Oh Syria the victory is coming

Salaam

Another update

Syria opposition turns to political path

Several rounds of UN-sponsored talks in Switzerland have failed

Riyadh: The Syrian opposition’s chief negotiator, Nasr Al Hariri, called for a renewal of UN-brokered peace talks while acknowledging “significant military losses” by rebel forces, in an interview with AFP.

The rebels have “not lost the war” ravaging his country since 2011, the head of the Syrian Negotiation Commission insisted Thursday, playing down the likelihood of an all-out regime assault on the last major rebel bastion of Idlib in northwestern Syria.

Al Hariri took aim at the international community for having allowed regime ally Russia to determine the course of the war since its 2015 military intervention.

“By international consensus, military and non-military support for the opposition has been stopped, as well as political support to a great extent,” he said in the Saudi capital Riyadh.

Moscow, meanwhile, has been allowed “to intervene as it wants”.

“Militarily, the opposition has lost considerable ground. All we have left is the political process, on the basis of the Geneva declaration and (UN) Resolution 2254,” he said, referring to calls for the formation of a transitional government and free elections.

Several rounds of UN-sponsored talks in Switzerland have failed over the opposition’s demand for the ouster of President Bashar Al Assad, a condition which his regime has ruled out. The government has since Russia’s military intervention in September 2015 notched up a string of battlefield victories and now controls more than 60 percent of Syrian territory.

Al Hariri said Turkish “guarantees” over Idlib would likely bar a regime assault on the northwest province.

“It will be difficult for the regime, Iran and Russia to launch any operation unless Turkish troops withdraw,” said the opposition negotiator, a trained cardiologist.

But on the same day, Al Assad told Russian media his regime’s next priority would be retaking Idlib province, currently dominated by rebels.

“Now Idlib is our goal, but not just Idlib,” Assad said, in comments carried Thursday on Russian newswires.

“The military - and it is at their discretion - will decide priorities and Idlib is one of these priorities,” he said.

Al Hariri voiced bitterness at Western and Arab supporters of the opposition that in 2012 formed a Friends of Syria group which has faded since Russia’s intervention.

“May it rest in peace,” he said, while also lambasting international efforts.

“Unfortunately, today Syrian blood has become a commodity on international markets and bazaars,” Al Hariri said.

He pointed to a reluctant acceptance that Moscow would play a key role in any settlement.

“We are not counting on the regime... Our wager is on the state (Russia) that is supporting the regime, even if it continues to battle alongside it and to commit crimes with it.”

The war in Syria has killed more than 400,000 people since it began in 2011 with a brutal regime crackdown on protesters.

https://gulfnews.com/news/mena/syria/syria-opposition-turns-to-political-path-1.2257894

Salaam

Another update, rebels are preparing for Assads assault.

More analysis.

Syria's Idlib emerges as Achilles heel in Russia-Turkey partnership

There are indications that the Syrian army will launch an operation against rebel forces in Idlib in September, after completing operations in the south of the country in Daraa and Quneitra. The possibility of such an operation against Idlib, where more than 100,000 militants have amassed following rebel evacuations from all over Syria, has made Turkey nervous. On July 14, in a phone call with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned that such an operation will be the end of the Astana process that Iran and Russia initiated with Turkey.

On his way to the BRICS summit in South Africa, Erdogan repeated that he will raise the issue with Putin during their meeting there.

“Current developments in Syria regarding both Tel Rifaat and Manbij are not progressing in the desired direction as of now," Erdogan said. "The only areas where the events are going as desired are Afrin, Jarablus and al-Bab. All these [areas] are fully under our control in the terrain of 4,000 square kilometers [1,545 square miles] we control. We have also held some talks and reached some agreements regarding Manbij and Tel Rifaat. We will certainly discuss all these thoroughly during our one-on-one meeting. One of the challenging issues here is the Daraa issue, and there is also the Idlib issue. Anything can happen in those places.”

While conveying his concerns to Putin in Johannesburg, Erdogan had many cards in his hand to play: the future of the Astana process; Turkey’s efforts to incorporate the Syrian opposition into the political process; the cooperation of the Turkish government in delivering stability to liberated areas of eastern Aleppo and the eastern Ghouta region; providing assistance in evacuating armed groups; and the presence of Turkish troops at 12 observation posts established in Idlib.

Erdogan also expressed his concerns about possible civilian casualties and a new wave of immigrants, as the population of Idlib has already surpassed 2 million due to the influx of internally displaced persons.

However, developments on the ground make such scenarios avoidable. Ankara was not expecting the Daraa and Quneitra fronts to collapse so quickly after the United States and Israel changed their course. Turkey was hoping to at least add Tel Rifaat and Manbij to its holdings to boost its bargaining power before Idlib moved out of its reach.

In addition to Turkey’s reactions, other factors changed the situation in Idlib. Above all, with the continuous collapse of opposition fronts, not many forces were prepared to stall the Syrian army, which now feels encouraged to recover Jarablus, Azaz, al-Bab and Afrin — territories that are under Turkish control — as well as areas near the Euphrates front line that have been under the control of the predominately Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. On July 26, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said that the military priority is Idlib.

“No matter what Russia has promised to Turkey, the Idlib operation will be carried out," Syrian media reported, citing sources close to Damascus. "Russia and Syria have agreed on opening safe corridors for the civilians in Idlib to relocate to government-controlled areas."

Reports from Hama and Latakia suggest that military preparations are already underway.

Jihadi groups had besieged the Shiite settlements of Fuah and Kefraya in the Idlib region, but those settlements were evacuated July 17 as a result of a prisoner swap between the government and opposition groups besieging the area. Thus the armed groups lost their deterrent power in the face of an Idlib operation.

Following the evacuations, Russia’s need for Turkey’s help diminished considerably compared with previous years, meaning that Putin has fewer reasons to ease Erdogan’s concerns.

One also has to bear in mind that Turkey’s moves around Manbij, such as making deals with the Americans, strengthened the impression that Turkey was playing both sides whenever possible, and that should Ankara obtain more concessions from the United States regarding the Kurds, then Turkey might revert to its original pro-West axis.

Turkey’s tendency to return to factory settings and to its efforts to strengthen ties with NATO allies, such as during the July 11 NATO summit in Brussels, was also noted by Moscow.

Moreover, the Russians are increasingly determined to take a firm position against opposition groups after attacks by homemade unmanned aerial vehicles have increased against the Russian air base at Khmeimim near Latakia.

Another important factor is that all the anti-Russia Northern Caucasus fighters have assembled in Idlib. Russia was hoping from the outset to settle its accounts with these homegrown enemies away from home territory.

Despite all these developments, it is still too early for Russia and Turkey to dismantle the Astana process. While the bilateral relations that had deteriorated due to the Syria crisis are normalizing, the economic ties between the two countries have just started to gain the upper hand. Despite their discord over Idlib, both Putin and Erdogan are aware they need each other. Everyone is now wondering how these two leaders will tackle what has become the Achilles heel of Russia-Turkey relations. Everyone is aware that Idlib cannot be left in the hands of al-Qaeda-minded organizations. It is clear there will be an operation, but how?

Tough battles are unavoidable in Idlib, and the Daraa model of opposition — handing over heavy weapons and agreeing to a regime of non-hostility — will not work. Turkey is alarmed by the possible consequences of an operation against a region that it had promised to defend. Turkey expects a new wave of immigration as well as an influx of armed groups along the Turkish border, possibly even penetrating Turkish territory.

What are Turkey’s options for the impending operation? The first question is whether those 12 Turkish army observation posts will actually be a deterrent against the operation. It won’t be possible for Turkey to indefinitely postpone an operation with its limited presence in Idlib.

The option, then, is to implement the Afrin scenario in Idlib. It should, however, be remembered that the militant groups gathering in Idlib are fervently motivated by Islamic ideology and refuse to participate in the reconciliation process advocated by the Russians. These groups also firmly reject any dialogue with the regime and consider the Astana and Geneva processes as treason. These factors will make for a tough mission full of risk factors for Turkey in Idlib.

Another scenario is for Turkey to end its partnership with Russia and to turn to the United States. Yet looking at the performance of the Donald Trump administration, this doesn’t sound promising. Washington wants Ankara on its side unconditionally in an economic and political embargo against Iran, and would therefore not be too concerned about Ankara's worries. Moreover, as long as the Pentagon’s support for Kurds continues, a consistent and comprehensive American-Turkish partnership is not likely to take hold in Syria. Ankara’s most critical hope is for the United States to sever its ties with Kurds.

Ankara has another serious worry: If the Kurds distance themselves from the Americans and develop a dialogue with Damascus, their de facto autonomy in Rojava could gain legal recognition. This is not all that far-fetched, given the reported dialogue efforts between the Kurds and Damascus. The most recent was on July 26, when the Kurds sent a delegation to Damascus headed by Ilham Ahmed, the president of Syrian Democratic Council, and Ibrahim Kaftan, the president of the Future Syria Party.

Prior to that meaningful visit to Damascus, Aldar Khalil, the chairman of the influential Movement for a Democratic Society, indicated that Kurds could join the Idlib operation. “Turkey must leave Syrian territory," he said. "If we are asked to play a role at Idlib that would contribute to the liberation of Afrin, we are ready.”

In other words, an alternative to the cooling of the Turkish-Russia partnership could mean a new equation of an Idlib shared by the Kurds.

In sum, Turkey’s claim of sponsorship of armed groups in Idlib is forcing Ankara to choose between bad and worse options. Turkey's sponsorship aspirations in Idlib are also proving difficult to achieve due to the clandestine efforts of the Islamic State to find openings for its affiliates in Idlib; the growing strength of al-Qaeda-associated groups; and escalating clashes between all these factions. The following al-Qaeda-linked groups are striving to increase their influence in Idlib and make the area ungovernable: Huras al-Din (Guardians of Religion Organization), which was set up Feb. 27 with a pact among Jaish al-Malahim, Jaish al-Badiya, Jaish al-Sahil, Saraya al-Sahil and Jund al-Aqsa. Although certain groups insist on Turkey acting as a guarantor at Idlib, Ankara may one day opt to give up Idlib. But that doesn’t sound feasible.

The current rulers of Idlib are among the most irreconcilable and fanatic factions of the war, making the likelihood of an operation a strong possibility.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/turkey-russia-syria-astana-on-verge-of-collapse-due-to-idlib.html#ixzz5MrePm2A9

Salaam

Another update

Turkey to clear Idlib of militants to prevent Syrian government assault

Talks between Russia, Turkey and Iran have focused on Idlib, as Syrian President Assad warns the northwestern province is next target

Turkey is working to clear al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated groups from Idlib, staving off a major offensive by Damascus against the last rebel-held stronghold in Syria.

According to a Turkish diplomatic source who has been working on Syria for six years, Ankara is working with other opposition groups in Idlib to eliminate the militants. Most of Idlib is controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria.

Delegates from Turkey, Iran and Russia gathered in Sochi on Monday for two days of talks aiming to resolve the situation in northern Syria.

A Syrian opposition commander, who spoke to the Middle East Eye on condition of anonymity, said that Russia and Iran were also prioritising removing the militants from Idlib, rather than planning an all-out assault, despite threats by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to retake the territory.

The commander added that the US was happy with Russia and Turkey’s Idlib plan, since it meant the Turkish-backed opposition would be in control of the city instead of Iran and Syrian government-backed forces.

Idlib, a province of two million inhabitants, is one of the "de-escalation zones" agreed by the three countries after previous talks in the Kazakhstan capital Astana. Turkey has set up 12 monitoring posts in opposition-controlled areas, while the Iranians and Russians set up posts in the government-controlled regions.

There are around 70,000 Turkish-backed opposition fighters in Idlib and the previously Kurdish-controlled enclave of Afrin.

Russia’s Syria envoy Alexander Lavrentiev told Russian journalists after the talks and that there was no question of an operation or a major assault on Idlib.

“We hope that the opposition along with our Turkish partners will manage to stabilise this region. Because the threat coming from this zone is still significant,” he said.

As a first step, on Tuesday, Turkey used its power over the groups in Idlib to remove a checkpoint controlled by HTS.

The checkpoint was the largest controlled by HTS on the main road between Aleppo and Damascus - a crucial route for all the parties.

According to the Syrian opposition commander, Russia wants to prevent any attacks on its military airbase in the government stronghold of Latakia. To secure that, Moscow plans to clear the city of Jisr al-Shugour and the villages on the Turkmen Mountain on Turkey’s border of any militant presence.

Should the Syrian army capture the area, it would be in control of the only road into Latakia. At present, Turkey has two monitoring posts in that area.

In late June, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in an interview that Ankara warned Russia and Iran that any attacks on Idlib would end the Astana and Sochi talks. He also reminded them that all the groups who are considered "terrorists" by Russia and Iran were brought to Idlib after the latter backed attacks on Aleppo and other areas further south.

The joint statement after the talks said: “We emphasised that the Idlib de-escalation area is a main component of the Astana agreement and that its functionality must be preserved.”

US-Turkey talks

General Curtis Scaparotti, head of US European Command and NATO’s supreme allied commander, was set to visit Ankara on Wednesday to talk about Syria with his counterparts.

In June, Cavusoglu and his US counterpart Mike Pompeo agreed on a roadmap for the city of Manbij, which includes withdrawal of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from the northwest Syrian city.

The agreement proposed three months for the withdrawal, but it has yet to begin.

The Turkish army and Turkish-backed opposition forces are based north of Manbij, with the Sajur River creating a frontline between the SDF and Syrian opposition forces.

After the agreement, US and Turkish armies conducted 23 coordinated patrols, Turkey on the north and the US south of the river.

Turkey has been infuriated by US support for the SDF, which is dominated by the pro-Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) whom Ankara view as a terrorist organisation, and has threatened to push its offensive in the Afrin region further east to Manbij, risking confrontation with US troops stationed there.

Turkey sees the YPG as an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Kurdish militant group in Turkey designated as a terrorist organisation by the US. Washington views the YPG as a key ally in the fight against the Islamic State (IS) group.

Vajeh Juma, a member of the Syrian Turkmen Council who is originally from Manbij and now based in Al-Rai, told the MEE that the withdrawal should have started in June but as the YPG resisted, the US was trying to gain more time.

“Their military camps are still there in Manbij. We expect a solution from General Scaparotti’s visit,” he added.

Damascus-YPG talks

As Turkey and the Ankara-backed Turkmen groups are looking for the withdrawal of the YPG from Manbij, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), a group which was founded and is led by the YPG, has been holding talks with the government in Damascus.

The YPG controls more than a quarter of Syria, thanks to US cooperation in their fight against IS.

Ankara has not publicly reacted to these talks. When Middle East Eye asked Foreign Ministry officials, they repeated their concerns regarding the YPG’s existence on its borders.

The government-Kurdish talks started after US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Helsinki on 16 July. Moscow first proposed a decentralised Syria in January 2017, when they invited various groups from Syria to create a draft constitution. The draft suggested “cultural autonomy” for Kurdish regions.

Both Damascus and Ankara oppose a federal solution in northern Syria, which would give autonomy to YPG controlled areas.

After the talks in Sochi, Turkey insisted on “the importance of opposing the separatist agendas of groups that pose a threat to the political unity and territorial integrity of Syria and the national security of neighbouring countries” in the joint statement.

http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-happy-russia-and-turkey-s-idlib-plans-2118571356

More analysis

Salaam

More analysis.

Are we heading towards the end of the Syrian civil war?

Salaam

Al Hariri voiced bitterness at Western and Arab supporters of the opposition that in 2012 formed a Friends of Syria group which has faded since Russia’s intervention.

“May it rest in peace,” he said, while also lambasting international efforts.

“Unfortunately, today Syrian blood has become a commodity on international markets and bazaars,” Al Hariri said.

Brother should of expected this, to paraphrase states are not moral agents they are vehicles of power.

Lessons of history

Salaam

Another update

Israel and Jordan kill Islamic State fighters flushed out of Syria

Israel and Jordan said on Thursday that their forces had killed Islamic State insurgents who approached their borders after being squeezed out of southwestern Syria by the army of President Bashar al-Assad.

In a nod to his battlefield gains, Israel described victory by Assad, who is on a last push to restore his rule after more than seven years of civil war, as a fait accompli that could calm the Golan Heights.

The strategic plateau divides Israel and Syria, old foes, and saw decades of stable stand-off before the Syrian rebellion.

Meanwhile, in a major change to the pre-conflict 2011 status quo, Russian military police began deploying on the Syrian-held Golan and planned to set up eight observation posts in the area, the Defence Ministry in Moscow said.

After weeks of intensive Russian-backed bombing, Syrian forces have seized the lush farmland where the Yarmouk River flows that was once controlled by a group affiliated to Islamic State known as the Khaled Bin Walid Army.

The Israeli military said it carried out an air strike on the Golan on Wednesday night, killing seven insurgents it believed were from the Khaled Bin Walid Army and en route to attack an Israeli target.

Separately, the Jordan military said it had clashed with encroaching Khaled Bin Walid Army fighters for 24 hours between Tuesday and Wednesday, killing an unspecified number of them.

“We applied rules of engagement and members of the Daesh (Islamic State) gang were forced to retreat inside Syria,” an army source told Jordanian state news agency Petra.

CHANGE OF TONE

Assad’s sweep of southwest Syria drove hundreds of thousands of refugees toward Israel and Jordan, alarming both.

As tensions peaked last week, Israel shot down a Syrian warplane that it said had strayed into the Israeli-occupied Golan and warned Assad’s Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah reinforcements against trying to deploy on the Syrian-held side.

But Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman sounded more upbeat on Thursday as he described an Assad win as a given.

“From our perspective, the situation is returning to how it was before the civil war, meaning there is a real address, someone responsible, and central rule,” Lieberman told reporters during a tour of air defense units in northern Israel.

Asked whether Israel should be less wary of possible flare-ups on the Golan - much of which it seized from Syria in a 1967 war and annexed in a move not recognized abroad - Lieberman said: “I believe so. I think this is also in Assad’s interest.”

There was no immediate Syrian government response to the border clashes reported by Jordan and Syria on Thursday.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a Britain-based war monitoring group, confirmed fighting between Assad’s forces and Islamic State on the Syrian-held Golan, which also abuts Jordan.

In Moscow, the Russian Defence Ministry said its deployment of military police on the Syrian-held Golan was aimed at supporting a decades-old U.N. peacekeeper presence.

It said the new Russian posts would be handed over to the Syrian government once the situation had stabilized.

Lieberman said that, for there to be long-term quiet between Israel and Syria, Assad must abide by a 1974 U.N.-monitored armistice that set up demilitarized zones on the Golan.

Lieberman reiterated Israel’s demand that Iran not set up military bases against it in Syria, nor that Syria be used to smuggle arms to Hezbollah guerrillas in neighboring Lebanon.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-politics-druze/israels-loyal-druze-arabs-push-for-changes-after-jewish-state-law-idUSKBN1KN2OG

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Seems the Zionists will settle for Assad in a weakened state.

Syria’s Assad Has Become Israel’s Ally

Israel wants Assad to remain in power. Both Israel and the Syrian president now depend on Russia, and when Israel threatens Syria over Iran, it should know it's threatening Putin, too

Early in 2012, the year after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the Foreign Ministry drafted recommendations on Israel’s position regarding Syrian President Bashar Assad.

As Haaretz reported at the time, the ministry said Israel should denounce the slaughter in Syria and call for Assad’s ouster. It argued that Israel shouldn’t be the only Western country not to condemn Assad, since that would feed conspiracy theories that Israel preferred the mass murderer to remain in power.

The Israeli foreign minister at the time, Avigdor Lieberman, accepted this recommendation, but Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opposed it. Netanyahu denounced the slaughter and the Syrian army and charged that “various leaders have no moral qualms about killing their neighbors and their own people as well.” But he never mentioned Assad as the person responsible or demanded his ouster. Israel’s UN ambassador during that period, Ron Prosor, said Assad has “no moral right to lead his people,” but that was it.

These diplomatic acrobatics and the Lieberman-Netanyahu dispute only fed the conspiracy theories, and Syrian rebel leaders were convinced that Israel wanted Assad to remain in power. They were right.

Now that Assad has regained control of most of Syria and is waging a final battle against rebels in the south, Israel is acting as if it is now reformulating its policy and becoming “reconciled” to Assad’s continued rule. Several weeks ago, Israel reportedly told Russia it wouldn’t oppose that, as if the decision were in its hands or as if Israel even had any leverage over what kind of government is in power in Syria after the war ends.

But Israel isn’t merely “reconciled” to rule by Assad. It also feared the prospect that the various rebel militias might succeed in ousting him, sparking a new civil war among the rebels themselves.

Position papers drafted by the Israeli army and the Foreign Ministry over the past two years didn’t actually voice support for the Syrian president, but their assessments show that they viewed his continued rule as preferable or even vital for Israel’s security. Israel’s close cooperation with Russia, which gave Israeli forces a free hand to attack Hezbollah and Iranian targets in Syria, added the Israelis to the unofficial coalition of Arab states that support Assad’s continued rule.

Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi, who met with the head of Syrian intelligence in 2015, said that same year that “Egypt and Syria are in the same boat.” Egyptian delegations visited Damascus despite Syria’s ouster from the Arab League, and in a 2017 interview, Al-Sissi even said that “Egypt supports the armies of states like Iraq, Libya and Syria.”

King Abdullah of Jordan was one of the first leaders to denounce Assad and demand his ouster. But he later reversed himself, thereby angering Saudi Arabia. And following conversations between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Russian officials, even Riyadh is no longer publicly opposing Assad’s continued tenure.

Russia’s military intervention in Syria, which began in 2015, was initially viewed by Israel as ineffective and doomed to fail. But in reality, it bolstered Assad’s status domestically, created a coalition with Iran and Turkey and neutralized the intervention of Arab states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. And since the United States had withdrawn from the arena even before that, Israel ostensibly had to make do with the lesser evil.

But the Russian coalition is no love affair. Tehran and Moscow are at odds over control of the de-escalation zones. Turkey, which invaded Kurdish areas of northern Syria, threatens Russia’s desire for a united Syrian state.

Therefore if Israel’s goal is to oust Iran from Syria, Russia — rather than the United States or the Arab states — is the only power capable of limiting Iran’s operations there and perhaps even getting it to leave.

Assad is deeply dependent on Russia, even more than on Iran. And that’s convenient for Israel, because it means Syria’s foreign policy, including its future policy toward Israel, will be vetted by the Kremlin, thereby at least ensuring coordination with Israel and a reduction in the threat from Syria. In exchange, Israel has committed not to undermine Assad’s rule.

Moreover, Israel has insisted that the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement that followed the Yom Kippur War remains in effect, meaning Israel won’t accept Syrian forces in parts of the Golan Heights demilitarized under that agreement. Officially, UN observers oversee the agreement’s implementation. But in practice, it was the Assad regime that ensured that Syria upheld the agreement and that kept the border quiet for decades. Israel, which has a low opinion of UN observers, also used its military deterrence to persuade Assad that upholding the agreement served his interests.

Now Russia is effectively joining this supervisory force, and it sees eye to eye with Israel about the need to keep the border quiet. Therefore Israel ought to wish Assad sweeping success and a long life. And when Israeli ministers threaten his continued rule if he lets Iranian forces set up shop near Israel’s border, they should know they’re also threatening Russia — as well as Israel’s new strategic partner in the presidential palace in Damascus.

https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-syria-s-assad-has-become-israel-s-ally-1.6240499

Salaam

Another update, long detailed analysis.

The Urgency of Idlib: The Impending Regime Offensive and the Delicate Balance in Syria’s Northwest

As the Assad regime completes its conquest of southwestern Syria, attention is shifting to the country’s northwest and in particular to the province of Idlib, the last remaining bastion of opposition control. To many people’s great concern, the question of Idlib’s future has more recently turned to when the regime and its Iranian and Russian backers will attack, rather than whether they will do so.

An estimated 2.5 to 3.3 million people – at least 1.2 million of whom are internally displaced – are currently crammed into this largely rural region, which only constitutes 3 to 4 percent of Syria. Before 2011, Idlib was home to no more than 750,000 inhabitants. Syria’s northwest, long a hotbed of armed resistance and the heartland of al-Qaeda-linked operations, has become a real-life dumping ground for defeated opposition fighters and their families from elsewhere in the country. At least 70,000 armed men are currently in Idlib and its surrounding areas, according to one estimate, a sizable minority of whom belong to groups formerly or still linked to al-Qaeda. Should the regime unleash what would inevitably be a brutal military campaign upon Idlib, it would be civilians who would suffer immeasurably – and in larger numbers than ever before.

Having already taken in more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees since 2011, Turkey has firmly shut its border to any more people seeking to flee, so the prospect of conflict in Idlib is truly a nightmare scenario. All other events in Syria would look like drops in the ocean. And yet the United States, the European Union, and their allies in the region appear entirely disinterested.

Turkey has declared Idlib a “red line” and seems intent on enforcing it, though it remains unclear if that will be enough to stop a regime campaign. Russia, meanwhile, insists it is opposed to any escalation in hostilities in Idlib, but similarly, evidence of its capacity to truly restrain the Assad regime and Iran is limited at best.

The United States, Europe and their allies should urgently recognize the importance of sustaining the relative calm that currently prevails in northwestern Syria to avoid the array of challenges and threats that would result from a major escalation in fighting. Diplomacy is at the core of the solution. Idlib may look complicated and chaotic, but there is some order to that chaos – particularly because of Turkey’s risk-laden investment in asserting control over northwestern Syria’s various opposition actors. Russia’s dedication to continued de-escalation should be tested and reinforced. If there was ever a time to “work with the Russians,” it is now. Should hostilities be allowed to resume, the resulting havoc will be unprecedented in seven years of war and the consequences will be felt far and wide.

Syria’s De-Escalation Zones: Only Idlib Remains

A year ago, Syria contained four internationally negotiated “de-escalation zones” – areas in which actors on the ground and external states agreed not to engage in or to support hostilities in order to allow for much-needed calm and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the hundreds of thousands in need. For most countries with a stake in the situation, this scheme – designed largely by Russia – appeared to move things towards something close to stability. Or at least that is what they convinced themselves. The immediate humanitarian benefit of lessened conflict served to justify Western support for “de-escalation.” By choosing to extend their stated support, Western capitals avoided having to do more, or indeed anything, to resolve other, more deep-seated issues.

However, it quickly became clear that the Assad regime was using this de-escalation design for malign purposes. Having long suffered the consequences of thinly stretched forces fighting on multiple fronts against a well-supported opposition, de-escalation provided an opportunity for the regime to regroup and prioritize. The amount of humanitarian aid granted was virtually meaningless and over time, the pro-regime alliance methodically violated the de-escalation zones themselves, initiating scorched-earth campaigns aimed at inducing mass opposition surrenders. Between January and late July 2018, three of four zones (around Homs, in Damascus’ Eastern Ghouta, and in the southwestern provinces of Deraa and Quneitra) were militarily retaken by the regime. Meanwhile, the world stood virtually silent. Only a regime chemical attack in Eastern Ghouta brought a joint U.S.-U.K.-French punitive air response, but even that amounted to little more than a slap on the wrist.

Now only the northwestern de-escalation zone remains in opposition hands, and the international community once again looks unlikely to stand in the way of the Assad regime. Already, new deployments of pro-regime troops have arrived to Idlib’s west (in the Latakia villages of Kinsaba and Ain al-Qantara); east (in and around Abu Dhuhour); and south (in Hama’s northern countryside). As a leading commander in Ahrar al-Sham based inside Idlib told me:

We have recently witnessed significant movements by the regime and Iranian militias… our forces on the fronts say the enemy has doubled its forces opposite Idlib over the past two weeks, in both Aleppo and Latakia, and many heavy weapons and artillery have also been sighted.

Despite the insistence by Russia’s special envoy to Syria that “any large-scale operation in Idlib is out of the question,” Assad himself and his ambassador at the United Nations have publicly signaled their determination to retake the northwest by force. In fact, Russia’s own foreign minister seemed to contradict his own special envoy on Aug. 2, when he insisted it was “necessary to deal a final blow to terrorists” in northwestern Syria.

Russia has long positioned itself as opposed to a major military offensive in Idlib. Given the mountainous terrain; the broadly dispersed and largely rural population; the scale of armed opposition numbers and marbled presence of experienced and committed jihadists; and the sheer size of the civilian and internally displaced population, any campaign to retake Idlib by force would likely require a far greater Russian military effort than anything Moscow has undertaken in Syria thus far. Moreover, the risk to Russian personnel and heavy equipment, as well as the reputational cost of the likely losses associated with any Idlib campaign make it an even less attractive prospect. Nevertheless, just as Russia’s limited ability to constrain Iran in southern Syria has been revealed for all to see in recent weeks, Moscow’s ability to deter the Assad regime and Iranian-linked militias from initiating a major conflict in Idlib is likely to be similarly insufficient.

How Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Could Benefit From the Idlib Incursion

Should the regime launch a serious campaign in the opposition-controlled northwest, it will be inserting itself into an immensely complex environment. Idlib and its immediate environs contain the entire array of anti-Assad armed groups, from the most moderate of the Free Syrian Army, to groups ideologically aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood and others who embrace more hardline Salafist (but still nationalist) beliefs, and finally to al-Qaeda. In recent months, an increasingly broad network of apparent ISIL sleeper cells has also emerged, more than four years after the jihadist group was expelled by opposition factions.

Over the past year, one armed group in particular has aggressively asserted its military preeminence in the northwest: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS. Formerly al-Qaeda’s official affiliate in Syria under the name Jabhat al-Nusra, HTS has since re-asserted its local strategic focus on Syria, at the expense of its relationship with al-Qaeda. Leaders within the global jihadist movement, including its overall leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, now openly speak of HTS as an entirely separate movement, stridently critiquing it for violating its oath of allegiance and abandoning the global cause.

Having achieved dominance in the area, thanks primarily to a series of military campaigns against more mainstream opposition rivals, HTS has sought to expand its political and governance efforts, coordinating them through a civilian-run “Salvation Government.” The group has expanded and energized initiatives to provide core services, from education and health care to electricity and water. Some formerly military units have been reorganized into local police forces and perhaps most notably, a previously subdued Political Office has been restructured and authorized to conduct outreach to foreign governments. According to two HTS leadership figures and several government officials – all speaking on the condition of anonymity – HTS now retains active political relations with at least two regional states, while multiple European governments have actively considered the prospect of establishing formalized relations with the “Salvation Government” and its political leaders, some of whom spend considerable time across the border in southern Turkey. As one Islamist figure who works closely with HTS leadership explained to me:

Although [HTS] has many problems with others, nobody can ignore their power… [HTS] have done much work to reform their image and… God willing, the people will come to acknowledge this and support our vision, for this is their best path … We also want to talk to foreign governments, so long as they are genuine in their intentions.

The situation is not quite so simple, however, because HTS is now immensely unpopular in the northwest. The way it achieved military dominance in Idlib – at the expense of more local, more mainstream opposition groups – burned bridges with the civilian population and broader opposition movement that HTS’ predecessors spent years building. Many on the ground now refer to HTS as “Hitsh” – a play on the HTS acronym that audibly, and intentionally, resembles the popular derogatory use of “Da’esh” for ISIL. In a one-on-one meeting I had in late 2017, the leader of Ahrar al-Sham, Hassan Soufan, spoke plainly about the threat posed by “Hitsh’s” extremism, which he himself compared to that of ISIL. Earlier this week, I spoke with a leading member of Ahrar’s Shura Council expressed similar frustrations:

[HTS] attacked the [other opposition] factions because we established relations with Turkey and the international community in order to achieve the best interests of the revolution and for the Syrian people. [HTS] accused the factions of using weak political speech and they [HTS] mobilized their fighters [against us] using these ideas, but it later became clear… that [HTS] is doing exactly the same thing! They are now paying the price for the contradictions between their rhetoric and actions and for their aggressions on the factions and the people.

Most northwestern communities have submitted to their new jihadist overlords, but only grudgingly. Though far from perfect, this situation is preferable to the one seemingly on the horizon, as it is only the threat of a massive regime offensive on Syria’s northwest could change the equation and place the people back into HTS’ pocket.

Turkey: The Real Power

The most important actor in northwestern Syria is in fact not HTS, but Turkey. Having long exerted a powerful influence over opposition actors in the northwest, Turkey’s role has expanded since its military intervention in northern Aleppo in August 2016. Driven primarily by a determination to block further expansion of the Kurdish YPG – the Syrian wing of Turkey’s decades-old terrorist adversary, the PKK – Turkey’s military has since established control over a 150km-wide band of territory, stretching from Afrin east to Jarablus on the western bank of the Euphrates River. As a principal guarantor of the northwestern de-escalation zone, Turkey’s military has also established 12 “observation posts” ringing in opposition territory from western Aleppo south through Idlib, into northern Hama, and back up through western Idlib’s border with Latakia. These posts began as minor lookout points, but have grown to resemble small forward-operating bases, ringed by barbed wire and increasingly by reinforced concrete walls, and housing fleets of armored vehicles and other heavy weaponry.

Until now, HTS has actively assisted Turkey in establishing its military presence in Idlib – despite considerable consternation within HTS ranks and severe criticism from al-Qaeda loyalist circles. For HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, this cooperative relationship with a foreign state’s armed forces has been a pragmatic way to protect his group’s long-term interests. But that explanation is becoming increasingly difficult to sell internally, without more evidence that the alliance with Turkey can indeed prevent a regime campaign. Strong Turkish pressure on HTS to dissolve itself and integrate into a broader, more mainstream opposition structure – possibly as an extension of the Turkish-backed “National Army” based to the east in northern Aleppo – has added to a sense within HTS that Turkey may not have the group’s best interests at heart. In fact, multiple Islamic figures close to HTS have insisted to me in recent days that HTS will eventually have no choice but to merge into an explicitly Turkish-backed armed structure. “Merge or die,” as one of them said.

Turkey, for its part, has expanded ties with HTS and affiliated bodies in northwestern Syria in order to control HTS – to bolster the group’s “pragmatic” wing and undermine the hardcore fundamentalists. In other words, Turkey has engaged HTS to control it and to divide it, with the objective being to shape a reformed HTS more willing to fall under Ankara’s control. Over the past year, Turkey has facilitated the assassination of troublesome jihadists, including members of HTS, as part of a complex shaping strategy. Until now this intrinsically risky approach appears to have worked, but it’s unclear how durable Turkey’s influence over HTS will be if and when the regime turns its guns on Idlib.

According to multiple opposition leaders I spoke with in early 2018, Turkey has also continued to engage with other opposition actors in the northwest, occasionally “turning the taps back on” in terms of military support, in response to significant incursions by pro-regime forces. “Turkey has been the most important supporter of the Syrian revolution,” one leading Free Syrian Army commander based in western Aleppo told me. “Turkey stands next to us as a partner, as we face the threats from the regime, Russia, Iran and the likes of Hezbollah. Any threat to our factions is a threat to Turkey, and [vice-versa].” The prominent Ahrar al-Sham Shura Council member told me that while he agreed that Turkey served a role as the defender of the opposition, it would be Syrians, not Turks, who would do any fighting: “”There is no doubt that the role of Turkey – as an ally of the Syrian revolution – is very central to preserving the liberated north,” he said, but “the task of defense and fighting will remain on us.”

Turkey has pressured mainstream opposition factions to unite their forces to present a more cohesive challenge to HTS’ aggressive tendencies. Such a force would be easier for Ankara to control and could more effectively deter regime attack. Consequently, in February 2018, Ahrar al-Sham and Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki merged to form the Syrian Liberation Front (SLF) and in late May, ten Free Syrian Army factions combined to create the National Liberation Front (NLF). Meanwhile, the “National Army” has continued to expand its forces alongside separate military and civilian police forces – all trained and equipped by the Turkish military.

It has been no secret that Turkey has wanted all of these forces – the National Army, the NLF, SLF and HTS – to unite. According to seven senior opposition figures involved, through July, Turkey mediated intensive talks – held in northern Idilb, northern Aleppo, and in Ankara, and including HTS – expressly seeking this objective. Eventually, the groups agreed that the SLF, Suqor al-Sham and Jaish al-Ahrar would join the NLF (announced on Aug. 1). A second agreement stipulated that in the event of a major regime offensive on Idlib, a single operations room would undertake a collective defense, combining the efforts of the NLF, SLF, HTS and notably also a number of al-Qaeda loyalist groups. Such a unity of effort would mark a major turning point, given the bitter and frequently hostile divisions among these actors. As one leading figure within the opposition Islamist community in Idlib told me: “If it comes to it, every gun will count and our differences will fade away.”

Despite agreeing to unify their forces, mainstream opposition groups in Idlib do not appear to have concentrated any effort on training and preparation for a resumption of hostilities. On the other hand, HTS has invested considerably, according to three military commanders in the group – all of whom spoke to me on the condition of anonymity. According to them, HTS has leveraged mid- and senior-level members with prior professional military experience to run intensive training camps in small unit tactics such as snatch-and-grab kidnappings, small group raids, drive-by shootings and stand-off attacks using rocked-propelled grenades and similar weapons. Specialist units, the commanders told me, have been trained in manufacturing IEDs and the list of fighters willing to be suicide bombers has grown substantially. HTS has also made use of “Syria’s first jihadi private military contractor,” known as Malhama Tactical – run by Russian-speaking former elite soldiers who provide bespoke training courses on light and heavy weaponry and other tactical instruction. Compared to Turkey’s most favored and more controllable opposition groups, HTS – which Turkey has engaged but sought to keep at an arm’s length – has done far more to prepare for the fight, suggesting that should hostilities indeed erupt, the extremists may still be the ones best equipped to fight back.

Conflict is Likely, But Can It Be Prevented?

The dynamics of northwest Syria are extraordinarily complex and the preceding discussion represents only a surface-level picture. Despite the challenges posed by hostile jihadists, Idlib’s civil society continues to thrive; the region’s huge population of internally displaced persons continues to grow while foreign aid struggles to meet their needs; and a deeply entrenched war economy remains in place, with enemies trading huge sums on a daily basis.

Although the costs of massive conflict in Idlib are clear to most, there are spoilers aplenty, including the growing network of ISIL sleeper cells, which seem determined to instill or exacerbate opposition divisions. The determination among al-Qaeda loyalists to demonstrate their rejection of the de-escalation agreement – a deal negotiated by foreign, “apostate” powers – has resulted in a number of deadly armed assaults on pro-regime positions in Latakia, which only serve to justify the regime’s desire to conquer the northwest. Some loyal to al-Qaeda may even seek to erode the relationship between HTS and Turkey , thereby re-opening the possibility of al-Qaeda re-assuming control over the thousands of fighters it lost when HTS pursued its separate path. Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, nearly 20 mysterious kamikaze drone attacks emanating from western Idlib have targeted Russia’s military headquarters in Hmeymim Airbase in Latakia. These attacks could persuade a skeptical Russia of the need to back a regime campaign to squash the opposition in Idlib.

Moscow has a major role to play in deterring its partners in Damascus and Tehran from pursuing a brutal military solution in Idlib. Unfortunately, there is no evidence from developments elsewhere in Syria that Russia can match its restrained words with actual restraint. If Russian statements on Idlib begin to focus more heavily on the presence of “terrorist” groups, singling out the role of HTS and al-Qaeda , one should assume a military campaign is in the cards. Overall, it seems the reasons for a regime offensive are adding up, not dwindling, notwithstanding the many statements coming from Moscow that suggest the contrary.

The key question is: What will Turkey do if an offensive begins to look imminent? Ankara has insisted Idlib is a red line, but exactly how red remains to be seen. Allowing Idlib to fall would set a dangerous precedent, swiftly opening the path for a pro-regime campaign to recapture other areas of northern Syria currently under Turkish control. For Turkey, that scenario places the Kurdish YPG into the center of the equation, particularly given recent comments by senior Kurdish officials suggesting that the YPG would be willing to assist a regime campaign on Idlib. Besides that threat, the broader political body responsible for the YPG’s campaign against ISIL, known as the Syrian Democratic Council, only days ago initiated a formal dialogue with the Assad regime in Damascus, raising the stakes yet further for Ankara.

As such, Turkey may be willing to take extraordinary risks to prevent the regime from initiating hostilities – something Russia probably knows well. Opposition members have suggested in private conversations that Turkey will soon be supplying them with MANPADS. These rumors are almost certainly designed with one audience in mind: Russia, which would be greatly sensitive to any heightened threat to air assets. Likewise, newly intensified negotiations for armed group mergers in the northwest and a recent marked increase in Turkish military reinforcements and structural and defensive improvements to its observation posts in Idlib all speak to a sense of real urgency. Turkey has also reportedly signaled that it will withdraw from the Astana process altogether and resume full support to the complete array of armed group proxies in northern Syria, should its Idlib “red line” come under threat.

The question about Idlib’s future is no longer about protecting the last remaining pocket of actors capable of confronting the Assad regime – this seems like a moot point given the irreversible trajectory of the conflict in the regime’s favor. Instead, the question is now about the sheer scale of the humanitarian disaster that would result from a military campaign would be extraordinarily destructive. The regime’s conquest of southern Syria in recent weeks forced more than 330,000 people from their homes – the largest displacement in seven years of conflict. A sustained military campaign in Idlib would dwarf that by a sizable margin.

Russia could try to sell a compromise to Turkey, Assad and Iran, in which peripheral areas of strategic value (northern Hama, Jisr al-Shughour and Jabal Turkman, for example) to the pro-regime alliance would come under regime attack, leaving the core of Idlib intact. Ultimately, even if Russia were to sell such a halfway bargain, it remains virtually impossible to imagine pro-regime forces stopping part of the way in.

Preventing the worst-case scenario will require a serious and immediate diplomatic investment. It may be true that the United States and its Western allies have minimal immediate interests inside Idlib, but allowing the situation there to deteriorate so markedly will guarantee the explosion of serious secondary effects that will threaten Western interests for some time. As I recently argued, the globalist terrorist threat emanating from northwestern Syria may never have been more real than it is now, though it at least remains small in scale for the time being. However, should hostilities explode, that threat will increase substantially. And that is not even to mention the unprecedented number of displaced persons, the potential for a refugee crisis, and the destruction, violence, and mass casualties – all of which will create a breeding ground for extremism for years to come.

Options for international action are limited, but diplomacy should play a central role, beginning with public acknowledgments of the importance of sustaining a state of relative calm in northwestern Syria. The pro-regime alliance speaks frequently of its determination to rid Syria of terrorism, but it’s clear that chaos and destruction feed the roots of extremism. Bringing hellfire onto Idlib and its millions of inhabitants will not deal with terrorists – it will gift them an invaluable opportunity to survive into the long term. If Russia truly opposes any escalation in hostilities in the northwest, as it claims to, the United States and its allies should hold it to that position. If there was ever a time to “back the Russians,” this is it.

The United States, the European Union, and allies in the region should collectively propose an international conference aimed at renegotiating a more durable de-escalation mechanism for Syria’s northwest. Such an arrangement should appreciate the importance of maintaining one final pocket of opposition territory in Syria, but specifically one under the iron grip of an Astana guarantor state (Turkey). In this way, the United States and other foreign governments would be actively contributing to the viability and authenticity of ongoing political efforts, whether the United Nations’ new Constitutional Committee and other subject-matter working groups, or the nascent Geneva or Vienna processes. The collective international effort should also include a continuation of humanitarian and stabilization assistance into northwestern Syria, preferably directed through the Turkey-backed, internationally recognized Syrian Interim Government, whose fledgling on-the-ground presence in the area needs help expanding.

The recommendations laid out here are not especially novel. They merely focus on reinforcing the status quo, in which an extended period of relative calm brings continued humanitarian benefit, avoids a catastrophic escalation, and provides more space for the one actor with real on-the-ground leverage – Turkey – to continue its attempts to minimize the malign influence of the most dangerous actors around. Ankara’s recent success in securing a mass merger of all non-HTS groups into an Free Syrian Army-led umbrella could prove a crucially important development in challenging extremists. It certainly raises the pressure on a group like HTS to follow suit, or risk alienating itself yet further. On the other hand, a return to all-out conflict would guarantee that the likes of HTS and al-Qaeda will win the narrative war and sustain themselves for years to come.

https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-urgency-of-idlib-the-impending-regime-offensive-and-the-delicate-balance-in-syrias-northwest/

Salaam

Another update.

Refugees have become a pawn in the struggle for Syria

Russia wants to help them return—if the West pays to rebuild Syria

FEW believed President Bashar al-Assad would survive the rebellion that swept his country seven years ago. But Syria’s blood-soaked dictator is on the brink of defeating those who tried to topple him. The only rebels left are boxed into a corner of Syria’s north-west, in Idlib province. Regime forces are mustering at its edge, having recently seized rebel-held areas near the border with Jordan and Israel, in the south. The fall of Idlib would sound the rebellion’s death knell.

Trapped between rebels and the regime in Idlib are 2.6m civilians. More than half have already fled fighting in other parts of the country. The offensive in the south pushed hundreds of thousands of Syrians out of their homes. The UN warns that an assault on Idlib could displace 2m more. Turkish border guards are likely to shoot them (as they have done in the past) if they try to cross into Turkey.



Even as this potential exodus looms, there is increasing talk of sending home the 6m Syrians who have already fled to countries such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan (see map). Russia, which props up Mr Assad, wants to help 1.7m refugees, including 200,000 from Europe, go back in the near future. It sees their return as confirmation that the war is ending, Mr Assad has won and the country is stable. As part of the plan it has asked America and European countries to pay for Syria’s reconstruction, which could cost as much as $250bn, a sum Russia and the Assad regime cannot afford.

European powers have struggled to cope with the influx of Syrian refugees, which has fuelled populism. But they insist that they will not be blackmailed. They want to use reconstruction money as a bargaining chip to force Mr Assad to make concessions and set Syria on a less tyrannical path. The dictator, though, has no interest in negotiating over a war he is winning. America has not replied publicly to Russia’s plan, but President Donald Trump seems to want little to do with Syria.

Russia has already begun reaching out to Jordan and Lebanon, which grumble about the difficulty of absorbing huge numbers of Syrian refugees. The Russian plan has gone down especially well in Lebanon, which has started to send refugees back. About 1,200 returned on July 28th, according to Syrian state television. Even Lebanese officials opposed to Mr Assad say they are willing to co-operate with Russia and the regime if it means more follow.

The UN says Syria is still too unsafe for most refugees to return. Nevertheless, it is ramping up support for those coming back. It has opened nearly 100 centres to provide handouts, such as plastic sheeting for war-damaged homes. If the trickle of returning refugees turns into a flow, the West may feel increasing pressure to help rebuild their houses, schools and hospitals.

Mr Assad says refugees, especially businessmen, are welcome to return. But he seems in no rush to take back many of them. Most are Sunnis, who were once a large majority in Syria—and the backbone of the rebellion. Mr Assad, who is Alawite (an esoteric offshoot of Shia Islam), says Syria has “won a healthier and more homogenous society”. Refugees must obtain permission from the security services to return. Thousands have applied; only a few have been allowed back.

Mr Assad is using reconstruction to punish refugees and reward loyalists. He is reluctant to take money from the West, which would have strings attached. Instead he takes from his people. A decree, called Law 10, allows the regime to grab property from Syrians unless they can prove their ownership—hard for those who have fled. Refugees can designate family members in Syria to represent them, but they must obtain a certificate of good conduct from the police. Anyone with ties to the opposition is unlikely to get one. Many Sunni homes and shops have already been given to regime loyalists.

There are plenty of other reasons why refugees are staying away. Returning men face military conscription. Some have been arrested and tortured for alleged links to the rebels. Neighbourhoods are littered with mines and unexploded bombs. Millions of homes have been flattened or damaged in the fighting.

But Mr Assad’s policies, such as Law 10, also act as a magnet. Many refugees want to claim their assets before it is too late. Others fear that if they don’t go back soon, they may be kept out for ever. And as life in refugee camps grows more miserable, some are choosing to return. Back home, though, their fate is uncertain. “My husband went back to make sure our house wasn’t sold,” says Sara al-Hussein, a refugee in Lebanon. “He’s now living in a tent in a camp for displaced people. There is no future for us, not here and not in Syria.”

https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/08/04/refugees-have-become-a-pawn-in-the-struggle-for-syria

Salaam

Another update

As Syria’s proxies converge on Idlib, what’s next for Turkey’s northern state-within-a-state?

In Syria’s rural northern Aleppo province, children raised speaking Arabic and Kurdish are set to begin studying Turkish this fall. Meanwhile, local council offices display signs in both Arabic and Turkish, and Turkey’s flag features prominently—alongside the triple-starred Syrian rebel banner—when local photographers cover official meetings.

In this corner of northern Syria, there are yet more signs of growing Turkish influence. One photo posted to Facebook last month shows construction vehicles laying asphalt in the northern Aleppo town of Bazaa with the caption: “Paving ‘Olive Branch’ Street,” ostensibly named after a Turkish-led military campaign in northern Syria earlier this year. In the background, a mural depicting a Turkish soldier watches over the freshly paved street.

Operation Olive Branch, which began in January, saw Turkish and Ankara-backed Syrian rebel brigades seize a roughly 40-kilometer stretch of borderland from majority-Kurdish forces. This year’s campaign came after Turkish and rebel forces seized adjacent, formerly Islamic State-held territory in 2016.

The result: a zone of Turkish control in rural Aleppo province stretching from the majority-Kurdish Afrin region in Syria’s far northwest, to the once Islamic State-held town of Jarablus some 130 kilometers east.

Turkey’s occupation of the region has not been without harm. London-based rights watchdog Amnesty International decried Turkish-backed rebels’ treatment of Afrin citizens in a damning report last week, while displaced Syrians complain of a lack of even the most basic services in a series of Turkish-administered camps that dot the border region. Meanwhile, residents of al-Bab and other northern Aleppo cities are still rebuilding after years of Islamic State rule.

Nevertheless, Ankara is digging deep into northern Aleppo’s nominally rebel-held towns and villages—and it doesn’t plan on leaving anytime soon, says Joshua Landis, director of the University of Oklahoma’s Center for Middle East Studies.

“Turkey is prepared to, in a sense, quasi-annex this region,” Landis tells Syria Direct’s Madeline Edwards.

But behind what some local residents refer to as “Turkification” are a slew of complex—seemingly contradictory—diplomatic ties that could collapse as Syria’s warring parties converge on yet another, imminent, military campaign: the battle for Idlib province.


Q: In recent months, we’ve seen Turkish authorities entrenching in northern Syria: school administrators are adding Turkish language school curriculums, local councils are displaying Turkish flags and Turkish propaganda is increasingly visible in public spaces. There’s even a word some residents are using to describe the phenomenon: “Turkification.” What do you see as Turkey’s long-term priorities in maintaining this presence in northern Aleppo?

I think Turkey is prepared to, in a sense, quasi-annex this region. It’s the only thing that makes sense, because if they don’t, they’re going to be re-conquered by the Assad regime and they’ll be brought back into Syria.

The long-term problem for Turkey is whether they can do this kind of thing and have it accepted by the international community. And so far, it’s working for them.

I would compare it to İskenderun, [also known as] Alexandretta, which was a separate administrative unit of Syria under the French Mandate until Turkey annexed it in 1939. There were somewhere over 40,000 or 50,000 refugees who fled the region into Syria at that time. The Sunnis stayed and became Turks. The lines between a Turk and an Arab could be fungible.

Q: But do you see that dynamic—of pro-Turkish sentiment among Syrians in the north—playing out now?

Yes, I do. I think many Sunnis believe that they’d be better off with Turkey. And that’s really demonstrated in the fact that most of the rebel militias who use Turkey as a refuge also see Turkey as, in a sense, a mothership that supplies them with diplomatic support, political support, military support, economic support, everything. And they see the Turks as champions of their Islamic identity.

In a sense, by being Turks, by being under the umbrella of Turkish rule, in some ways they are more authentically Muslim. It underlines the ambiguities, just like it did in the 1930s, between Islamic and ethnic identity, which we see in today’s civil war and in the uprising against Assad.

Q: But what does Ankara stand to benefit from potentially annexing northern Aleppo, or at least maintaining a heavy presence there?

Turkey has a number of things. First, on the most practical level, Turkey gains leverage to affect future negotiations with Assad.

Second, Turkey is very fearful that Assad will drive all the rebels and their families [who are currently present in northern Aleppo and Idlib] into Turkey, scattering them across Anatolia. And that’s tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people.

So Turkey has a great interest in not allowing Assad to drive all of these tens of thousands of rebels [out]. They don’t want refugees. They have enough, with two million-point-something.

[Ed.: As of July 2018, the UN counts more than 3,500,000 registered Syrian refugees living in Turkey.]

Assad would love to just drive all of those rebel groups that are in Idlib and in northern Syria into Turkey and say, ‘These are your people, you get to have them. You financed them, you can choke on them.’

So it’s in Turkey’s interest to make sure that this doesn’t happen.

Q: What kind of leverage does Turkey’s presence in northern Aleppo actually hold over the Syrian government?

Well, the [potential] trade that’s sitting there, and waiting to be done, is that if the Syrian government controls the Kurds, Turkey will withdraw from territory in [northern] Syria.

[Ed.: US-backed, majority-Kurdish authorities in a de facto autonomous region of northeastern Syria are pushing forward with plans to negotiate with Damascus for a “decentralized, democratic system” in areas under their control, Syria Direct reported late last month. The Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, announced in July it had entered into talks with the Syrian government for a “roadmap leading to a “democratic and decentralized Syria.”]

Well, the trade that can be made is that Turkey abandons the Syrian rebels to a certain degree and gives Syria much of Idlib province in exchange for the Syrian government retaking much of the Kurdish region, and America leaving. And that means no more arming of the Kurds, no more weapons going to the Kurds. Syrian intelligence would have to work closely with the Turkish intelligence, I presume, to make sure that the Kurds are not smuggling arms up to the PKK, and that the Turkish army gets to destroy the PKK inside of Anatolia and suppress the Kurds.

But Turkey doesn’t trust Assad. They believe that he has cooperated with the [separatist, Kurdish-nationalist group] PKK in the past. So Turkey is fearful that Syria will go back to helping the PKK divide Turkey in the same way that Turkey has helped the rebels divide Syria.

As soon as [Turkey] gives up that territory, they have no leverage whatsoever over Syria.

Q: You mentioned earlier that Ankara doesn’t want rebels in Idlib streaming into Turkey if they face a possible defeat there. Can you talk more about the stakes in Idlib from a military perspective? Do you see Ankara poised to back rebels there in an oncoming battle, to the extent that we’ve been seeing in northern Aleppo?

Turkey has 12 observation posts that it has established across Idlib, which are backed up by Turkish soldiers with heavy weapons and tanks. So, if Assad bombs them, he’s going to be bombing Turkey and this is going to be a casus belli in theory. So, Assad has to step very carefully around these observation points.

Q: You wrote earlier this year on your Syria Comment blog that the US policy of backing majority-Kurdish groups in northern Syria has “pushed Turkey into the sphere of Russian influence.” How is this dynamic playing out today with regard to preparations for a battle for Idlib? Do you see any major contradictions?

Russia is very keen on trying to make a deal between Turkey, the Kurds and Syria. They’re trying to negotiate a way to avoid war, in much the same way that they did in southern Syria, where the Syrian Arab Army was able to retake all of that region in only about a month’s time and Israel, Jordan, the United States all agreed to it [and] did not enter into the war to stop the Syrian army. And the rebels were forced to make agreements with the army or to retreat to Idlib province.

The problem is that northern Syria is much more difficult. It’s filled with all these radical Islamist groups, it’s right on Turkey’s border and Turkey is a major power—it’s not like Jordan. And Russia has a great deal invested in Turkey. Russia does not want to go to war against Turkey.

This is going to tax Russian diplomacy to the max. Nobody knows what to do about it. In a sense it’s the collecting point of all the problems in Syria.

Q: Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan warned his Russian counterpart Putin last month that a battle in Idlib would effectively “destroy” the Astana accord, which placed the province within one of four so-called “de-escalation zones.” Is that just an empty talking point, or is there real concern here of a diplomatic fallout?

Good question. The Astana accord represents an agreement between Russia, Turkey, Iran and other regional powers to use diplomacy and not to go to war. If that falls that apart, it really means the dialogue falls apart. And that means you could fall to blows.

I think both Russia and Turkey have the idea that they are not going to war. And that they both think they can finesse the situation.

So, there’s going to be a lot of pushing and pulling, and we’re not sure how it will end. Or where exactly the lines will be drawn. But I think Assad is committed to taking back the whole [province].

Q: But there’s the argument that Astana is meaningless, that none of the de-escalation zones it established in Syria did much to stop the fighting at all, except maybe in parts of southern Daraa and Quneitra provinces for a period of time.

That wasn’t their purpose. Their actual purpose was to provide the United States with a graceful way to abandon the Syrian rebels. President Obama [decided], “I’m not going to war against Russia for Syria.” That’s been American foreign policy ever since. They conceded Syria to Russia.

That meant that they had to find a way to allow Assad and Russia to destroy the rebels. But of course, the US had committed to the rebels. So it’s very embarrassing for America to have to do that. And America kept hoping that it could get leverage, that it could force Assad to step down, that they could save face by getting a negotiated solution. None of that’s turned out to be correct.

Now it’s a question of whether Turkey will go to war with Syria for these rebel groups. And, my hunch is, Turkey won’t want to.

Q: What about Turkey’s interest in refugee returns? We’ve seen Lebanon and Jordan pushing for refugees to go back to Syria. Is that something you see happening with Turkey? Or is it a different dynamic there because it’s been a political safe haven for the Syrian opposition?

I think that Turkey is going to be much better [with retaining its Syrian refugee population] than either Jordan or Lebanon. The Jordanian and Lebanese economies are really up against a wall.

But Turkey is in a different position because it’s so much wealthier. It’s a much bigger country. I suspect a lot more of the refugees will become Turks—that their children will stay in the country and become Turks.

Yes, Syrians in Turkey have been going back to northern Syria, but they’re not staying. They’ll go back for Eid, for example, but they don’t stay. In northern Syria, even in areas where Turkey is in control, there are many gangs. Despite the growing Turkish influence there, it’s still a very lawless place. So no one with a family will want to move there. There isn’t much to go to. There’s very little security, and there’s very little economic promise.

https://syriadirect.org/news/as-syria%E2%80%99s-proxies-converge-on-idlib-what%E2%80%99s-next-for-turkey%E2%80%99s-northern-state-within-a-state/

Salaam

Another update

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Latest IS atrocity.

'No one was spared': Sweida massacre leaves Syrians reeling

As the dust settles over IS attack that left 250 dead, some begin to wonder why the Damascus government allowed the disaster to happen

- It was 6 am, and like any other day Asma al-Aswad was buying groceries for her family of five in the Syrian city of Sweida.

Walking down the road where she would typically buy groceries, a man parked his car and began selling fruit and vegetables.

Enticing people with his low prices, dozens began to approach the car. Aswad was one of those people, but, as she approached, the vehicle exploded.

"The man blew himself up and turned everyone who was near him into small fragments," 28-year-old Aswad recalled.

"I fell to the ground. The floor was full of dust and blood. Whoever did this wanted to kill as many people as possible. Most people would do their shopping at this time."

Assaults with guns and explosives followed the suicide bombing in the city of Sweida, on villages to its north and east. Government forces also killed two would-be suicide bombers, according to pro-Syrian government outlets.

A fourth blast hit the provincial capital later in the day. The Islamic State group (IS) claimed the assault hours later.

Aswad survived the IS attack on Wednesday. However, about 250 people were killed in the attacks that day, which marked the worst bloodshed to hit Sweida province since the civil war began in 2011.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights activist group, at least 45 IS militants died while carrying out the attacks.

But as Syrians inside Sweida come to terms with what took place, their anger is shifting towards Syria's government, which some believe turned a blind eye, letting the massacre take place.

Sweida, a province in southern Syria, is predominantly Druze. Since the outbreak of the civil war, the majority of the city has been under government control and seen relatively little fighting.

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https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/No-one-was-spared-Residents-recount-Sweida-massacre-Islamic-State-2081845763