruption claims against himself.
Sisi playing the blame game.
Salaam
Another update
'Vital security interest': Why Israel is quietly rooting for Egypt's Sisi
Former intelligence officials say Israel is discreetly backing the Egyptian leader to survive a wave of protest, but dare not do so publicly for fear of further undermining him
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is not the only one playing down the outbreak of protests against his rule. So too are politicians and media in neighbouring Israel.
The lack of coverage of last month’s demonstrations in Cairo and other cities, and the crackdown that has followed them, can be easily dismissed as a product of the Israeli media’s current preoccupation with domestic politics and the saga of the continuing efforts to form a new government.
International coverage, meanwhile, has remained focused on Iran, and continuing tensions in the Gulf.
Yet, talking off the record, members of the Israeli parliament uncharacteristically reluctant to speak publicly on the issue say there is deep concern about the future of a man who is often labelled as “the most pro-Israeli Egyptian leader ever”.
They also recognise that any Israeli expression of concern to that effect is bound to do more harm than good to a leader already criticised in parts of the Arab world for being exactly that.
Open cooperation
In the years since Sisi seized power in 2013, the Egyptian and Israeli governments have moved from working tacitly together to open cooperation, a relationship reinforced by photo ops featuring Sisi with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
“I certainly hope Sisi survives this round of protests,” said Zvi Magen, a former high-ranking officer in Israeli military intelligence and now a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
“Even if some define Sisi as a dictator who came to power by use of force, he is a more positive player than his predecessors," Magen told Middle East Eye.
“He, unlike Mubarak, is the strongman post-2011 Tahrir Square, and he knows where it can lead. He is bound to be much more cautious.”
Magen said it did not appear that the situation in Egypt would lead to “full-blown violence” and that Israeli military intelligence and the government would wait to see how it developed.
Intelligence sharing
But he also said Israel could help Sisi discreetly by providing him with intelligence.
“We do not have an opinion as to what the Egyptian regime should look like, but a messy situation is bad for both sides. Israel can help him with intelligence information, but certainly should not interfere.”
Amiram Levin, a former deputy head of the Mossad intelligence agency, told MEE that Sisi was also paying a price for his open relations with Israel.
“Iran, for instance, classifies him as an enemy. In general, this serves as a propaganda factor against him,” Levin said.
“Here Netanyahu is totally wrong when he runs to spread the good news of friendship.”
The relationship between Sisi and Netanyahu is not one of mutual chemistry between leaders however, but one of shared interests.
Under Sisi, military cooperation with Israel in the Sinai has reached unprecedented levels, with both countries identifying Islamic State- and al-Qaeda-linked militants in the peninsula as a common threat.
While Egyptian forces are waging the war there on the ground, Israel is providing crucial intelligence for the campaign.
Sisi has also played an important role as a broker in the bloody conflict between Hamas and Israel in Gaza.
While criticising Israel’s use of excessive force and the subsequent deaths of civilians, he also considers Hamas to be an enemy of Egypt, even while hosting Hamas leaders for talks in Cairo, and convening a donors conference for the reconstruction of Gaza.
This careful manoeuvring has made him an important player in the region, but also a target for countries with other interests, including Turkey and Iran.
Here too, analysts say, an intelligence relationship with Israel has likely proved useful for Sisi.
Despite the close ties however, Israeli-Egyptian relations are always accompanied by some level of suspicion.
Many then-prominent Israelis suspected that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s 1977 visit to Israel, and the 1979 peace treaty between the countries were a dangerous trap.
Two decades later in 2001, Avigdor Lieberman suggested that Israel should bomb the Aswan Dam if Egypt continued to build up military forces in the Sinai, and for many years the now-former defence minister believed the Egyptians were secretly preparing for another war with Israel.
“Some level of suspicion is understandable,” Efraim Halevy, the head of the Mossad from 1998 to 2002, told MEE, emphasising the importance of stability in Egypt for Israel.
“The security of Egypt and its political system – certainly now the security of President Sisi – are a vital security interest for Israel. Egypt has the largest population in the Arab world and a long border with Israel and Sinai.”
On the other side of the border, he added, Islamist militants were waging a continuous war against Sisi and the Egyptian leadership.
“This aspect, together with the peace and stability of Jordan, provide irreplaceable security capabilities for Israel,” said Halevy.
One practical way for Israel to help Sisi, Halevy suggested, would be to make sure Washington is aware of his leadership’s strategic importance to Israel.
The lesson of Morsi
Levin, however, believes that Israel should also heed the lessons of past occasions when it has involved itself in the domestic politics of its neighbours, with unpredictable and dangerous consequences.
The democratic election in 2012 of the Muslim Brotherhood-backed predecessor Mohamed Morsi was considered to be Israel’s worst nightmare. Yet in office, he was more pragmatic than expected prior to his ousting by Sisi in a military coup.
Contrary to Israel's initial concerns and perhaps conscious of his dependency on US aid, Morsi never attempted to end the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, and security coordination never stopped.
And while he improved ties with Hamas, Morsi's government stayed away from direct involvement in periodic clashes between Hamas and Israel, working instead to broker a ceasefire in Gaza.
“That was a lesson to learn,” said Levin. “Israel should not have expressed that level of dissatisfaction and fear [about Morsi].”
Levin also cites the example of Israel’s support for Bashir Gemayel, the Christian militia leader who was assassinated after being elected president of Lebanon in 1982.
The killing plunged Lebanon even deeper into a civil war which raged until 1990, with Israeli forces occupying the south of the country until their withdrawal in 2000.
He says that while Israel may have a "fantastic understanding" of what is going on in neighbouring countries, it should recognise the limits of its ability to influence societies with complex traditions and histories of their own stretching back decades and centuries.
“Israel has no particular interest in neighbouring dictatorships nor in strengthening regimes around us," he said. "Any kind of interference turns out to be a horrific mistake.”
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/friendly-neighbour-why-israel-quietly-rooting-sisi-survive
Another update
'Vital security interest': Why Israel is quietly rooting for Egypt's Sisi
Former intelligence officials say Israel is discreetly backing the Egyptian leader to survive a wave of protest, but dare not do so publicly for fear of further undermining him
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is not the only one playing down the outbreak of protests against his rule. So too are politicians and media in neighbouring Israel.
The lack of coverage of last month’s demonstrations in Cairo and other cities, and the crackdown that has followed them, can be easily dismissed as a product of the Israeli media’s current preoccupation with domestic politics and the saga of the continuing efforts to form a new government.
International coverage, meanwhile, has remained focused on Iran, and continuing tensions in the Gulf.
Yet, talking off the record, members of the Israeli parliament uncharacteristically reluctant to speak publicly on the issue say there is deep concern about the future of a man who is often labelled as “the most pro-Israeli Egyptian leader ever”.
They also recognise that any Israeli expression of concern to that effect is bound to do more harm than good to a leader already criticised in parts of the Arab world for being exactly that.
Open cooperation
In the years since Sisi seized power in 2013, the Egyptian and Israeli governments have moved from working tacitly together to open cooperation, a relationship reinforced by photo ops featuring Sisi with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
“I certainly hope Sisi survives this round of protests,” said Zvi Magen, a former high-ranking officer in Israeli military intelligence and now a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
“Even if some define Sisi as a dictator who came to power by use of force, he is a more positive player than his predecessors," Magen told Middle East Eye.
“He, unlike Mubarak, is the strongman post-2011 Tahrir Square, and he knows where it can lead. He is bound to be much more cautious.”
Magen said it did not appear that the situation in Egypt would lead to “full-blown violence” and that Israeli military intelligence and the government would wait to see how it developed.
Intelligence sharing
But he also said Israel could help Sisi discreetly by providing him with intelligence.
“We do not have an opinion as to what the Egyptian regime should look like, but a messy situation is bad for both sides. Israel can help him with intelligence information, but certainly should not interfere.”
Amiram Levin, a former deputy head of the Mossad intelligence agency, told MEE that Sisi was also paying a price for his open relations with Israel.
“Iran, for instance, classifies him as an enemy. In general, this serves as a propaganda factor against him,” Levin said.
“Here Netanyahu is totally wrong when he runs to spread the good news of friendship.”
The relationship between Sisi and Netanyahu is not one of mutual chemistry between leaders however, but one of shared interests.
Under Sisi, military cooperation with Israel in the Sinai has reached unprecedented levels, with both countries identifying Islamic State- and al-Qaeda-linked militants in the peninsula as a common threat.
While Egyptian forces are waging the war there on the ground, Israel is providing crucial intelligence for the campaign.
Sisi has also played an important role as a broker in the bloody conflict between Hamas and Israel in Gaza.
While criticising Israel’s use of excessive force and the subsequent deaths of civilians, he also considers Hamas to be an enemy of Egypt, even while hosting Hamas leaders for talks in Cairo, and convening a donors conference for the reconstruction of Gaza.
This careful manoeuvring has made him an important player in the region, but also a target for countries with other interests, including Turkey and Iran.
Here too, analysts say, an intelligence relationship with Israel has likely proved useful for Sisi.
Despite the close ties however, Israeli-Egyptian relations are always accompanied by some level of suspicion.
Many then-prominent Israelis suspected that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s 1977 visit to Israel, and the 1979 peace treaty between the countries were a dangerous trap.
Two decades later in 2001, Avigdor Lieberman suggested that Israel should bomb the Aswan Dam if Egypt continued to build up military forces in the Sinai, and for many years the now-former defence minister believed the Egyptians were secretly preparing for another war with Israel.
“Some level of suspicion is understandable,” Efraim Halevy, the head of the Mossad from 1998 to 2002, told MEE, emphasising the importance of stability in Egypt for Israel.
“The security of Egypt and its political system – certainly now the security of President Sisi – are a vital security interest for Israel. Egypt has the largest population in the Arab world and a long border with Israel and Sinai.”
On the other side of the border, he added, Islamist militants were waging a continuous war against Sisi and the Egyptian leadership.
“This aspect, together with the peace and stability of Jordan, provide irreplaceable security capabilities for Israel,” said Halevy.
One practical way for Israel to help Sisi, Halevy suggested, would be to make sure Washington is aware of his leadership’s strategic importance to Israel.
The lesson of Morsi
Levin, however, believes that Israel should also heed the lessons of past occasions when it has involved itself in the domestic politics of its neighbours, with unpredictable and dangerous consequences.
The democratic election in 2012 of the Muslim Brotherhood-backed predecessor Mohamed Morsi was considered to be Israel’s worst nightmare. Yet in office, he was more pragmatic than expected prior to his ousting by Sisi in a military coup.
Contrary to Israel's initial concerns and perhaps conscious of his dependency on US aid, Morsi never attempted to end the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, and security coordination never stopped.
And while he improved ties with Hamas, Morsi's government stayed away from direct involvement in periodic clashes between Hamas and Israel, working instead to broker a ceasefire in Gaza.
“That was a lesson to learn,” said Levin. “Israel should not have expressed that level of dissatisfaction and fear [about Morsi].”
Levin also cites the example of Israel’s support for Bashir Gemayel, the Christian militia leader who was assassinated after being elected president of Lebanon in 1982.
The killing plunged Lebanon even deeper into a civil war which raged until 1990, with Israeli forces occupying the south of the country until their withdrawal in 2000.
He says that while Israel may have a "fantastic understanding" of what is going on in neighbouring countries, it should recognise the limits of its ability to influence societies with complex traditions and histories of their own stretching back decades and centuries.
“Israel has no particular interest in neighbouring dictatorships nor in strengthening regimes around us," he said. "Any kind of interference turns out to be a horrific mistake.”
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/friendly-neighbour-why-israel-quietly-rooting-sisi-survive
Salaam
Another update
Turki al-Sheikh threatens to sue Egyptian whistleblower Mohamed Ali in Spain
Top Saudi royal aide and owner of Almeria FC targets Egypt's most notorious YouTube star after being lambasted for helping prop up Sisi
A senior adviser to the Saudi crown prince and owner of a Spanish football club has said he will seek to extradite Barcelona-based Egyptian whistleblower Mohamed Ali by filing a libel lawsuit against him in Spain.
Turki al-Sheikh is a senior adviser to Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and head of the kingdom's Entertainment Authority. He is also the owner of the Spanish football club Almeria FC, which he acquired in August after controversially withdrawing his ownership of Egyptian team Pyramids FC.
Mohamed Ali is an Egyptian businessperson and actor-turned-whistleblower, whose video statements accusing top military officials in his country of opaque and lavish expenditure have gone viral since the beginning of September.
Speaking from his experience as a real estate developer, Ali revealed that Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi has built palatial residences using public money. The accusations triggered a response from the president, who defended the policy by saying they were built “in the name of Egypt”.
Sisi’s response, however, has ignited an online movement calling for his overthrow, and sparked rare protests in a country where nearly half the population lives under poverty line.
In one of his videos, Ali criticised Egyptian singers and film stars for signing contracts with Sheikh to perform in Saudi Arabia, as part of the kingdom’s reforms aimed at shaking off its ultra-conservative image by becoming a regional hub for entertainment.
Ali accused the celebrities of humiliating Egypt by taking turns to sign contracts with Sheikh at a press conference in Riyadh in February.
“Who is that Turki? Are you signing with him merely for the sake of money? Don’t you have enough money and fame?” he said while addressing Egyptian celebrities and condemning Saudi Arabia's bankrolling of the Sisi government.
“You are a beggar, you and your men and your media,” he told Sisi.
Sisi took power from his democratically elected predecessor Mohamed Morsi in a 2013 military coup with Saudi backing, and his government currently receives billions in support from Riyadh.
“I heard there is a contractor who wanted to play the role of a hero but couldn’t pull it off,” Sheikh wrote on Facebook on Thursday, referring to Ali.
“He is unfortunately Egyptian and based in Spain. In my capacity as the owner of a club in Spain and holder of Spanish residency, and due to his transgressions and insults in one of his YouTube and Facebook clips, I have decided to take legal action with the biggest law firm in Spain,” he added.
Sheikh said he sought eventually to deport Ali to Egypt if he was found guilty.
“I wish I could win this case so that, who knows, maybe he will be extradited to his original country, although he doesn’t seem to be original. It seems he never drank Nile water,” he said.
Since Ali’s videos became the trending topic in Egypt, the state has attempted to counter them with pro-state propaganda, including a single by best-selling rapper and actor Mohamed Ramadan titled “All they want is Chaos”.
Sheikh, who also writes songs as a hobby, was the latest to take part in the pro-Sisi campaign.
He announced on Thursday a new single by Amr Diab, who signed a contract with him in February, titled “I am in love with you, Egypt”.
The video clip begins and ends with pictures of Sisi with Sheikh next to him.
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/...sue-egyptian-whistle-blower-mohamed-ali-spain
Another update
Turki al-Sheikh threatens to sue Egyptian whistleblower Mohamed Ali in Spain
Top Saudi royal aide and owner of Almeria FC targets Egypt's most notorious YouTube star after being lambasted for helping prop up Sisi
A senior adviser to the Saudi crown prince and owner of a Spanish football club has said he will seek to extradite Barcelona-based Egyptian whistleblower Mohamed Ali by filing a libel lawsuit against him in Spain.
Turki al-Sheikh is a senior adviser to Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and head of the kingdom's Entertainment Authority. He is also the owner of the Spanish football club Almeria FC, which he acquired in August after controversially withdrawing his ownership of Egyptian team Pyramids FC.
Mohamed Ali is an Egyptian businessperson and actor-turned-whistleblower, whose video statements accusing top military officials in his country of opaque and lavish expenditure have gone viral since the beginning of September.
Speaking from his experience as a real estate developer, Ali revealed that Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi has built palatial residences using public money. The accusations triggered a response from the president, who defended the policy by saying they were built “in the name of Egypt”.
Sisi’s response, however, has ignited an online movement calling for his overthrow, and sparked rare protests in a country where nearly half the population lives under poverty line.
In one of his videos, Ali criticised Egyptian singers and film stars for signing contracts with Sheikh to perform in Saudi Arabia, as part of the kingdom’s reforms aimed at shaking off its ultra-conservative image by becoming a regional hub for entertainment.
Ali accused the celebrities of humiliating Egypt by taking turns to sign contracts with Sheikh at a press conference in Riyadh in February.
“Who is that Turki? Are you signing with him merely for the sake of money? Don’t you have enough money and fame?” he said while addressing Egyptian celebrities and condemning Saudi Arabia's bankrolling of the Sisi government.
“You are a beggar, you and your men and your media,” he told Sisi.
Sisi took power from his democratically elected predecessor Mohamed Morsi in a 2013 military coup with Saudi backing, and his government currently receives billions in support from Riyadh.
“I heard there is a contractor who wanted to play the role of a hero but couldn’t pull it off,” Sheikh wrote on Facebook on Thursday, referring to Ali.
“He is unfortunately Egyptian and based in Spain. In my capacity as the owner of a club in Spain and holder of Spanish residency, and due to his transgressions and insults in one of his YouTube and Facebook clips, I have decided to take legal action with the biggest law firm in Spain,” he added.
Sheikh said he sought eventually to deport Ali to Egypt if he was found guilty.
“I wish I could win this case so that, who knows, maybe he will be extradited to his original country, although he doesn’t seem to be original. It seems he never drank Nile water,” he said.
Since Ali’s videos became the trending topic in Egypt, the state has attempted to counter them with pro-state propaganda, including a single by best-selling rapper and actor Mohamed Ramadan titled “All they want is Chaos”.
Sheikh, who also writes songs as a hobby, was the latest to take part in the pro-Sisi campaign.
He announced on Thursday a new single by Amr Diab, who signed a contract with him in February, titled “I am in love with you, Egypt”.
The video clip begins and ends with pictures of Sisi with Sheikh next to him.
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/...sue-egyptian-whistle-blower-mohamed-ali-spain
Salaam
Like to share.
Abdulhaq was born in Cairo on October 1, 1945 (78 years old). He grew up in a religious family in the upper-middle-class neighborhood of Heliopolis in Cairo. His father was an English teacher, and the whole family were members of the prestigious Heliopolis Sporting Club.
Abdulhaq joined MB in 1962, during his high school years. The issue of seniority has proved critical in the recent internal strife. In the same year, he enrolled in the Faculty of Medicine at Ain Shams University, but he graduated in 1976 due to his prolonged imprisonment.
The new General Guide of the MB was arrested in 1965 when he was only 19, where he got closer to Sayyid Qutb (executed in 1966). Abdulhaq was imprisoned with the current General Guide Mohamed Badie (in prison since 2013) and his deputy Mahmoud Ezzat (in prison since 2020).
Abdulhaq was released in 1974, finished his medical studies and MS in 1982. In 1985, he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia where he worked as a dermatologist, got married, and lived until weeks ago. He was recently appointed to the General Shura Council [the main legislative body].
As we expected in our "Broken Bonds" book, the new General Guide is not a member of the Guidance Bureau, is old enough, whether in age or through his time in the organization, to assume seniority, and has not been publicly implicated in the legitimacy crises since 2013.
In early 2022, during one of the interviews for Broken Bonds, I asked a question about whether the 20-something-year-old MB member can name a single leader they can trust. My interviewee answered instantly, "Salah Abdulhaq is the only one."
Abdulhaq did not take part in the recent feud within the MB; his name is clean for members in the different competing factions. An MB member said that his character has similarities to those of both the open-minded and conservative leaders within the organization.
Abdulhaq's roles within the MB revolved around internal education and "Tarbiyaa," the upbringing, which is the most powerful department inside the Brotherhood. He has a generally low profile, partly because of his residence in Saudi Arabia.
MB statement and sources said that Abdulhaq's priorities are to resolve the issues of the political detainees in Egypt and the internal conflict, and to include more youth in the leadership structure of the MB.
According to the MB sources, before Ibrahim Mounir's death in November 2022, he recommended three names for the MB to choose his successor from. Abdulhaq was elected unanimously from the Shura council, and he got the endorsement of the MB inside Egypt.
Mahmoud Hussein's faction within the MB has issued a statement denying the appointment of Abdulhaq. But his camp is almost dead within Egypt and abroad. He still controls some of the MB's assets, but Abdulhaq has the credibility and connections to put an end to Hussein.
When I asked a middle-ranking MB member if Abdulhaq is the right person to negotiate with the Egyptian government, he described him as a 'good delegator'. 'Abdulhaq knows his strengths and shortcomings, and he will give the mission to the person who can do it,' he said."
To conclude, Abdulhaq is a relatively unknown figure among the public, but a respected & trusted leader within the MB. He faces serious challenges, both internally & externally, but his experience & reputation within the organization could provide a path forward for the group.
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1637939528366161925.html
Like to share.
Abdulhaq was born in Cairo on October 1, 1945 (78 years old). He grew up in a religious family in the upper-middle-class neighborhood of Heliopolis in Cairo. His father was an English teacher, and the whole family were members of the prestigious Heliopolis Sporting Club.
Abdulhaq joined MB in 1962, during his high school years. The issue of seniority has proved critical in the recent internal strife. In the same year, he enrolled in the Faculty of Medicine at Ain Shams University, but he graduated in 1976 due to his prolonged imprisonment.
The new General Guide of the MB was arrested in 1965 when he was only 19, where he got closer to Sayyid Qutb (executed in 1966). Abdulhaq was imprisoned with the current General Guide Mohamed Badie (in prison since 2013) and his deputy Mahmoud Ezzat (in prison since 2020).
Abdulhaq was released in 1974, finished his medical studies and MS in 1982. In 1985, he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia where he worked as a dermatologist, got married, and lived until weeks ago. He was recently appointed to the General Shura Council [the main legislative body].
As we expected in our "Broken Bonds" book, the new General Guide is not a member of the Guidance Bureau, is old enough, whether in age or through his time in the organization, to assume seniority, and has not been publicly implicated in the legitimacy crises since 2013.
In early 2022, during one of the interviews for Broken Bonds, I asked a question about whether the 20-something-year-old MB member can name a single leader they can trust. My interviewee answered instantly, "Salah Abdulhaq is the only one."
Abdulhaq did not take part in the recent feud within the MB; his name is clean for members in the different competing factions. An MB member said that his character has similarities to those of both the open-minded and conservative leaders within the organization.
Abdulhaq's roles within the MB revolved around internal education and "Tarbiyaa," the upbringing, which is the most powerful department inside the Brotherhood. He has a generally low profile, partly because of his residence in Saudi Arabia.
MB statement and sources said that Abdulhaq's priorities are to resolve the issues of the political detainees in Egypt and the internal conflict, and to include more youth in the leadership structure of the MB.
According to the MB sources, before Ibrahim Mounir's death in November 2022, he recommended three names for the MB to choose his successor from. Abdulhaq was elected unanimously from the Shura council, and he got the endorsement of the MB inside Egypt.
Mahmoud Hussein's faction within the MB has issued a statement denying the appointment of Abdulhaq. But his camp is almost dead within Egypt and abroad. He still controls some of the MB's assets, but Abdulhaq has the credibility and connections to put an end to Hussein.
When I asked a middle-ranking MB member if Abdulhaq is the right person to negotiate with the Egyptian government, he described him as a 'good delegator'. 'Abdulhaq knows his strengths and shortcomings, and he will give the mission to the person who can do it,' he said."
To conclude, Abdulhaq is a relatively unknown figure among the public, but a respected & trusted leader within the MB. He faces serious challenges, both internally & externally, but his experience & reputation within the organization could provide a path forward for the group.
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1637939528366161925.html
Salaam
Another update.
Qatari authorities ask 100 Egyptian nationals affiliated to Muslim Brotherhood, Jama’a al-Islamiya, Salafist Front to leave country
About 100 Egyptian nationals living in Qatar have been asked by Doha authorities to leave the country within a few weeks time, according to an Egyptian opposition figure based abroad who spoke to Mada Masr on condition of anonymity.
The move by Qatar comes after Egypt requested that the figures — all of whom are affiliated with Islamist groups — be delivered to Egyptian authorities, said the source.
The list of names includes Muslim Brotherhood leader and former head of the group’s association for members abroad Mohamed Abdel Wahab, as well as a number of figures belonging to the Jama’a al-Islamiya and to the Salafist Front, said the source, who currently resides in a European country.
Qatar has given the Egyptian nationals notice to leave the country amid a diplomatic rapprochement between Doha and Cairo that has blossomed over the past year.
Relations between the two countries were frosty for almost a decade following the 2013 toppling of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi, with Egypt joining a bloc of Gulf countries in a blockade that left Doha out in the cold from 2017 to 2021.
But a thaw beginning last year saw President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi pay in September a first visit to the country since assuming office. Helping bridge the distance between Doha and Cairo are the increasingly strained relations between the current Egyptian administration and its long-standing Gulf backers in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as a number of economic investment opportunities, with potential for Egypt’s need for foreign direct investment to soothe its distressed balance of payments to align with Qatari interest in a number of key strategic economic sectors, including agriculture and telecommunications.
Security cooperation has also expanded under the banner of rapprochement. According to the source, Qatari authorities requested 250 Egyptian nationals, including Islamist opposition figure Abdallah al-Sherif, who ran a series of satirical programs on YouTube and Al Jazeera, to leave the country when diplomatic ties were first being established in 2022.
Egypt’s capacity to reach opposition figures abroad has also extended as of late to Turkey, home to a large number of Egyptian nationals with affiliations to Islamist movements, who were welcomed by Ankara after Sisi’s accession to power.
With Cairo and Ankara establishing closer ties in 2021, the Turkish government instructed opposition media channels broadcasting from Turkish soil to stop criticizing Sisi and his government.
Anchor Hossam Ghamry has been detained by Turkish authorities on more than one occasion, most recently in November, amid calls for anti-government protests in Egypt on November 11.
Cairo-Ankara rapprochement was accelerated by Doha’s mediation and financial promises at the close of last year, when the three heads of state met on the sidelines of the FIFA World Cup that Qatar hosted last year.
Opposition groups now anticipate that similar pressure could target its affiliates in Turkey, with a first official meeting between Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan anticipated in the wake of Erdogan’s reelection.
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2023/06...-al-islamiya-salafist-front-to-leave-country/
Another update.
Qatari authorities ask 100 Egyptian nationals affiliated to Muslim Brotherhood, Jama’a al-Islamiya, Salafist Front to leave country
About 100 Egyptian nationals living in Qatar have been asked by Doha authorities to leave the country within a few weeks time, according to an Egyptian opposition figure based abroad who spoke to Mada Masr on condition of anonymity.
The move by Qatar comes after Egypt requested that the figures — all of whom are affiliated with Islamist groups — be delivered to Egyptian authorities, said the source.
The list of names includes Muslim Brotherhood leader and former head of the group’s association for members abroad Mohamed Abdel Wahab, as well as a number of figures belonging to the Jama’a al-Islamiya and to the Salafist Front, said the source, who currently resides in a European country.
Qatar has given the Egyptian nationals notice to leave the country amid a diplomatic rapprochement between Doha and Cairo that has blossomed over the past year.
Relations between the two countries were frosty for almost a decade following the 2013 toppling of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi, with Egypt joining a bloc of Gulf countries in a blockade that left Doha out in the cold from 2017 to 2021.
But a thaw beginning last year saw President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi pay in September a first visit to the country since assuming office. Helping bridge the distance between Doha and Cairo are the increasingly strained relations between the current Egyptian administration and its long-standing Gulf backers in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as a number of economic investment opportunities, with potential for Egypt’s need for foreign direct investment to soothe its distressed balance of payments to align with Qatari interest in a number of key strategic economic sectors, including agriculture and telecommunications.
Security cooperation has also expanded under the banner of rapprochement. According to the source, Qatari authorities requested 250 Egyptian nationals, including Islamist opposition figure Abdallah al-Sherif, who ran a series of satirical programs on YouTube and Al Jazeera, to leave the country when diplomatic ties were first being established in 2022.
Egypt’s capacity to reach opposition figures abroad has also extended as of late to Turkey, home to a large number of Egyptian nationals with affiliations to Islamist movements, who were welcomed by Ankara after Sisi’s accession to power.
With Cairo and Ankara establishing closer ties in 2021, the Turkish government instructed opposition media channels broadcasting from Turkish soil to stop criticizing Sisi and his government.
Anchor Hossam Ghamry has been detained by Turkish authorities on more than one occasion, most recently in November, amid calls for anti-government protests in Egypt on November 11.
Cairo-Ankara rapprochement was accelerated by Doha’s mediation and financial promises at the close of last year, when the three heads of state met on the sidelines of the FIFA World Cup that Qatar hosted last year.
Opposition groups now anticipate that similar pressure could target its affiliates in Turkey, with a first official meeting between Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan anticipated in the wake of Erdogan’s reelection.
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2023/06...-al-islamiya-salafist-front-to-leave-country/
Last edited:
Salaam
Another update
Realigning priorities: Egypt's strategic shift toward Qatar, Turkey, and Iran
During President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi's first term in office (2014-18), Egypt had strained relations with Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. However, this began to change during his second term, as Cairo made an incremental shift toward Ankara, Doha, and later Tehran. This shift coincided with changes in global and regional dynamics, stalemates in many of the Middle East’s conflict zones, and a detente between regional powers. While some analysts attribute Egypt's realignment to a change in the foreign policies of its influential allies, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, toward engaging with the three countries, it can be argued that Egypt's shift is primarily motivated by its domestic dynamics and its unfulfilled foreign policy objectives between 2014 and 2018. Egypt's realignment, in that sense, seeks to achieve multiple unmet domestic and regional aims.
Mitigating the financial crisis
The most pressing of these goals is mitigating Egypt’s financial crisis. For years, the country has faced a financial crisis aggravated by inflation, substantial foreign debt, and a foreign currency shortage. Domestically, this has led to soaring prices for goods and services, putting the Egyptian government under pressure from social discontent. The International Monetary Fund and Egypt's traditional allies, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which previously provided tens of billions of dollars in assistance, appear unwilling to provide additional funding this time around unless Egypt adopts structural reforms. But further accelerating fiscal reforms could spark a backlash and fuel unrest, a concern that Egypt perceives as a matter of national security. This dilemma has prompted Cairo to seek other sources of foreign currency by approaching other donors, attracting foreign investors, trying to get involved in post-conflict reconstruction in the region, supporting the tourism sector, and, more importantly, turning the country into a liquefied natural gas (LNG) hub for Europe.
Following the restoration of diplomatic ties with Cairo, Doha deposited $3 billion into Egypt’s central bank last year. In addition, Turkey and Qatar pledged $5.5 billion in investments. With their leverage in Libya, both countries could potentially enable Egypt to access postwar reconstruction opportunities there. Similarly, Iran's influence could grant Egypt access to the reconstruction market in Syria. The combined cost of rebuilding Libya and Syria is expected to exceed $350 billion, which could create profitable opportunities for Egyptian companies once funding for such efforts is available. In parallel, restoring ties with Iran could provide a lifeline for Egyptian tourism, a vital source of income for the country, accounting for around 10-15% of the economy, and one that has fluctuated since 2011. Egypt hopes to double tourist numbers to 30 million annually by 2028, in part by drawing a growing share of Iran’s outbound tourists, estimated at 6 million in 2018. For Iranian tourists, Middle Eastern countries are among the most popular destinations. In a change announced earlier this year, Egypt will allow Iranians to obtain visas on arrival in the south of the Sinai Peninsula to extend access to other parts of the country.
Becoming a regional LNG hub
Egypt's ambition to become a natural gas hub in the Mediterranean is another goal with a political dimension for its regional realignment. In mid-2022, Egypt signed a memorandum with the EU and Israel to boost its LNG exports, capitalizing on its existing infrastructure, and, more importantly, benefitting from Western needs and the global gas shortage driven by the conflict in Ukraine. Egypt, which shipped 80% of its LNG to Europe in 2022, aims to boost its exports by roughly 40% from 2025, in part by using its infrastructure to carry Israeli gas, with a primary focus on the European market. However, Egypt still needed the cooperation of Turkey, which has contested its ambitious gas exploration efforts in the Mediterranean. De-escalation with Turkey could result in a settlement over the two countries’ respective maritime economic zones and boost Egypt’s exploration in the area. That would not only increase Egypt's political significance for Europe but could also generate substantial profits. Following the Cairo-Ankara rapprochement, a deal between Libya and Turkey that allowed Turkish companies to explore in waters that are disputed with Egypt was suspended.
But Egypt's ambition to become a regional LNG hub also needs bigger investors. This is where Qatar comes in. By the end of 2021, Doha was one of the most active sovereign investors globally through the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), estimated to have $300 billion in assets. Egypt has proposed economic incentives to Qatari investors through tax exemptions and offers to operate ports along the coast. The energy sector is of particular interest for the Qataris, whose eyes are also on manufacturing, telecommunications, construction, and tourism. In March 2022, Qatar Energy signed an agreement with Egypt ExxonMobil to acquire a 40% interest in a gas exploration block off the coast in the Mediterranean. But if that is about economics, what about politics?
Breaking the pincer
Politically, Egypt's realignment could bring stability to its western border with Libya, a country where the post-Gadhafi security vacuum has previously allowed jihadists to infiltrate Egypt and conduct operations targeting the army. Over the years, Egypt, on the one hand, and Qatar and Turkey, on the other, have supported different political factions in Libya. Although the escalation between Egypt and Turkey in 2020 got close to a military confrontation, a stalemate has since prevailed. Cairo’s support for Gen. Khalifa Hifter in eastern Libya failed to achieve a decisive victory, leaving Egypt in need of building bridges with the Tripoli government in the west and trying diplomacy instead of proxy war.
But for Egypt the advantage of repairing relations with Turkey extends to the Horn of Africa as well, a region where Iran, too, has influence. The Horn of Africa is a strategic region for Egypt as it overlooks the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and it comprises the upstream of the Nile River, which provides vital water resources for Egypt’s agriculture, drinking water, and energy production. For years, the Turkish presence in the Horn of Africa, including Ankara’s construction of a military base in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, and efforts to establish a footprint on the Red Sea through Sudan, has alarmed Egypt. Today, rapprochement could help Egypt to break the Turkish pincer from the west and the south. And that could allow Egypt to focus on potential threats coming from the Egypt-Sudan border while also pursuing a deal over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a massive hydroelectric project that Ethiopia considers critical to its economic development.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Since 2014, Egypt has sought to reach an agreement with Ethiopia over the GERD that ensures minimal harm to Cairo’s share of the Nile River. Although Egypt has affirmed that “all options are on the table,” conventional military action seems less feasible than before, meaning its options are probably limited to diplomacy. But Egypt's traditional partners, such as the UAE, the U.S., and Russia, have not showed enough muscle to pressure Ethiopia to reach a deal. Thus, the potential assistance of influential actors in the Horn of Africa, including Turkey and Iran, could help. Both countries have strong ties with the Ethiopian government. Turkey, the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, signed a military cooperation agreement with Addis Ababa in 2021 amid an escalation with Cairo. The use of Turkish and Iranian drones in Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s war in Tigray suggested potential Turkish and Iranian military support. Moreover, Turkey offered to mediate negotiations between Ethiopia and Sudan over the GERD a few years ago. Today, by approaching Iran and Turkey, Egypt could benefit from their leverage over Ethiopia to help reach a fair deal for both sides.
Leveraging relationships with US adversaries
Another goal of Egypt's realignment is to enhance its strategic significance for the West. While Egypt's aspirations to become an LNG hub could bolster its importance for Europe, Cairo also recognizes the need to strengthen its relevance for the United States. Over the past decade, the bilateral relationship between Egypt and the U.S. has experienced fluctuations and some tensions, particularly concerning human rights. Previously, Egypt's significance for the U.S. predominantly relied on its contributions to counterterrorism, regional co-mediation, and its peace agreement with Israel. However, the Middle East geopolitical landscape is evolving and emerging regional powers are now taking on some of Egypt's previous roles. One significant development in this regard is the Abraham Accords, which facilitated an unprecedented level of engagement between Arab monarchies and Israel, surpassing the Egypt-Israel peace that remained cold for decades. Nowadays, other countries, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, have taken on responsibility for mediating regional conflicts as well. To maintain its relevance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Egypt recognizes it needs to control escalation from Gaza and to continue to work toward fostering reconciliation among the Palestinian factions. To this end, Egypt needs Turkey and Qatar's leverage over the Islamic movement in Gaza. It also needs Iran, whose support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad significantly contributed to the expansion of the range of their missiles in a short period of time to 250 kilometers, reaching Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv.
Moreover, as some Arab countries currently leverage their relationships with U.S. adversaries (Russia and China), a calculated rapprochement with Iran could give Egypt some leverage in its relationship with the U.S. That aligns with Egypt's calculated approach toward Russia after 2014 to pressure the U.S. Today, approaching Iran would contribute to Egypt's interest in diversifying its global allies and partners, becoming part of the BRICS grouping of leading emerging economies, and minimizing global reliance on the U.S. dollar. All of this could give Egypt additional bargaining chips in its relationship with the U.S., which is still crucial for furthering Cairo’s interests.
Minimizing the Muslim Brotherhood effect
Another goal for the Egyptian government is to continue dismantling the Muslim Brotherhood in diasporas, as its propaganda machine could take advantage of the regime's domestic vulnerability over the economic crisis. Since 2013, many leaders of the Brotherhood, designated as a terrorist group in Egypt, fled to Tukey and Qatar and established media platforms and satellite television channels targeting the regime. Although the government successfully went after the group's organizational, financial, and mobilizational capacities in Egypt, the Brotherhood still has influence on social media. As a condition for normalizing ties, Egypt demanded that Turkey and Qatar end their support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Approaching Turkey and Qatar has allowed Egypt to disrupt the presence of the group’s leaders and key figures in both countries, while pressuring others to move elsewhere and lowering the tone of their critics.
Ultimately, Egypt's regional realignment can be seen as a response to internal and regional dynamics. Nevertheless, Cairo continues to face multiple challenges. Although funding from external sources may contribute to mitigating Egypt's economic crisis, it cannot substitute for necessary domestic reforms. Furthermore, Egypt's success in achieving its regional goals will depend on several factors. These include the durability of the newly formed ties in a dynamic region and what Egypt can offer to the three countries in return. Additionally, it will also hinge on whether the expected benefits outweigh profound conflicts of interest, as well as the feasibility of maintaining relationships based on cooperation and competition. The response of other influential Egyptian partners, such as Israel and the U.S., to its approach to Iran poses another challenge as well. Finally, the potential of Egyptian diplomacy to navigate regional complexities and balance partners with conflicting agendas will play a significant role in determining whether Cairo’s regional realignment proves successful.
https://www.mei.edu/publications/re...-strategic-shift-toward-qatar-turkey-and-iran
More generally
Blurb
In this insightful episode of the Blood Brothers Podcast, Dilly Hussain hosts journalist, political pundit and activist Sami Hamdi. #bloodbrotherspodcast #ikhwan #islamism
Topics of discussion include:
- What is ‘political Islam’ and should Muslims use the term “Islamist”?
- Has Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) become synonymous with the Muslim Brotherhood/Ikhwan?
- What is the future of Islamic political parties and movements in the MENA, namely the MB?
- Pitfalls of unrestricted political pragmatism - compromises and being fair/consistent in criticising/praising Islamist movements and figures.
- The plausibility of any meaningful Muslim unification emerging in the existing world order.
Another update
Realigning priorities: Egypt's strategic shift toward Qatar, Turkey, and Iran
During President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi's first term in office (2014-18), Egypt had strained relations with Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. However, this began to change during his second term, as Cairo made an incremental shift toward Ankara, Doha, and later Tehran. This shift coincided with changes in global and regional dynamics, stalemates in many of the Middle East’s conflict zones, and a detente between regional powers. While some analysts attribute Egypt's realignment to a change in the foreign policies of its influential allies, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, toward engaging with the three countries, it can be argued that Egypt's shift is primarily motivated by its domestic dynamics and its unfulfilled foreign policy objectives between 2014 and 2018. Egypt's realignment, in that sense, seeks to achieve multiple unmet domestic and regional aims.
Mitigating the financial crisis
The most pressing of these goals is mitigating Egypt’s financial crisis. For years, the country has faced a financial crisis aggravated by inflation, substantial foreign debt, and a foreign currency shortage. Domestically, this has led to soaring prices for goods and services, putting the Egyptian government under pressure from social discontent. The International Monetary Fund and Egypt's traditional allies, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which previously provided tens of billions of dollars in assistance, appear unwilling to provide additional funding this time around unless Egypt adopts structural reforms. But further accelerating fiscal reforms could spark a backlash and fuel unrest, a concern that Egypt perceives as a matter of national security. This dilemma has prompted Cairo to seek other sources of foreign currency by approaching other donors, attracting foreign investors, trying to get involved in post-conflict reconstruction in the region, supporting the tourism sector, and, more importantly, turning the country into a liquefied natural gas (LNG) hub for Europe.
Following the restoration of diplomatic ties with Cairo, Doha deposited $3 billion into Egypt’s central bank last year. In addition, Turkey and Qatar pledged $5.5 billion in investments. With their leverage in Libya, both countries could potentially enable Egypt to access postwar reconstruction opportunities there. Similarly, Iran's influence could grant Egypt access to the reconstruction market in Syria. The combined cost of rebuilding Libya and Syria is expected to exceed $350 billion, which could create profitable opportunities for Egyptian companies once funding for such efforts is available. In parallel, restoring ties with Iran could provide a lifeline for Egyptian tourism, a vital source of income for the country, accounting for around 10-15% of the economy, and one that has fluctuated since 2011. Egypt hopes to double tourist numbers to 30 million annually by 2028, in part by drawing a growing share of Iran’s outbound tourists, estimated at 6 million in 2018. For Iranian tourists, Middle Eastern countries are among the most popular destinations. In a change announced earlier this year, Egypt will allow Iranians to obtain visas on arrival in the south of the Sinai Peninsula to extend access to other parts of the country.
Becoming a regional LNG hub
Egypt's ambition to become a natural gas hub in the Mediterranean is another goal with a political dimension for its regional realignment. In mid-2022, Egypt signed a memorandum with the EU and Israel to boost its LNG exports, capitalizing on its existing infrastructure, and, more importantly, benefitting from Western needs and the global gas shortage driven by the conflict in Ukraine. Egypt, which shipped 80% of its LNG to Europe in 2022, aims to boost its exports by roughly 40% from 2025, in part by using its infrastructure to carry Israeli gas, with a primary focus on the European market. However, Egypt still needed the cooperation of Turkey, which has contested its ambitious gas exploration efforts in the Mediterranean. De-escalation with Turkey could result in a settlement over the two countries’ respective maritime economic zones and boost Egypt’s exploration in the area. That would not only increase Egypt's political significance for Europe but could also generate substantial profits. Following the Cairo-Ankara rapprochement, a deal between Libya and Turkey that allowed Turkish companies to explore in waters that are disputed with Egypt was suspended.
But Egypt's ambition to become a regional LNG hub also needs bigger investors. This is where Qatar comes in. By the end of 2021, Doha was one of the most active sovereign investors globally through the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), estimated to have $300 billion in assets. Egypt has proposed economic incentives to Qatari investors through tax exemptions and offers to operate ports along the coast. The energy sector is of particular interest for the Qataris, whose eyes are also on manufacturing, telecommunications, construction, and tourism. In March 2022, Qatar Energy signed an agreement with Egypt ExxonMobil to acquire a 40% interest in a gas exploration block off the coast in the Mediterranean. But if that is about economics, what about politics?
Breaking the pincer
Politically, Egypt's realignment could bring stability to its western border with Libya, a country where the post-Gadhafi security vacuum has previously allowed jihadists to infiltrate Egypt and conduct operations targeting the army. Over the years, Egypt, on the one hand, and Qatar and Turkey, on the other, have supported different political factions in Libya. Although the escalation between Egypt and Turkey in 2020 got close to a military confrontation, a stalemate has since prevailed. Cairo’s support for Gen. Khalifa Hifter in eastern Libya failed to achieve a decisive victory, leaving Egypt in need of building bridges with the Tripoli government in the west and trying diplomacy instead of proxy war.
But for Egypt the advantage of repairing relations with Turkey extends to the Horn of Africa as well, a region where Iran, too, has influence. The Horn of Africa is a strategic region for Egypt as it overlooks the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and it comprises the upstream of the Nile River, which provides vital water resources for Egypt’s agriculture, drinking water, and energy production. For years, the Turkish presence in the Horn of Africa, including Ankara’s construction of a military base in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, and efforts to establish a footprint on the Red Sea through Sudan, has alarmed Egypt. Today, rapprochement could help Egypt to break the Turkish pincer from the west and the south. And that could allow Egypt to focus on potential threats coming from the Egypt-Sudan border while also pursuing a deal over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a massive hydroelectric project that Ethiopia considers critical to its economic development.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Since 2014, Egypt has sought to reach an agreement with Ethiopia over the GERD that ensures minimal harm to Cairo’s share of the Nile River. Although Egypt has affirmed that “all options are on the table,” conventional military action seems less feasible than before, meaning its options are probably limited to diplomacy. But Egypt's traditional partners, such as the UAE, the U.S., and Russia, have not showed enough muscle to pressure Ethiopia to reach a deal. Thus, the potential assistance of influential actors in the Horn of Africa, including Turkey and Iran, could help. Both countries have strong ties with the Ethiopian government. Turkey, the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, signed a military cooperation agreement with Addis Ababa in 2021 amid an escalation with Cairo. The use of Turkish and Iranian drones in Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s war in Tigray suggested potential Turkish and Iranian military support. Moreover, Turkey offered to mediate negotiations between Ethiopia and Sudan over the GERD a few years ago. Today, by approaching Iran and Turkey, Egypt could benefit from their leverage over Ethiopia to help reach a fair deal for both sides.
Leveraging relationships with US adversaries
Another goal of Egypt's realignment is to enhance its strategic significance for the West. While Egypt's aspirations to become an LNG hub could bolster its importance for Europe, Cairo also recognizes the need to strengthen its relevance for the United States. Over the past decade, the bilateral relationship between Egypt and the U.S. has experienced fluctuations and some tensions, particularly concerning human rights. Previously, Egypt's significance for the U.S. predominantly relied on its contributions to counterterrorism, regional co-mediation, and its peace agreement with Israel. However, the Middle East geopolitical landscape is evolving and emerging regional powers are now taking on some of Egypt's previous roles. One significant development in this regard is the Abraham Accords, which facilitated an unprecedented level of engagement between Arab monarchies and Israel, surpassing the Egypt-Israel peace that remained cold for decades. Nowadays, other countries, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, have taken on responsibility for mediating regional conflicts as well. To maintain its relevance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Egypt recognizes it needs to control escalation from Gaza and to continue to work toward fostering reconciliation among the Palestinian factions. To this end, Egypt needs Turkey and Qatar's leverage over the Islamic movement in Gaza. It also needs Iran, whose support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad significantly contributed to the expansion of the range of their missiles in a short period of time to 250 kilometers, reaching Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv.
Moreover, as some Arab countries currently leverage their relationships with U.S. adversaries (Russia and China), a calculated rapprochement with Iran could give Egypt some leverage in its relationship with the U.S. That aligns with Egypt's calculated approach toward Russia after 2014 to pressure the U.S. Today, approaching Iran would contribute to Egypt's interest in diversifying its global allies and partners, becoming part of the BRICS grouping of leading emerging economies, and minimizing global reliance on the U.S. dollar. All of this could give Egypt additional bargaining chips in its relationship with the U.S., which is still crucial for furthering Cairo’s interests.
Minimizing the Muslim Brotherhood effect
Another goal for the Egyptian government is to continue dismantling the Muslim Brotherhood in diasporas, as its propaganda machine could take advantage of the regime's domestic vulnerability over the economic crisis. Since 2013, many leaders of the Brotherhood, designated as a terrorist group in Egypt, fled to Tukey and Qatar and established media platforms and satellite television channels targeting the regime. Although the government successfully went after the group's organizational, financial, and mobilizational capacities in Egypt, the Brotherhood still has influence on social media. As a condition for normalizing ties, Egypt demanded that Turkey and Qatar end their support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Approaching Turkey and Qatar has allowed Egypt to disrupt the presence of the group’s leaders and key figures in both countries, while pressuring others to move elsewhere and lowering the tone of their critics.
Ultimately, Egypt's regional realignment can be seen as a response to internal and regional dynamics. Nevertheless, Cairo continues to face multiple challenges. Although funding from external sources may contribute to mitigating Egypt's economic crisis, it cannot substitute for necessary domestic reforms. Furthermore, Egypt's success in achieving its regional goals will depend on several factors. These include the durability of the newly formed ties in a dynamic region and what Egypt can offer to the three countries in return. Additionally, it will also hinge on whether the expected benefits outweigh profound conflicts of interest, as well as the feasibility of maintaining relationships based on cooperation and competition. The response of other influential Egyptian partners, such as Israel and the U.S., to its approach to Iran poses another challenge as well. Finally, the potential of Egyptian diplomacy to navigate regional complexities and balance partners with conflicting agendas will play a significant role in determining whether Cairo’s regional realignment proves successful.
https://www.mei.edu/publications/re...-strategic-shift-toward-qatar-turkey-and-iran
More generally
Blurb
In this insightful episode of the Blood Brothers Podcast, Dilly Hussain hosts journalist, political pundit and activist Sami Hamdi. #bloodbrotherspodcast #ikhwan #islamism
Topics of discussion include:
- What is ‘political Islam’ and should Muslims use the term “Islamist”?
- Has Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) become synonymous with the Muslim Brotherhood/Ikhwan?
- What is the future of Islamic political parties and movements in the MENA, namely the MB?
- Pitfalls of unrestricted political pragmatism - compromises and being fair/consistent in criticising/praising Islamist movements and figures.
- The plausibility of any meaningful Muslim unification emerging in the existing world order.
Salaam
Another update
More comment.
More perspectives
Another update
More comment.
Today marks the 10th anniversary of the horrific Raba'a Massacre in Cairo, Egypt.
Here is a thread detailing the bloody events of that day.
On August 14, 2013, Egyptian security forces, under the command of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, violently attacked peaceful civilian protestors who were expressing their opposition to the military coup that ousted the democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi.
The violence unleashed on that day was shocking & devastating. The Egyptian police & armed forces used armoured vehicles, bulldozers, snipers, & live ammunition.
These were deployed indiscriminately, deliberately & lethally against unarmed civilian protestors, which included women, children & medical personnel. Witnesses recounted horrifying scenes of protestors being shot in the head, neck & chest.
According to reports from Human Rights Watch, between 800-1000 civilians lost their lives in the massacre, making it one of the largest single-day killings of demonstrators in recent history, larger than the Tiannamen and Andijan Massacres.
The true figure of the number of dead, however, is unknown & thought to be much higher than current figures.
Beyond the lives lost, the survivors faced further atrocities. Over 800 protestors were detained, imprisoned & subjected to torture by security forces.
Field hospitals & mosques that served as a refuge to the besieged protestors were deliberately targeted & set on fire. Bodies of slain protestors were prevented from being retrieved by medical services.
Sadly, yet unsurprisingly, the international response to the Raba'a Massacre has been one of silence. Despite the scale of the killings, no investigation was launched.
Some countries, including the US, EU & UK even lent support to el-Sisi's regime, revealing Western collusion that has legitimised the massacre & severely weakened any attempts of accountability & justice.
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/7/10/exclusive-us-bankrolled-anti-morsi-activists
The lack of accountability & continued support by the international community has allowed el-Sisi to maintain a ruthless grip on power in Egypt. The freedoms of speech, assembly & opposition have been brutally suppressed. The victims & their families deserve justice.
On this solemn anniversary, let us remember the lives lost in the Raba'a Massacre & stand together in solidarity with the people of Egypt who continue to seek justice & accountability for the crimes committed against them.
The legacy of Raba'a lives on in the persecution of Egyptian activists who survived the massacre around the globe.
The continue to live in exile and in fear of extradition to be tortured or worse killed in el-Sisi's dungeons.
More perspectives
Today marks 10 years since the Rabaa massacre, the worst massacre in Egypt’s modern history.
I find it really difficult to talk about because of the atrocities committed by the Sisi regime that day, but something happened recently that made me want to remember it
2 weeks ago, I attended the film screening of ‘Memories of a Massacre’, a documentary that recounts in detail the Rabaa massacre, as well as days of the 2011 revolution and the political events that culminated in one of the worst acts of violence in Egypt’s history.
In all honesty, I didn’t want to attend this screening. For years I’ve distanced myself from anything to do with Egypt, not out of indifference, but out of self-preservation.
The documentary included harrowing testimonies from survivors of the massacre as well as graphic footage from Rabaa square on the day of the massacre itself, footage that I’ve tried to avoid because of the awful memories it would bring back.
I’ve spoken on here before about the many family and friends I lost that day, either to the bullets of the Egyptian army and police or those rotting away in Sisi’s prisons or those still struggling to cope mentally, and many that have had to flee the country to avoid persecution.
I heard people around me sobbing and I found myself struggling to breathe at numerous points during the film because of how distressing the footage was.
Several people I spoke to admitted they had to leave halfway through because they couldn’t handle the painful flashbacks.
The screening was followed by a panel discussion and a Q&A session. @ganobi
who was on the panel made the excellent point that there is an Egypt before Rabaa and an Egypt after Rabaa and that there will be no future for Egypt unless we address as a nation what happened that day.
As if to illustrate this point perfectly, a man stood up during the Q&A session and interrupted the event. He praised Sisi and compared the Rabaa sit-in protesters to Israelis occupying Palestine. He called the audience terrorists and tried to derail the whole event.
This man had seen the same harrowing scenes we all had. The inconsolable mother whose daughter was killed during the massacre. The doctor forced to abandon patients at gunpoint because the army threatened to kill him. The woman whose brother is still missing since the massacre.
Yet he was completely unmoved, callous even. I found myself asking how as a nation we could ever reconcile with people like him who after ten years, can look survivors of a massacre in the eye and tell them that he supports what happened to them, that they deserved worse?
His attitude underlined a deeper problem that Egypt faces today: a nation at war with its own history and collective memory.
The mere screening of this documentary in London, miles away from Egypt, was perceived as a threat by Sisi’s regime.
In anticipation, the regime's propaganda machine went into overdrive. Pro-Sisi media outlets dedicated whole segments to the documentary, criticising it before it even screened and vilifying anyone involved in the filming and dissemination of the documentary.
Pro-Sisi groups affiliated with the Egyptian embassy in London released a statement denouncing the documentary, and protested outside the venue where the documentary was being screened, recording & shouting at attendees as they left the screening in an attempt to intimidate them.
It was incredible to witness how fragile Sisi’s regime is in the face of the very simple act of remembrance. By all counts, the Sisi regime is fully in control of all arms of the state. Egypt is an authoritarian, dictatorship and there is no external pressure on Egypt to reform.
Yet the Sisi regime was desperate to shut down this screening, trying and failing to export its tactics of fear to wipe the memory of that day from people’s minds and to make Egyptians regret standing up for democracy and demanding their rights.
A part of me still hopes that in our collective act of recalling and testifying, we might lay the groundwork for the eventual downfall of this regime. But another part of me sees no way out, and every anniversary of the massacre feels more hopeless than the one before it.
10 years on from the Rabaa massacre, I feel nothing but despair. I’m sat in London, banned from entering Egypt and unable to even properly mourn the events of that day without the state’s authoritarian shadow looming over our memories.
The only people that have truly been able to escape the Rabaa massacre were the people killed that day. Everyone else is still stuck there. But our experiences and memories of that day couldn’t be more different.
The Sisi regime has successfully turned the act of remembering itself into a battleground. Seeing that man’s heartless reaction to the documentary reminded me that we still have a very long way to go as a nation before we come to terms with what happened that day.
I want Rabaa to be their nightmare, not ours. Every voice silenced, every moment of agony – they should be the ones weighed down by it, not us.
Until then, we hold onto those memories and we try to remember that remembering is resisting.
Rabaa, we haven’t forgotten you.
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